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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
María Belén Norona  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Department of Geography 
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Title: Peripheries of Extraction in the Amazon of Ecuador: An Analysis of Indigenous 
Territory, Livelihoods and Voices 
In the last 15 years, Ecuador has expanded its mining frontier in the 
Amazon at a pace and scale not seen before; this expansion has required the state to 
modify legal frameworks and institutions to increase territorial control in areas 
where the state’s presence was previously weak. For example, laws require a 
portion of mining profits to be invested in modernization and development of 
populated areas near extractive sites. Mining investments are used to persuade 
populations to agree to extractive activities and are utilized as a strategy to 
modernize rural/indigenous ways of life. Thus, state intervention and mining, and 
oil activity expansion affect the local ability to respond to changes taking place at a 
rapid pace while also causing a number of conflicts. 
I use case studies of communities facing encroachment of mining in the 
Amazon of Ecuador to better understand: a) the ways in which affected people 
struggle to maintain control over territories, b) the ways in which people adapt and 
respond to the negative effects of state and oil expansion and c) the ways in which 
indigenous people understand and cope with conflicts and violence produced by 
mining and oil industry. 
v 
My findings show first that indigenous and peasant communities require 
access to ‘volumetric knowledge’ in order to increase their ability to participate in 
processes of negotiation 
with the state. These processes define access to land and redistribution of oil 
extraction profits. Volumetric knowledge makes reference to understandings of oil 
volume, quality, infrastructure and environmental impacts in affected territories. 
Second, my findings show that communities affected by oil extraction respond 
ambivalently when adapting livelihood strategies to the expansion of oil extraction 
and increased state presence. Specifically, people partially reject and embrace 
state-imposed development and modernization programs. I focus on the process 
that informs families’ decision-making process, suggesting that ‘tactical 
subjectivity’ informs livelihood strategies at the household level. Third, state 
modernization and development programs reinforce colonial power dynamics in 
the Amazon; thus, ‘epistemic violence’ takes place as indigenous traditional 
knowledge that makes sense of conflicts and violence is undermined and erased by 
western logic driven by state-led modernization and development. 
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On October 16, 2013, the first of a number of uprisings of indigenous women 
took place as approximately 300 women representing seven indigenous nationalities and 
other environmental organizations arrived in Quito, the capital of Ecuador, after walking 
from areas deep in the Amazon forest. They had traveled this long distance to demand the 
government stop extractive activities in the Yasuní National Park, considered to be one of 
the most diverse areas of the region (Bass et al., 2010). Uprisings continued over the 
years, culminating in a march in 2018 in which women from 11 nationalities wrote a 
regional mandate composed of 22 points. In this mandate, they declared that their people 
would not acknowledge state agreements with oil and mining companies and further 
demanded the government enforce constitutional laws that protect their territories and 
ethnic rights (Vallejo & García, 2017). Patricia Gualinga, one of the movement’s 
spokespersons, was interviewed on October 23, 2013 and explained the reasons behind 
their struggles: 
There is no real assessment of the true cost of extractive activities, not an 
assessment that goes beyond establishing corporate costs... in addition to the 
environmental damages, our men become short-term labor, alcoholism increases, 
there is prostitution, rapes, companies bribe our leaders, there are fights within 
families and overall fractures in the fabric of communities... An overall process of 
violation of our rights and those of nature... We fight not only for indigenous 
people, but for the survival of all Ecuadorians as we depend on nature...We are 
requesting an independent assessment and monitoring of the outcomes of oil 
extraction led by an independent organization such as the United Nations... we 
want to know what is happening and what is going to happen in all territories 
where extractive activities are currently taking place. The decision to exploit 
natural resources without a full assessment of the cost is wrong in a plurinational 
state like Ecuador... 
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Indeed, these indigenous women’s concerns and struggles only depict a broader 
reality as in the last 15 years, the mining frontier in the Amazon of Ecuador has expanded 
at a pace and scale not seen before. In 2010, 21% of the region was affected by oil 
extraction; this proportion has dramatically increased over the years. By the end of 2018, 
up to 68% of the Amazon had been affected by active oil extraction, seismic prospecting, 
and/or geological surveys that precede extraction of oil and other minerals (Lopez et al., 



























Fig. 1. Oil blocks and proven oil wells in the Amazon of Ecuador. Map by R.J Theofield 
(Hydrocarbons Secretariat, 2019; Geographic Military Institute, 2012). 
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Such expansion has required substantial changes in legal and institutional frameworks to 
allow the state to increase its presence and control over mining resources and people in 
areas where the state had been relatively absent until recently (Vela-Almeida, 2017; 
Sánchez & Polga-Hecimovich, 2018). 
State-led intervention in rural and indigenous territories alongside oil and mining 
extraction has paved the way for a wave of conflicts in which rural and indigenous 
populations oppose, resist, negotiate and adapt to state intervention and the loss of land 
and livelihoods (Murcia et. al 2015; Machado, 2016). Conflicts are articulated around 
opposition and resistance to mining activities and state control over indigenous territories 
(Vallejo & García, 2017; Indigenous Women’s Mandate, 2018). Conflicts are also 
articulated along struggles to negotiate the mechanisms of national inclusion and ethnic 
recognition; such mechanisms are intrinsically tied to the oil-industrial complex among 
other mining interests that, in the case of Ecuador, are controlled and mediated by the 
state (Lu, Valdivia & Silva, 2017: Ch.2–3; Lu & Silva, 2015; Martinez-Sastre, pp. 223– 
254). Finally, local response has been organized around local understandings of the 
unequal distribution of oil-related benefits and of marginalization in which race, gender, 
and class differences play important roles (Vallejo, 2014; Vallejo & García, 2017; Cielo 
& Carrion 2018, Cepek 2018). 
State expansion into rural and peripheral extractive territories and the conflicts 
this phenomenon creates are well documented by political ecologists, feminist critical 
geographers, and resource geographers, but there is still a pressing need for study of the 
realities of how extractive activities and the materiality of oil impact indigenous 
livelihoods; these types of studies would require multidisciplinary input (Hubber, 2015; 
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Bury & Bebbington, 2013b). In addition, studies that look at how indigenous people cope 
and adapt their ways of survival, especially in frontiers of extraction, are necessary (Bury 
& Bebbington, 2013b, pp. 9–12). Such an understanding is difficult to attain because 
transformations are rapidly taking place in areas that are difficult to access 
geographically, given their remoteness. 
As Patricia Gualinga elaborates in the interview featured at the beginning of this 
paper, indigenous people need updated information to better understand how they are 
being affected and how their realities are changing. This information would allow them to 
contest current legislation and institutional frameworks. Indigenous people are especially 
in need of information that allows them to understand bureaucratic and technical aspects 
of legislation and mining operations in addition to information aimed at assessing 
environmental and socio-economic oil impacts across populations and territories 
(CONFENIAE, 2013; Shade, 2015). With the exception of critical information produced 
by local activists in collaboration with indigenous people and local scholars working at 
the frontlines of state-indigenous struggles, like the work of Carlos Mazabanda (2013) or 
Víctor López et al. (2013), indigenous people still find it difficult to access the 
information they need. 
Thus, emerging areas of scholarship in the Amazon of Ecuador are: a) the links 
between citizenship, nationalism, and oil as a tool of social inclusion (Sawyer, 2004; Li, 
et al., 2017), b) access to technical and scientific knowledge as associated with political 
and economic power (Sawyer, 2015); c) assessment of indigenous responses to mining 
based on changing subjectivities (Lu, et al., 2017; Cepek 2018; Lyall, 2017); d) an 
assessment of the rapid growth of infrastructure and local understandings of 
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modernization (Wilson & Bayon, 2017; Cielo & Carrión, 2018) and e) studies on race 
and gender dynamics along with intracommunity violence (Warnaars, 2013; Vallejo 
2014; Vallejo & García-Torres, 2017; Cielo & Carrión, 2018; Cielo et al. 2016; among 
others). 
This dissertation adds to the emerging scholarship and keeps coherence with 
indigenous requests for specialized information that could be useful to them by asking the 
following questions: 
1) How have recent legal and institutional frameworks that allow the expansion of 
the oil frontier affected traditional indigenous political participation and 
indigenous agency in the configuration of indigenous territories? 
2) How have livelihoods changed in response to state and oil expansion in the last 12 
years? What are the mechanisms that inform current survival strategies? 
3) How do local epistemologies make sense of the presence of oil extractive 
activities, conflicts, and violence? How do indigenous people, especially women, 
cope with violence? 
In addition to being useful for indigenous people, these findings fill theoretical gaps 
in political ecology literature as associated with resource geography and feminist critical 
geography, as detailed later in the literature review of this dissertation. This work is 
particularly salient when oil and mining extraction threaten approximately 245,000 
indigenous and 72,200 non-indigenous people living in affected areas (INEC, 2010; 
Mazabanda, 2013). These numbers don’t account for uncontacted tribes whose numbers 
are unknown and that occupy primary forest in the Yasuní National Park (Lu et al., 2017, 
pp. 229–263). 
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The rise of extractive activities alongside the configuration of state-corporate 
ways of governance is not particular to Ecuador, but instead is part of a regional trend; 
the findings of this dissertation also inform similar processes taking place in countries 
like Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil, where rural and indigenous communities face similar 
threats and governments have also increased their presence dramatically in the frontiers 
of extraction. 
Context: Mining Governance in Latin America 
 
In the last two decades, Latin America has seen a dramatic rise in mining, oil 
extraction, and increased investment in the energy industry, encouraged by the growth of 
Asian economies (Walter, 2016, pp. 10; Bury & Bebbington 2013a). For example, 
Chinese investment in Latin America grew from 38 billion dollars in 2005 to 109.5 
billion in 2014, while Indian investments increased to 16 billion in 2014 (Walter, 2016). 
This increase has been the product of countries’ efforts to overcome economic downfalls 
by endorsing extractive agendas encouraged by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. These institutions have encouraged countries to reform their legal 
frameworks and reorganize their institutions since the 1980s so they could attract foreign 
investment for extractive activities (Bebbington et al. 2008; Arboleda, 2015). 
Financial institutions had been pushing for legal reforms in constitutions and 
mining laws that would allow for the privatization of mining resources, land, and labor; 
similarly, these institutions have pushed for the production of geological surveys for 
mining companies interested in investing in the region (World Bank, 1996, pp. 30–39). 
Foreign investment has fueled not only extractivism, but also the growth of infrastructure 
that the energy industry needs to circulate commodities (De Melo & Panagariya, 1995; 
7  
Wilson & Bayón, 2016; Finner et al. 2015), but also investments in geological 
exploration and overall biophysical and social assessment of extractive territories where 
the state had previously been absent (Sawyer, 2008; Kelly & Pryor, 2013; Lerch, 2014). 
Legal reforms that facilitate the privatization and/or leasing of mining resources 
have been considered part of a larger neoliberal agenda in the region in the last 20 years. 
This agenda seeks to incorporate large tracts of rural land into international markets 
interested in agricultural commodities such as biofuels and palm oil among others 
demanded by growing economies (Borras et al., 2012). Rural and indigenous people, 
social movements, and conservationists have opposed such policies and have grown 
preoccupied with the economic, social, and environmental consequences of privatization 
and leasing of land and natural resources (Bebbington et al., 2008; Orta-Martinez & 
Finer, 2010). In countries like Ecuador and Bolivia, for example, the indigenous 
movement not only opposed policies that threatened land tenure in rural areas, but also 
advanced claims for increased autonomy over indigenous territories; they pushed for 
legislation that would prevent commodification of natural resources and/or measures that 
would lessen the negative effects of extraction while including local populations’ 
participation in the planning of extractive activities, if they were to take place (Hindery, 
2013, Ch.5; Becker, 2010). 
Discontent with neoliberal policies that have sought to incorporate rural land, 
natural resources, labor, and social safety nets paid by states have brought leftist 
governments that have criticized such policies into power in the 1990s and 2000s in 
several countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina. The election of 
left leaning governments gave rise to a period of time generally referred to as post- 
8  
neoliberalism because left-leaning politicians had promised to distance themselves from 
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and to end privatization that favored 
international markets (Yates & Baker, 2014). For example, Ecuador’s post-neoliberal 
regime (2007–present) rewrote its constitution in 2008. The new constitution declared 
Ecuador a pluri-national state, recognized indigenous autonomy in rural territories, 
granted rights to nature (natural resources such as forests and water sources) to protect 
them from damages produced by extractive and other capital-intensive activities, and 
mandated indigenous participation in extractive activities and the redistribution of oil 
profits among populations living in territories where extraction takes place (Ecuadorian 
Constitution 2008;Vela-Almeida, 2018). Very similar measures were taken in Bolivia, 
while Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil offered national inclusivity policies, re-regulated 
social security networks, and established more controls on foreign investment (Yates & 
Baker, 2014). 
However, despite these progressive moves, post-neoliberal governments aligned 
with the left expanded the extractive frontier and the energy sector more rapidly than 
previous neoliberal governments, revealing contradictions between leftist discourse and 
economic policy (Kröger & Lalander, 2016; Rhó, 2016). Countries like Ecuador and 
Bolivia, for instance, nationalized mining resources, increasing the state’s ability to 
mediate all mining operations by leasing land (Borras et al., 2012); states also increased 
their institutional, administrative, and political reach on mining territories (Bebbington, 
2013). On the other hand, countries like Peru and Brazil have gone back and forth about 
regulating foreign investment. Whether leaning to the left or right, all of these countries 
have sought to expand the extractive frontier and continue to pursue the original mining 
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objectives set up during the neoliberal period (Gudynas, 2009; Bebbington & 
Humphreys-Bebbington, 2011). 
In addition, Ecuador and Bolivia have justified the encroachment of the mining 
frontier along with the nationalization of mining resources by using a nationalistic 
discourse that portrays mining as needed for economic growth, social redistribution, and 
inclusion of the majority of the population in social programs (Anthias, 2018, Ch. 7; Lu, 
et al., 2017, Ch. 1). Nationalistic discourses and practices in Ecuador and Bolivia, also 
known as resource nationalism (Koch & Perreault, 2018), feed on national identity 
sentiments that emphasize resource sovereignty where all citizens would benefit from 
mining profits through modernization and the expansion of social safety nets regardless 
of ethnic and class differences. Resource nationalism has facilitated states’ efforts to gain 
support for extractive activities while marginalizing minorities and indigenous peoples 
along ethnic and gender lines (Mollet, 2016). 
Literature Review and Significance: 
 
This dissertation brings political ecology into conversation with resource 
geography and postcolonial critique by analyzing the following areas of inquiry: 1) 
political ecology and the study of underground resources as important elements that 
mediate processes of territorialization, 2) the study of local strategies to adapt traditional 
ways of live, also known as livelihoods, to the expansion of mining, and 3) the study of 
postcolonial analysis of race and gender and decoloniality to understand the nature of 
mining violence. These contributions fill gaps identified in the last decade by political 
ecologists assessing the field. Some of the gaps detailed in the next section, such as the 
need to understand the materiality of mining resources in shaping territorial conflicts, 
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coincide with the rise of the mining boom in Latin America and elsewhere, and some, 
such as the need to better understand racial and gendered violence, have been exacerbated 
by conflicts associated with mining. 
Political Ecology, Underground Resources and Territorialization 
 
In 2013, Jeffrey Bury and Anthony Bebbington edited Subterranean Struggles; in 
this book, they argue that political ecology in Latin America should expand its scope of 
inquiry to account for the role that underground resources (mining and hydrocarbons) 
have played in shaping social production and reproduction while also creating societal 
conflicts. Thus, they call for the emergence of underground political ecology (2013b, pp. 
1–8). Specifically, they ask how we can account for the ways that underground resources 
shape political economy without resorting to resource determinism (2013, p. 7). With 
some exceptions, such as Michael Watts (2001, 2004a, 2004b), Sawyer (2004), and 
Mitchell (2011) who have written extensively about the political economy of oil and how 
the overall oil complex shapes and is shaped by conflicts on the ground, there has been 
silence among political ecologists, who have ignored the role of mining and 
hydrocarbons in shaping politics, economics, and conflicts at various scales up until the 
mid-two thousands in Latin America (Bury & Bebbington, 2013b, pp. 2–3; Bebbington, 
2012) 
Coming from traditional resource geography, Appel, Mason & Watts (2015, pp. 
1–26), Huber (2015) and Squire & Dodds (2019) clarify that what is missing in scholarly 
work in general is attention to the biopolitical consequences that underground resources 
and infrastructure have in shaping the lifestyles we depend on in addition to their 
influence in configuring global networks of governance, along with domestic surveillance 
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and jurisdiction. Lack of information in these areas reinforced by the lack of 
understanding that even educated sectors of society have in relation to how much our 
surrounding world and social life is built upon these resources (Appel et al., 2015, pp. 4– 
5). In this sense, Bebbington and Bury (2013b, p. 18) and Huber (2015) believe that 
political ecologists should engage with political economy, resource geography, and other 
disciplines such as geology to understand the ways that conflicts are mediated by the 
material properties of the subsoil, properties that are usually hidden from view. 
Particularly important for this dissertation is the call for increased attention to 
extraction as a territorializing process that involves technology and access to specialized 
knowledge related to the volumetric properties of subsoil resources (Bridge, 2013), as 
well as to the role that speculation on oil and gas volume and quality has in shaping land 
enclosures and conflicts (Bebbington & Bury 2013b, pp. 9–11; Watts 2015; Appel et al., 
2015, pp. 10-20). Finally, scholars studying territory and territoriality have also turned to 
understanding underground resources as a volume along with state and corporate efforts 
to increase access, control, and surveillance over resources and infrastructure (Elden, 
2013; Squire, 2016) 
Political ecologists and resource geographers who have already pioneered the 
study of these topics have proven that linking subterranean knowledge and social 
conflicts allows us to better comprehend the ways that oil assemblages, made out of 
corporate-state interests, underground legal jurisdictions, and a variety of territorial 
enclosures, are linked to democracy, or the lack thereof (Watts, 2004a; Watts, 2015; 
Mitchell, 2011; Anthias, 2018; Squire & Dodds, 2019). Mitchell (2011), for example, 
shows that in pre-World War I Europe and the U.S, coal miners-controlled knowledge 
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was pertinent to underground tunnel digging for coal extraction and circulation; such 
knowledge enabled workers’ ability to negotiate better living conditions but also to use 
their political power to negotiate with corporate and state interests. 
Similarly, access to specialized knowledge pertinent to oil infrastructure, oil 
reserves, oil legislation, and oil toxicity shape current struggles to secure land, autonomy, 
political inclusion, and environmental reparations (Sawyer, 2004; Sawyer 2015). For 
example, Michael Watts (2004b) has demonstrated how Nigerian youth organizations 
struggled to access specialized knowledge related to oil flow stations and legal 
entitlements in order to negotiate concessions with oil companies and social inclusion 
with the government. Research related to these issues in Latin America is emerging at 
the same time that local struggles to access highly specialized knowledge are becoming 
an important point of contestation in countries like Bolivia and Ecuador, as shown by 
Anthias (2018) and Lyall (2017), respectively. 
Another area that is under-researched in the region is the link between 
hydrocarbons’ material properties, such as its quality and viscosity, with the speed at 
which development and modernization take place, turning oil extraction into a magic 
source of wealth and a synonym of urban modernization (Arboleda, 2015; Wilson & 
Bayon 2016; Kipfer, 2018). Finally, there are very few studies that link oil and gas 
material and financial speculation with domestic and regional legal frameworks, policies, 
and comprehensive plans to administrate territories (Valdivia, 2015). 
In chapter three of this dissertation, I add to this emerging interest in 
hydrocarbons by engaging with the materiality of oil and oil infrastructures, local 
struggles to control knowledge related to such materiality, and with theoretical 
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understandings of territory that account for underground resources. Chapter three links 
territorial conflicts with struggles that seek to access and secure “volumetric knowledge” 
in order to influence oil legislation aimed at controlling territories. Based on Bridge 
(2013) and Elden’s (2013) explanation of subterranean volumes and its materiality in the 
context of territory, I define volumetric knowledge in the Amazon as a means to visualize 
underground resources such as oil, anticipating its volume and quality, and even as a 
metric to predict environmental impacts. I not only argue that volumetric knowledge 
informs governance and surveillance as others already have (Mitchell, 2011), I also 
demonstrate that access to volumetric knowledge is key to indigenous struggles to 
increase their participation in defining how territories are governed in the Amazon of 
Ecuador. Volumetric knowledge guides state policy related to the extension of state 
control in oil producing territories and becomes a contested asset as indigenous people 
struggle to access and understand oil legislation. More importantly, indigenous people 
struggle to access knowledge about oil reserves, infrastructure that facilitates oil 
circulation, and environmental impact studies that define the potential damages of oil 
extraction. All this information is crucial as it informs state-indigenous conflicts over 
territories key to the extractive industry. 
Authors such as Anthias (2018), Lyall and Valdivia (2015) and Lyall (2017) have 
already documented how indigenous leaders in the Amazon of Bolivia and Ecuador have 
recently struggled to better understand the politics of the oil industry as a tactic to 
increase indigenous participation in extractive activities legitimizing indigenous control 
of territories. This chapter extends their line of inquiry by illustrating how oil politics in 
which the population agrees to cooperate with oil extraction are not enough to increase 
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indigenous agency in defining how oil extraction affects indigenous territories. In this 
chapter I demonstrate that indigenous access to and understanding of volumetric 
knowledge determines both their ability to define the ways in which their territories are 
legalized and also how they participate in decision-making processes that shape how 
redistribution of oil extractive compensations take place. 
Finally, it is important to note that, different from similar struggles led by youth- 
militia to access such knowledge from corporate power in countries like Nigeria as 
documented by Michael Watts (2004b), in Ecuador, Bolivia and other Latin American 
countries, the state mediates the ways in which indigenous people access such knowledge 
as a means to incorporate indigenous people into the nation-state. 
Political Ecology and Local Response to the Expansion of Oil Extraction 
 
Scholars interested in understanding how local communities respond to the loss of 
land and/or livelihoods produced by the encroachment of the mining frontiers and other 
capital driven stressors suggest that more research is needed to understand populations’ 
survival strategies in the short and long term (Bury & Bebbington, 2013b, p. 10; Scoones, 
2009; Crane, 2010). Indeed, in this dissertation I find that studies of local adaptive 
strategies in the context of extractive activities are limited, with some exceptions, such as 
the work of Adusa-Karikari (2015), Albert and Igbokwe (2014) and Bozigar Gray, 
Bilsborrow (2016) that look at changes in livelihoods in communities affected by oil 
extraction in Western Ghana and Nigeria and the Amazon of Ecuador respectively. 
Most studies of adaptation and livelihoods respond to climate change stressors 
(Agrawal & Perrin, 2009; McDowell & Hess 2012), the expansion of biofuels (Sulle & 
Nelson, 2009), and extraction of renewable resources (Gilberthorpe & Hilson, 2016); 
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thus, little attention is given to adaptation to hydrocarbons and mining in extractive 
frontiers. Moreover, scholars report that few studies focus on the local response to 
extractivism using a livelihood perspective (Speranza, Wiesmann & Rist, 2014). Such a 
lens is important to help us understand how communities cope with transformations 
taking place at a pace and scale not seen before in peripheral areas of extraction such as 
the Amazon, as one of the few and most recent studies on adaptation to oil shows 
(Bozigar et al., 2016). 
Thus, in chapter four of this dissertation I make a rapid assessment of livelihood 
changes using a 12-year framework in which I assess oil extraction and expansion of the 
state into primary and secondary forest in the Amazon using the Pañacocha community 
as a case study. In this chapter, I provide answer the need for a better understanding of 
how quickly livelihoods change and for the identification of the mechanisms that inform 
livelihoods strategies in peripheries of extraction. 
My findings show that in this particular case “tactical subjectivity” (Sandoval, 
2000, p. 54–59) informs decision-making processes at the household level, where local 
families partially embrace some aspects of development paid for with oil profits while 
rejecting others according to changing circumstances, material needs, local 
understandings of what counts as quality of life and even the symbolism that 
modernization and cash represents to these families. Thus, findings show that the local 
response does not always fit existing categories documented in the literature such as local 
resistance, coercion, and cooperation (Hindery, 2013; Sawyer, 2004; Anthias, 2018), and, 
instead, contradictory forms of resistance show selective use of modernization and 
development that feed local survival strategies. I argue that livelihood strategies models 
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aimed at better understanding how populations make decisions about how to respond the 
expansion of oil extraction and increased state presence should take into consideration 
ambiguous forms of resistance informed by tactical subjectivity. 
Specifically, I argue that tactical subjectivity in populations like Pañacocha 
inform family decision-making processes as related to all factors that Bebbington (1999) 
considers important when understanding livelihood strategies, especially people’s 
perceptions of what counts as quality of life, the ability to generate meaning out of assets 
such as imposed infrastructure in ways that empowers local ways of life, and the 
willingness to resist and contest imposed structural conditions, among others. 
Understanding livelihood strategies in the light of tactical subjectivity is important 
to inform policy prescriptions and, most importantly, to inform indigenous families. This 
dissemination of information is urgent when approximately 371 communities in the 
provinces of Sucumbíos, Orellana and Pastaza are undergoing modernization and are the 
recipients of state-led development programs, whether they agree to them or not. 
Political Ecology and Racism: Colonial Intersectionality, Settler Colonialism and 
Decoloniality 
Hispanophone political ecologists have studied struggles to access and secure land 
and livelihoods in the context of inequities produced by colonial logics inherited 
thereafter, where western and non-western ways of knowledge and race and gender 
inequalities are usually discussed to explain processes that mediate the distribution of 
ecological conflicts and the conditions for political participation to achieve social justice 
(Delgado-Ramos 2017; Alimonda 2001, 2015; Boff, 2015; Lugones, 2016; Martinez- 
Allier & Roca, 2001; among others). Such an approach has also been applied to the study 
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of mining conflicts in recent years in Latin America (Vallejo 2014; Vallejo & García, 
2017; De la Cadena, 2019). Similar efforts aimed at understanding struggles over 
resources informed by colonial and settler colonial legacies inform the work of 
anglophone critical geographers such as Radcliffe and Westwood (2005), Radcliffe 
(2015), Sundberg (2004; 2008) and Mollet (2010). 
However, when assessing anglophone political ecology produced by researchers 
in the global north, Elmhirst (2011) suggested that feminist political ecology might have 
lost momentum due to the displacement of gender as an analytical category, as gender is 
being replaced by multiple intersecting subjectivities where people embody fragmented 
identities. In addition, Mollet and Faria (2013, p.1, 117) argued that a resurgence of work 
branded as feminist political ecology had failed to critically address race. According to 
these authors, political ecology avoids addressing race and racism and instead has used 
ethnicity to account for differences in the global south; however, Mollet and Faria (2013) 
think that addressing race is necessary, as it informs the relationship between gender and 
the environment. 
Similarly, critical geographers and scholars in ethnic studies such as Pulido (2017, 
 
p. 310) have argued that the scarcity of studies focusing on race and racism in geography 
could be explained by the lack of racial diversity in the field and a lack of comfort with 
racial questions, further, processes of oppression are frequently studied in terms of 
dichotomies (white-people of colored struggles), missing the point that processes of 
racialization are complicit in oppression. In other words, people that identify as oppressed 
can simultaneously be oppressors. 
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In chapter five of this dissertation I account for the lack of critical engagement 
with race within anglophone political ecology; to achieve this, I draw from hispanophone 
accounts of colonial intersectionality developed mostly by Latin American scholars, I 
place this body of work into conversation with settler colonial theory, developed by 
anglophone scholars, which accounts for the elimination of indigenous people and the 
elimination of non-western knowledge and culture (Wolfe, 1999; 2006; Johnson & 
Murton, 2007). Such discussions provide a better understanding of the ways that oil 
extraction and the expansion of the state racialize people located at the peripheries of 
extraction. By using three case studies in the Amazon of Ecuador, I argue that the 
expansion of the oil frontier seeks to eliminate non-western epistemologies using a logic 
that uses race and gender submission to the logics of capitalism, western knowledge, and 
patriarchy. I complicate such processes by pointing at the ways in which mestizaje (racial 
mixing of indigenous people and people of European descent) and the elimination of non- 
western epistemologies could be seen as part of the same process in which subjects 
reproduce colonial violence while simultaneously trying to resist it. In this sense, I argue 
that colonial legacies are embedded in cultural amalgamation processes that seek to 
eliminate indigenous non-western knowledge that explains and denounces oil related 
violence. 
In chapter five I also contribute to decolonial scholarship, as this chapter uses a 
methodology that seeks to make visible indigenous traditional ways of knowledge, also 
known as indigenous epistemologies and ontologies, in order to empower marginalized 
populations. Decolonial scholarship seeks to confront colonial power dynamics and 
reconfigure non-western marginalized knowers (Walsh, 2012; Smith, 1999). Decolonial 
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scholarship responds to postcolonial critique (Asher, 2013; Rivera et al., 2018; Smith, 
1999) and critical feminism (Radcliffe, 2017) that has insisted that colonial power 
dynamics continue to play an important role in shaping power dynamics in Latin 
America. Decolonial scholarship calls for anti-colonial efforts both in the research 
methods and in the way knowledge is produced (Mignolo, 2012; Escobar, 2004; Naylor 
et al., 2017), 
Geographers such as Naylor et al. (2017, p. 1) and Radcliffe (2017) have arrived 
at the conclusion that geography scholarship remains embedded in western ways of 
knowledge that marginalize nonwestern ones and frequently ignore the politics of 
knowledge production. Moreover, they criticize those geographers interested in 
postcolonial studies who have paid little attention to anti-colonial struggles (Jazeel, 
2017), arguing that scholars keep producing research about the other instead of 
collaborating and co-producing knowledge with marginalized populations (Naylor et al., 
2017, p. 2). 
Other geographers such as Louis (2007), Peake and Kobayashi (2002), and Pain 
(2003, p. 652) have suggested that in order to make geographic research more relevant to 
social policy and community needs, scholars should make efforts to avoid seeing 
activism and scholarship as separate and, instead, scholars should understand theoretical 
production and teaching as political interventions where political subjectivity can’t be 
avoided (Gibson-Graham, 1994, pp. 211-213; Hale 2006, p. 100). For a long time, 
political ecology has called on scholars to make their contributions useful for social 
policy and marginalized populations, transcending academic production and seeking 
social justice (Bury & Bebbington, 2013b, pp. 12–13; Walker 2006, 2007; Blaikie, 2012). 
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Thus, I follow on the steps of other geographers and anthropologists such as 
Gibson-Graham (1994), Stephen (2013), Castro and Santacruz (2013), Rivera, Alatorre, 
García & Mercon (2018), and Zaragocín (2019), among others, who have used decolonial 
methods aimed at allowing marginalized populations to reconfigure their own 
epistemologies and ontologies to visibilize their realities, problems, and demands. 
Moreover, Naylor et al. (2017, pp. 4–5) and Stephen & Hale (2013), suggest that 
indigenous epistemologies should be taken seriously, rather than as empirical data used to 
theorize information. Thus, in chapter four I use collaborative and participatory research 
methods that take into consideration indigenous analysis of narratives as theory in its own 
right, and I treat these findings as both useful to indigenous people and theoretically 
important to political ecology and postcolonial critique. 
Explanation of Dissertation Format 
 
This dissertation consists of three manuscripts designed for publication in 
academic journals (Chapters III to V) and they are presented as separate pieces. Chapter 
one corresponds to the introduction, chapter two presents the methodology, and chapter 
six presents the conclusions. 
In chapter two, “Methods,” I provide an overview of the methodology and 
analysis used in each chapter of this dissertation, I also provide a discussion on 
positionality and a section that explains how I expect to give back to communities that 
collaborated in this research. 
In chapter three, Post-Neoliberal Legibility and Indigenous Oil Conflicts in the 
Amazon of Ecuador, I answer the first research question by building on contemporary 
understandings of indigenous political attempts to access and secure land as well as on 
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state efforts to increase legibility in the Amazon region of Ecuador. Using the Pañacocha 
community as a case study, in this chapter I make evident that state legibility is aimed at 
increasing control of underground oil deposits through legal and institutional mechanisms 
in which the state’s ability to legalize land and redistribute oil-extraction compensations 
profits is used to encourage communities to cooperate with oil activities. I argue that 
indigenous people struggle to access volumetric knowledge associated with oil deposits 
and infrastructure because these tools would allow locals to better negotiate the terms 
under which indigenous land is legalized and the way oil-extraction compensations are 
paid. Information that is kept away by the oil company in association with some 
indigenous leaders interested furthering personal gains. Local struggles are further 
complicated by intracommunity conflicts in which different parties have opposing visions 
on how local leaders should negotiate and manage oil-related development, generating 
conflicts over land and uneven distribution of oil-extraction compensations. 
In chapter four, Reclaiming Marginality: Forests Livelihood Response to Oil 
Extraction and State-Led Development in the Amazon of Ecuador, I answer the second 
research question. In this chapter I contribute to a better understanding of indigenous and 
peasant responses to the loss of lands and livelihoods, processes that are associated with 
the expansion of state-led oil activities in the Amazon region of Ecuador. I use an 
analysis of livelihoods strategies in the community of Pañacocha to understand the ways 
in which peasant and indigenous families make decisions related to survival. I argue that 
livelihood responses rely on tactical subjectivity; thus, families neither fully resist nor 
cooperate with oil activities or state intervention. Instead, their response is ambiguous as 
they tactically reject some aspects of oil development and modernization while 
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embracing others according to changing material needs, circumstances, and local views 
of what constitutes quality of life. Tactical subjectivity fits within theoretical frameworks 
of marginality and border thinking theory, complementing contemporary understandings 
of livelihood strategies. 
In chapter five, Mining as Epistemic Violence: Erasure of Indigenous 
Epistemologies in the Amazon Region of Ecuador, I answer the third research question. 
This chapter draws from postcolonial race and gender intersectionality and from settler 
colonial notions of elimination to understand state efforts to expand the mining frontier 
into the Amazon of Ecuador. By using three case studies of Kichwa indigenous 
communities, I illustrate how the state-led modernization paid for with oil profits 
reinforces colonial violence based on race, gender, and patriarchy. Based on analysis of 
female indigenous narratives, this chapter argues that internalized colonial violence and 
state interventions systemically undermine and eliminate indigenous ontologies and 
epistemologies that explain the complexity of mining conflicts and denounce systemic 
violence. 
In chapter six, Towards an Understanding of Peripheries of Extraction in the 
Amazon of Ecuador, conclude the dissertation by summarizing the theoretical, empirical, 
and methodological contributions of the dissertation, while also bringing attention to 




I conducted eight months of research during 2017 and 2018 in the Pañacocha and 
Santa Elena communities, located in oil block 12 in the province of Sucumbíos in the 
Amazon region of Ecuador. In addition, my research questions are built upon four 
months of research conducted between 2014 and 2015 in the community of Tzawata, 
located in oil block 28, province of Napo. I also participated in a number of indigenous 
events to resist mining in 2015. All this preliminary work defined the objectives of the 
dissertation. Participant communities identify as Kichwa, an ethnicity that constitutes 
51% of the total indigenous population in the Amazon region (Lopez et al., 2013, pp. 13– 
14). Additional research was conducted in the cities of Quito, Coca, and Shushufindi, 




















Fig. 1. Research sites. Map by R.J Theofield (Hydrocarbons Secretariat, 2018; 
Geographic Military Institute, 2012) 
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I used traditional research methods in Pañacocha to answer the first two research 
questions, and I used participative and collaborative research methods in Tzawata, 
Pañacocha, and Santa Elena to answer the third research question. 
Preliminary Fieldwork 
 
Indigenous people collaborated with me to define overall research questions as 
suggested by Stephen and Hale (2013). In 2014, I spent three months in Tzawata working 
with locals in an effort to resist gold mining operations in their territory. During this 
period of time, focus groups revealed that indigenous people needed access to 
information related to mining legislation as well as to information that clarifies how the 
state claims jurisdiction over ancestral indigenous territories. Such information informs 
indigenous resistance tactics. 
In 2015, I participated in a nationwide indigenous uprising in which Amazon 
regional organizations represented by the Confederation of Indigenous Organizations of 
the Amazon (CONFENIAE) marched to Quito, requesting the state stop extractive 
activities in their territories, enforce the law, and conduct proper prior consultation before 
mining activities take place. Leaders were worried about mining impacts and their ability 
to maintain their livelihoods, especially in peripheral areas of extraction where people 
rely on hunting, fishing, and forest gathering (Personal interview: CONFENIAE 
president, August 13, 2015). In August of the same year, I conducted a month of 
preliminary field work in the Pañacocha community; this allowed me to converse with 
women worried about oil-related violence. In September, I returned to Tzawata and 
shared information collected in Pañacocha with women who had been interested in 
25  
exchanging information with other communities about resisting mining and responding to 
violence (Focus group with Tzawata women, September 12, 2015). 
 
 
The Case Studies 
 
I chose Pañacocha and its neighboring community Santa Elena as case studies 
because they are located in a peripheral primary and secondary rain forest where the 
mining frontier has expanded rapidly along the Napo River. These are territories where 
the state presence had previously been semi-absent or weak and had lacked both the 
infrastructure and roads to allow the expansion of urban ways of life. Thus, traditional 
ways of survival had remained highly dependent on forest resources and intermittent 
contact with nearby markets. The expansion of the oil frontier and the growing presence 
of the state have impacted livelihoods and grassroots political organizations deeply in the 
last two decades. The reality of these communities is similar to many others located along 
the Napo River where the state and the national oil company Petroamazonas have 
persuaded indigenous leaders to agree to oil extractive activities in exchange for 
modernizing infrastructure and oil compensations distributed in cash (Lyall & Valdivia, 
2015; Wilson & Bayón, 2017, pp. 102–121; Vallejo, 2014). 
I included the Tzawata community in this study in response to indigenous needs 
to exchange information with other Kichwa communities facing similar problems; such 
interest was born primarily from Tzawata women worried about how to prevent mining 
violence in their territory and looking for legal ways to protect themselves against the 
expansion of oil and gold mining. A female Tzawata leader who organized women to 
develop tactics of resistance in Tzawata decided to accompany me to the field for two 
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months to share the story of her community’s resistance with the Pañacocha and Santa 
Elena population. Her objective was to share her story and learn from these sister 
communities in order to take information back to Tzawata. Chapter four of this 
dissertation builds on exchanges between this female leader and the populations in 
Pañacocha and Santa Elena, paying special attention to female narratives discussed 
among women in which they identify the nature of violence. 
Methods Overview 
 
I used participant observation with 20% of 95 households in Pañacocha, followed 
by in-depth conversations to avoid observation bias and clarify collected information as 
suggested by Schensul, S., Shensul, J and LeCompte (1999, p. 166). I also used semi- 
structured interviews with key informants in Pañacocha and Santa Elena, collecting a 
total of 27 interviews used in this dissertation. To achieve this, one research assistant and 
I lived with the 20 households for approximately 10 days each. For conducting semi- 
structured interviews, I had to move frequently between households, and sometimes I had 
to travel to nearby communities for a day or two. Also, I collected 14 interviews with 
state officials and oil company personnel in the cities of Quito, Shushufindi and Coca, 
and I compiled approximately 62 official documents associated with land conflicts in 
Pañacocha. 
In addition, the aforementioned Kichwa female collaborator from the Tzawata 
community accompanied me for two months in order to conduct a participatory research 
method detailed later in this section, during that time she also served as a kichwa 
translator. I spent a total of eight months doing research during 2017 and 2018 as follows: 
six months living with 13 households in Pañacocha and two households in Santa Elena, 
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one month conducting research in the cities of Quito, Coca, and Shushufindi, and 
approximately half a month was spent in traveling between places and in general 
organization of data in the city of Quito. The research assistant, a female college student, 
spent one and a half months in Pañacocha living with a total of five households, also for 
between 10 days each, she also spent about a week organizing data in the city of Quito. 
The Kichwa female collaborator and translator spent two months accompanying me as 
we stayed with households in Pañacocha and Santa Elena. I also spent five days 
collecting geospatial data that illustrates the unequal distribution of oil-related 
compensations in Pañacocha and Santa Elena. Finally, in 2018, I returned to the field to 
conduct participatory analysis of part of the data with the Tzawata indigenous 
collaborator and two female collaborators from Pañacocha and Santa Elena; the analysis 
was conducted over a period of 15 days. 
Methods Research Question No.1 
 
In order to answer the first research question—How have recent legal and 
institutional frameworks affected traditional indigenous political participation and 
indigenous agency in the configuration of indigenous territories? —I conducted 
interviews with 14 state officials from the ministry of the environment, the ministry of 
agriculture, the land secretariat, and Petroamazonas field personnel in the cities of Quito, 
Coca, and Shushufindi. I also conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with key 
informants such as former indigenous leaders, community members active in local 
politics, local teachers, and the school principal in Pañacocha. Other semi-structured 
interviews included former Petroamazonas field personnel in oil block 12 and former 
public servants involved in conflicts related to intracommunity disputes over land and oil- 
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related compensations. Finally, I collected official correspondence between state 
institutions, Petroamazonas and indigenous organizations involved in the conflicts over 
land and access to oil-related compensations in oil block 12; I compiled a total of 62 
documents that include official letters between state institutions as well as formal 
manuals that guide the ways in which oil profit compensations are to be redistributed 
among affected communities such as Pañacocha. See summary of research methods 
below: 
Method Population Participants 
Structured interviews n=14 state officials MAE-Quito, Shushufindi. 
Petroamazonas former 
employees, field employees. 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
n=18 population Indigenous leaders & 
former leaders, key 
informants (police, teachers, 
school teachers, etc) 
Official documents & 
correspondence 
n=32 official correspondence 





GIS data location: Oil- 
related compensations 
n=55 households Household members 
Table 1. Summary of research methods, research question No.1 
 
 
Analysis: Analysis of information required organizing semi-structured interviews 
and interview data into two main variables: V1. state access, organization, and 
administration of territory and V2. indigenous access, organization, and administration of 
territory. These variables respond to general findings that reveal clear frictions between 
state and indigenous views on how to administrate territory using oil profit 
compensations. These frictions are the main factors affecting indigenous participation 
and agency in the configuration of indigenous territories. Then, following Schensul et 
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V1: State access, organization, and administration of territory 
C1: Relies on recent legislation 
C2: Relies on changes in institutional frameworks 
E1: Content analysis of legal frameworks, see laws discussed in 
Ch.2 
E2: Content analysis of the national oil company’s strategic plans 
for working with communities and oil company’s 
correspondence. 
 
V2: Indigenous access, organization, and administration of territory 
C1: Depends on understanding changes in legislation and legal 
frameworks 
C2: Depends on access to volumetric information 
C3: Depends on ability to lobby with the state and mining company on 
behalf of the community 
D1: Semi-structured interviews (frequencies) 
D2: Interviews (frequencies) 
al.’s (1999, pp. 149–164) coding technique, I coded information based on frequencies. 
Specifically, each semi-structured interview and structured interview was reviewed with 
responses organized into categories; the categories with higher frequencies of responses 
were used to arrive at conclusions. Below is a scheme that summarizes the analysis 
process; the evidence and/or data (E, D) correspond to data frequencies that support each 
category: 
Table. 2: Analysis process, research question No.1 
 
 
Finally, I used geospatial data I collected in the field to visually understand the 
distribution of oil-related compensations in Pañacocha in relation to where oil 
infrastructure is located, a situation that generates territorial and intracommunity 
conflicts. 
Methods Research Question No.2 
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To address the second set of research questions—How have livelihoods changed 
in response to state and oil expansion in the last 12 years? What are the mechanisms that 
inform current survival strategies? —I conducted a focus group with 12 members of the 
communities of Pañacocha, Sani, El Edén and Santa Elena. The focus group was aimed at 
establishing living conditions enjoyed by the population living in oil block 12 before 
Petroamazonas took over operations 12 years ago. These communities were chosen due 
to their close proximity to Pañacocha and because Pañacocha families facilitating the 
research suggested that living conditions among all these communities had been similarly 
affected by the expansion of oil extraction in the last 12 years. Participants in the focus 
groups were suggested by the Pañacocha families that facilitated this research; these 
families considered these community members trusted individuals in the region. 
Establishing past living conditions was important to compare them with current living 
conditions and assess how livelihood strategies are changing as families adapt to oil 
extraction. The research assistant and I documented current survival strategies in 20 
households using participant observation followed by in-depth conversations with heads 
of households. Conversations were aimed at clarifying observations, but most 
importantly, they were aimed at understanding the logics that inform changes in survival 
strategies and the mechanisms that allow such changes. Finally, I collected nine semi- 
structured interviews with key informants such as schoolteachers, indigenous men that 
had worked for the oil company, and Petroamazonas field personnel. 
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Method Population Participants 
Focus group to establish 
difference in living 
conditions between 2005– 
2017 
n=12 Former indigenous leaders 
and elders—Pañacocha, 
Santa Elena, Sani, El Edén 
communities 
Participant observation and 
in-depth conversations 
n = 95 households aprox. 
20% (20 households) 
Family members 
Heads of households 
Semi-structured interviews n = 9 (2) Schoolteachers, (5) 
former oil workers, (2) 
Petroamazonas field 
personnel. 
Table 3. Summary of research methods, research question No.2 
 
 
Please note that participant observation with household members followed 
Emerson, Fretz & Shaw’s (2011, pp. 24–39) suggestions to keep on-the-spot notes that 
would be later elaborated into longer descriptions at the end of the day when researchers 
were not involved in household activities. Additionally, in-depth conversations required 
taking detailed notes on the spot. 
Analysis: The research assistant and I organized participant observation notes and 
in-depth conversations according to the following variables per household: a) families’ 
efforts to secure access and control over food and water, b) ways that families make use 
of oil cash compensations, c) the degree to which families engage in wage labor 
opportunities, and d) the extent to which families participate in productive projects 
introduced by Petroamazonas. In addition, we also keep track of the factors that inform 
major changes in livelihoods. I compared current conditions with those present 12 years 
ago, identifying how living conditions had changed since Petroamazonas began 
operations in oil block 12. Here is a summary of the variables against which current 






Table 4. Analysis process, research question No. 2 
 
 
Research findings are descriptive and reflect changes in livelihoods in the last 12 
years (see findings in chapter four). I also analyzed in-depth conversations with heads of 
households to better understand the logics behind livelihood strategies. Frequency 
analysis was used in this case, and the frequency of responses pointed at the following 
categories as main findings: a) difficulties accessing forest game and alternatives, b) 
difficulties accessing clean river water and alternatives, c) cash being used in survival and 
cash been used in luxury items, d) positive and negative perceptions of wage labor, e) 
positive and negative perceptions of productive projects. 
Methods Research Question No. 3 
V1. Access to and control over food and water (twelve years ago). 
C1. Traditional food products widely used: 
a) Staples: cassava, plantains, cassava drink (daily) 
b) Protein: forest game, turtle eggs, fish, trees groves (four to 
five times a week) 
c) Domestic animals: Around eight families raised chickens but 
not permanently. 
C2. Clean water (12 years ago): 
a) Napo River (daily), Pañayacu lake (daily), rain (rare) 
 
V2. Wage labor (12 years ago). 
C1. Wage labor in nearby cities or nearby agricultural opportunities: a) 
Occasionally and for less than two months (once a year). Most men. 
C2. Wage labor in oil extraction: a) Occasionally between 2005 - 2017 
(once a year). Men with young families. 
 
V3. Use of cash in order of priority: 
a) Food products (gas, oil); b) gas, agricultural materials, 
construction materials; c) school supplies; d) clothing; e) 
alcohol 
 
V3. Participation in productive projects introduced by the state (12 years ago): 
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In order to answer the third research question—How do local epistemologies 
make sense of the presence of oil extractive activities, conflicts, and violence? And how 
do women cope with violence?—I used participatory and collaborative research methods 
and semi-structured interviews with key informants. Participatory and collaborative 
research methods include the participation of indigenous peoples’ concerns in informing 
the research questions of this dissertation (see Preliminary Fieldwork in the methods 
section) and the participation of the female indigenous leader from Tzawata, who 
collaborated with the research by exchanging information related to mining violence with 
Pañacocha and Santa Elena communities, exchanges took place in Spanish and Kichwa, 
thus this collaborator also helped translating and/or clarifying information provided in 
Kichwa into Spanish when needed. 
I called this method “female epistemological exchange,” and it entailed exchanges 
between the Tzawata leader and women, focusing on forming a better understanding of 
mining-and oil-related violence. Such exchanges use Kichwa logics to make sense of 
reality. This is what I refer to as epistemology; female epistemological exchanges assume 
that human and non-human beings, as those that are part of the forest, have the capacity 
of making and communicating meaning (Kohn, 2007). The exchanges could be described 
as organic conversations in which women openly discussed oil extraction using dreams 
and narratives that blur the nature-culture divide (Descola, 2004). In this sense, oil 
expansion, state intervention, conflicts and violence could be narrated not only by 
Kichwa women but also through the lens of non-human beings that share the reality in 
which oil extraction takes place (Kohn, 2007; Uzendoski, 2010). 
34  
During this collaboration, women were in complete control of conversations and 
narratives. Thus, during most of the exchanges or in the construction of female narratives, 
I limited myself to taking notes of around eight narratives and would only participate 
when invited by the women. Because, some parts of the conversations would take place 
in Kichwa, the Tzawata collaborator and myself would debrief and clarify narratives at 
night almost daily. Given the importance of the narratives, I returned to the field in 2018 
to further analyze five of these narratives in collaboration with the Tzawata leader and 
two women from Pañacocha and Santa Elena who provided some of the most important 
narrations. In this dissertation I illustrate two of the narratives in chapter four with the 
permission of the women involved. Part of the analytical process is also briefly shared in 
this chapter as women explain the logics behind their narrations. In addition, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with oil company personnel, local police, health center 
personnel, schoolteachers, and traditional healers in order to better understand how 
outsiders understand violence in the region. 
Finally, I also used information collected in 2013 and 2015 in the Tzawata 
community, including five oral histories that explain indigenous resistance to the 
expansion of gold mining and two transcripts of group discussions. These are similar to 
focus groups in which 10% of the population (18 people) participated. Information 
collected in Tzawata provided context when answering the third research question and 
information needed to analyze gender power dynamics among indigenous communities. 
Here is a summary of research methods used to answer the second research question: 
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Method Analysis Participants 
Traditional methods 
Semi-structured interviews n=9 Key informants: 
Oil company personnel, 






Focus groups (2) 
Tzawata: n=5 
(Key informants 
involved in fighting the 
gold mining company) 
 
10% of population (18 
people) 
Elders and leaders involved 
in resistance 
 
(10) Mixed group (women, 





n=5 female narratives (12) Women from 
Pañacocha, Tzawata and 
Santa Elena 
Table 5. Summary of research methods, research question No.3 
 
 
Analysis: To analyze the data, I required the participation of the Tzawata 
collaborator and women from Pañacocha and Santa Elena in 2018. Specifically, 
following Sandoval’s methodology of the oppressed (2000, pp. 74–76), analysis of 
women’s narratives associated with violence required conversations about the 
positionality of each women in relation to different categories of power. To define what 
categories were used, with my help, women identified the main actors involved in power 
relations in the narratives through drawings. They identified the following categories: a) 
state officials, oil personnel, police and/or armed forces; b) mestizos (the dominant racial 
group in Ecuador); c) indigenous men; d) indigenous leaders and, e) natural beings 
(animals, bodies of water, oil, and the forest, among others). 
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Finally, I facilitated conversations among women, aiming to better understand 
what power relations undermine in women’s lives. Over the course of four meetings and 
following Sandoval’s methodology that suggests unveiling what power relations seek to 
achieve in the context of dominant relations (2000, pp. 105–108), women identified what 
power relations have achieved in the context of mining extraction. The most important 
findings include that power relations: a) dominate female labor at home, b) dominate 
natural resources for capital accumulation, c) dominate indigenous ways of live to 
transform them into modern ways of life desired by the state, and d) scare families from 
participating in oil profits redistribution. 
At this point, the women started to wonder how they could fight processes that 
seek to eliminate Kichwa culture and autonomy, and in the discussions, they suggested 
that keeping narratives alive was the best way continue to denounce violence and keep 
indigenous communities informed of the dangers of mining, oil, and patriarchy. I use 
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female narratives as theory in their own right, and in chapter four of this dissertation, I 
compare female narratives with postcolonial and settler colonial theory not only to 
answer the research questions posed by the women, but also to generate grounded 
understandings of the mechanisms through which state and western logics impose 




Collaborative and participatory methods of data collection and analysis were 
required to open spaces for women to freely discuss mining and oil related violence. In 
order to be able to engage with indigenous women in conversations, I tried to 
horizontalize power relations as Gibson-Graham (1994) and Stephen (2007, pp. 322–323) 
suggest. Thus, I disclosed my own positionality so that the women and I could relate with 
each other. I disclosed my subjective position as an Ecuadorian woman who identifies as 
mestiza (the hegemonic racial group in Ecuador) and has had the privilege to access 
western education. Although these are the subjective positions indigenous people in 
general take for granted in educated mestizas like me, I discussed other subjectivities 
embedded in power dynamics around which subjective common ground was established 
with the participating women. 
Thus, I shared my family history going back two generations to show my family’s 
rural and indigenous origins and to demonstrate the socio-economic struggles I 
experienced when growing up in Quito. In addition, I disclosed my own struggles in 
accessing higher education due to economic reasons and in part to overcoming gender 
bias, and my experience with gender discrimination and sexual harassment. Finally, I 
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disclosed and discussed my experiences with racism while living in the United States and 
my encounters with state violence both in Ecuador and the U.S. This information allowed 
women to relate to me and have open conversations about similar topics in the context of 
their own realities. Still, it is important to mention that women were aware of the 
advantages I enjoyed when encountering realities of social mobility that require western 
education and lighter skin color, among others; for these reasons we also made sure that 
knowledge production would benefit the women’s concerns and, at the same time, that it 
would fulfill my academic pursuits. 
Similar information, although not as detailed, was disclosed with indigenous 
leaders before starting research; this information is usually required by indigenous 
communities before they allow researchers into their territories. Similar exercises that 
required conversations with families about the researcher’s positionalities were 
conducted by the research assistant and me with every household we stayed with. It is 
important to note that the research assistant was a female U.S college student who had 
experience working with Kichwa communities in Ecuador. Because of this, power 
dynamics were unavoidable during fieldwork, as indigenous people recognize not only 
my privilege as an educated mestiza but also those of a foreign white person. Thus, 
discussion about the researchers’ positionalities was not enough; it had to be 
accompanied by the researchers’ willingness to fully join household activities in ways 
that are respectful and in ways that empower families. For example, interest in learning 
how to prepare traditional food, participating daily in productive activities, sharing food, 
and joining hard work such as cleaning fields for agricultural activities were as important 
as having discussions about one’s positionality. As Smith (1999, pp. 2, 15–16, 118–120) 
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reminds us, research of any kind is perceived by indigenous people as extraction of 
information in unequal terms unless it gives back to the community, and giving back is 
seen as a right the community has over information, rather than research benevolence. 
With this in mind, the research assistant, who were in the field for a month and a half, 
and I did as much as we could to lessen power dynamics. Families hosting the researchers 
were aware that research goals were aimed at giving back to the community; in many 
ways this encouraged families to collaborate with us but not always. However, the 
presence of the Tzawata Kichwa collaborator helped enormously to gain people’s trust 
and facilitate research as she had known me for years and her sole agenda was to further 
indigenous concerns. 
Giving Back to Communities 
 
It is important to mention that these research findings have been partially shared 
with the women participating in the research, indeed, they considered the processes of 
analysis of narratives as a learning opportunity that adds to women’s efforts to resist 
extractive activities. Also, as a way to give back, I also collaborated with Guillermo 
Jiménez, a painter who identifies himself as indigenous/mestizo. He painted the 
narratives used in this dissertation following directions from the women involved in the 
analysis of the narratives. The paintings are in the hands of indigenous women who 
wanted to use them to further reproduce narratives among other women. The paintings 
are also used in chapter four of this dissertation with the permission of Jiménez and the 
women involved. 
In addition, I plan to return to Ecuador in 2020 to share the rest of the findings of 
this dissertation with indigenous families in Pañacocha, Santa Elena, and Tzawata. In 
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2018, families who facilitated this research started to work on a methodology to share 
research results in a way that is useful to indigenous people. Specifically, in addition to 
the work I already conducted with indigenous women, the author will fulfill indigenous 
requests to provide research results relevant to communities through illustrated manuals 
that provide information on how to: 1) improve indigenous tactics to better secure 
territories and 2) explain how indigenous livelihoods have changed in the last 12 years, 




POST-NEOLIBERAL LEGIBILITY AND INDIGENOUS OIL CONFLICTS IN THE 




In the past two decades, Ecuador’s economic restructuring has continued to 
aggressively target oil and mining frontiers in the Amazon region. This restructuring has 
particularly increased under post-neoliberal regimes, affecting the indigenous territories 
where the state’s presence has historically been weak or absent. The post-neoliberal 
economic agenda requires territorial reorganization through new kinds of state legibility. 
Such legibility consists of large-scale central planning and the creation of legal 
frameworks and institutions aimed at controlling and modernizing territory and people 
while simultaneously facilitating oil and mining extraction (Vela Almeida, 2018; Lu & 
Silva, 2015). State legibility explains state and corporate attempts to make territories 
readable through simplification, regimentation, and identification of the value of certain 
resources like oil and the neglect of others (Scott 1998). 
This paper brings attention to the new kinds of legibility in which the state relies 
on “volumetric knowledge,” understood here as state calculations based on the location, 
quality, and volume of oil reserves, among others (Elden, 2013; Bridge, 2013). I argue 
that such knowledge guides state efforts to increase control over oil-rich territories and 
shapes indigenous struggles to control territory and access to oil compensations. 
I use a case study of the indigenous community of Pañacocha to illustrate that the 
state promotes legalization of indigenous territories along with the distribution of oil 
extractive compensations in areas that are key to the oil industry, and to show that 
indigenous leaders struggle to access and control the techno-bureaucratic and volumetric 
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knowledge that enables them to better negotiate land legalization and access to state-led 
modernization promised by the state in exchange for cooperation with oil extraction. 
This paper examines contemporary processes of territorialization in the Amazon 
region and indigenous political strategies to access and secure territory and political 
recognition. Overall, my findings advance understandings of oil conflicts associated with 
territory where access to information on oil infrastructure, oil flows, and environmental 
impacts matters for state recognition of indigenous territory and for social redistribution 
derived from oil extraction. 
Methodology 
 
This paper draws on seven months of research in the cities of Quito and Coca, and 
in the Pañacocha parish, located in Oil Block 12. In 2017, I conducted 14 interviews with 
state officials at the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
with field personnel of the national oil company (Petroamazonas) in Oil Block 12. I 
collected official correspondence between state institutions, Petroamazonas, and 
indigenous organizations involved in conflicts over land. Finally, I conducted participant 
observations and semi-structured interviews with indigenous community members and 
leaders involved in land conflict. The semi-structured interviews involved 5% of the 
community’s total population of 380 people. I analyzed the information I gathered using 
frequencies and coding of relevant categories relating to the strategies used by the state 
and indigenous people to seize control over land; such strategies were then compared and 
contrasted with existing legal frameworks and institutions that govern how territories are 
organized in the Amazon and how oil benefits are controlled and distributed. Finally, I 
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used geospatial data to map the distribution of oil extraction compensations among 
indigenous people competing for access to land and oil benefits. 
Post-Neoliberal Legibility: The Context 
 
Legal frameworks and institutions 
 
The concept of state legibility has been used to explain state and corporate 
attempts to make territories readable through simplification, regimentation, and 
identification of the value of certain resources and the neglect of others (Robbins, 2008; 
Scott, 1998, pp. 13–19). Such attempts usually follow economic interests such as oil, in 
which the state and/or corporate powers try to secure control over land in order to access 
oil deposits (Ferguson, 2005). 
In Ecuador, efforts to control such spaces have shifted between the state and 
corporations since the discovery of oil deposits in the Amazon in the 1940s (Radcliffe, 
2010). During the neoliberal period (1980s–2000s), the state sought to further oil 
extraction by decreasing regulations on oil companies (Acosta, 1995, pp. 157–202). The 
state acted either as a partner with or as a facilitator for foreign oil companies, which 
produced information on territories where the state—until then—had been almost entirely 
absent, and therefore lacked geographic, demographic, and resource data (Martinez- 
Sastre, 2015, p. 91-132). 
In contrast, the post-neoliberal period (2007–present) has been characterized by 
an increased state role in mediating mining activities; thus, there have been substantial 
efforts to increase its capacity for central planning. These efforts include surveying 
territory and producing legislation that increases control over minerals (Bebbington & 
Humphreys, 2011; Vela-Almeida, 2018; Yates & Bakker, 2013). Indeed, at the beginning 
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of the post-neoliberal period in 2007, government efforts were directed at producing a 
unified vision of how territory rich in oil and other minerals ought to be read and 
governed, especially in areas where the state had historically been weak. Thus, as 
Robbins (2008, pp. 213–214) explains, the state produces expert knowledge that become 
a location of epistemological struggle as this expert knowledge marginalizes local forms 
of knowledge and expertise. 
Because Ecuador’s economic agenda has identified mining as paramount for 
national development and has declared these resources are property of the state, 
regardless of who owns rights to the surface (Ecuadorian Constitution 2008, Art. 313, 
408), the state’s reading of oil reserves has resulted in new maps that reorganize the 
region by oil blocks. In the last twelve years, the government has leased 30% of remote 
primary forests in the Amazon for oil extraction; around forty oil blocks (Hydrocarbons 
Secretariat, 2019), either in active production or to be assigned for production, overlap 
protected areas and 68% of all territories occupied by indigenous people (Lopez et al., 
2013, p. 22). Many of those indigenous communities have not been recognized by the 
state as legal owners of the land. 
Subsequently, new laws have been passed, reformed, and institutionalized to 
bring these territories under state control (Vela-Almeida, 2018). Laws such as the 
Territorial Plan and Decentralization Strategy (2013–2017), the Mining Law (2009), the 
Land Organization Code (COOTAD, 2010), the Law for Rural and Ancestral Land 
(2016), and the Plan for the Territorial Organization of the Amazon of 2018 are aimed at 
ensuring that the Amazonian territory and its people will be systematically incorporated 
into civil society. As Radcliffe (2001) explains, state territorialization takes place through 
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classification and enforcement of control over space, usually through the legitimation of 
the state’s use of force. 
Dispossession, Legal Recognition of Indigenous Land, and Oil Reinvestments 
 
The state justifies its efforts to reorganize territory by asserting that oil revenues 
are needed for national growth and the modernization of rural territories and their people 
(Martinez-Sastre, 2015, Ch.8; Vallejo et al., 2016). According to the Mining Law (2009, 
Art. 67, 93), 12% of oil profits along with at least 5% of royalties generated by the oil 
industry are to be paid to the state for the sole purpose of investment in social projects. 
This approach allows the government to narrate the Amazon as poor and as a region that 
has long been forgotten by previous administrations and that has been waiting for 
productive insertion into national and international markets (Vallejo, 2014; Radcliffe 
1996, p. 24). Thus, the state hopes to create a reading in which the Amazon is assessed 
through oil productivity and quality of life is measured through access to education, 
health, infrastructure, and basic services, among other western indicators (Martinez- 
Sastre 2015, pp. 237-238). 
Oil reinvestments are distributed through decentralization schemes in which 
political territorial units, organized hierarchically, participate in the transfer of oil funds. 
They also participate in the diagnosis, planning, execution, and monitoring of 
development projects (COOTAD, 2010, Art.10). These decentralized units include 
territorial institutions such as municipalities, parishes, and, recently, indigenous 
governments that have land legally recognized by the state and that support the desired 
territorial model. 
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Still, according to Scott (1998, p. 22-24), state mechanisms of simplification like 
the one proposed by the Ecuadorian state are incapable of truly reflecting the complex 
relations between people and their environment and the complex social relations that 
have historically characterized indigenous ways of life, which leads to local resistance to 
the state. In the last ten years, conflicts between the state and populations resisting mining 
and extractive activities have spiked (Becker, 2013; Puig and Bastidas, 2012); these 
conflicts have been characterized by the criminalization of protest and by denying 
indigenous people and peasants’ requests for, or making it extremely difficult to achieve, 
legal recognition of land tenure (Bornschlegl, 2018; Murcia et al., 2015; Shade, 2015). In 
doing so, the state avoids having a legitimate population that which would need to be 
consulted about extractive activities and which could hold it accountable for them, as 
required by law (Ecuadorian Constitution, 2008, Art.57, No.7). Similarly, in cases where 
oil extraction takes place in territories whose indigenous populations have already 
secured legal tenure over land but who oppose extractive activities, the state has found 
ways to force oil extraction despite opposition (Lu, Valdivia & Silva, 2017; Cepek 2018; 
Mazabanda, 2013). 
This paper argues that, during the post-neoliberal period, strategies used by the 
Ecuadorian state to facilitate oil extraction in the Amazon include legalization of access 
to the surface of indigenous land for mining resources, and to control territory and 
people. It is notable that in the last ten years, 123 indigenous land titles have been 
granted; 82 of them are located in the Amazon and in provinces such as Morona Santiago 
and Zamora Chinchipe where mining activities are rapidly expanding (Sub-secretary of 
Land, 2018). Land has also been legally recognized in areas where communities with 
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land have already agreed to oil extraction and where pockets of land remained untitled. In 
other cases, territories that already hold indigenous land titles have been politically 
divided by mining interests; this has led to fragmentation of territories represented by 
councils that are more agreeable to oil extractive activities. This process is encouraged by 
inviting indigenous councils to participate both in territorial planning of land rich in 
mining resources and in processes that define how oil related compensations will be used 
in the territory. 
Post- Neoliberal Indigenous Territory 
 
The idea of territory and local space in Latin America has been used to talk both 
about political spaces over which the state has control and to refer to local populations’ 
claims on land and resources along ethnic lines (Sandoval, et al. 2017, pp. 56–58). 
Therefore, indigenous territory, legally recognized as such in the term “comunas,” has 
allowed indigenous people to claim ancestral lands by using the Commune Law, first 
passed in 1937, and it has also allowed the state an avenue to politically incorporate 
territories into the nation. 
Comunas have survived in the Ecuadorian legal framework due to their 
simultaneous use over time for both state and indigenous interests. For instance, between 
the 1950s and 1970s, comunas were part of state efforts to make territory legible through 
population surveys and the modernization of rural territory, particularly in the highlands 
(Yashar, 2005, pp. 89–97). Legal recognition of comuna territory was later discouraged 
in the 1980s and 1990s because the state was interested in opening rural land to the 
markets during the neoliberal period (Sanmartín, 2016, p. 96; Shade 2015, p. 779). 
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In 1990 and 1992, national indigenous uprisings challenged neoliberal laws that 
prevented legal recognition of indigenous territory, and those who accessed the land did 
so through great social strife. For instance, in the 1990s the Organization of Indigenous 
Nationalities of the Province of Pastaza (OPIP) requested recognition of large portions of 
territory for their people (Sawyer, 1994, pp. 47–48). In response, the state used the 
concept of comunas to legalize land not for the OPIP, but rather for specific indigenous 
populations on the land by drawing comunas arbitrarily on a map, where each comuna 
would have control over a piece of land (Sawyer, 2004, p. 51). Thus, the state does not 
view indigenous land as a territory, but as land in possession of specific indigenous 
groups organized as comunas. Despite this inconvenience, indigenous people find 
territorial comunas useful and have used them as an opportunity to organize politically 
along ethnic lines and to reproduce their material culture within their territories (Yashar, 
2005, pp. 61–88). Also, access to territorial comunas has legitimized indigenous people 
as interlocutors with the state and oil companies, although negotiations are in most cases 
not solved and sanctioned in their favor (Becker, 2013). As I show in the next sections of 
this paper, during the post-neoliberal period (2007–present), the state views territorial 
comunas as key to resource extraction when populations are likely to consent to 
extractive projects. 
Contemporary Role of Territorial Comunas 
 
Sandoval et al.’s (2017) overview of multiple understandings of territory from a 
Latin American perspective shows that territory is usually used to define lived and 
experienced space, space that is locally appropriated according to the diversity of people 
and places where actors have some degree of agency in shaping state and corporate 
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interventions (Escobar 2008; Erazo, 2013). Territory has also been conceptualized as a 
process in which capitalist forces, the state, and local actors influence the ways that 
territories are configured; in doing so, non-local actors engage in politics of scale, while 
locals struggle to control power dynamics that include sociopolitical processes and 
economics that shape territory (Bebbington, 1997, 2002; Korovkin, 1998; Noroña, 2014; 
Warnaars, 2013). 
 
Thus, territory has been seen both as a series of strategies used to contest state and 
corporate power, but also as a strategy that aligns with state and/or oil power, where the 
ultimate goal is to increase control over territory and indigenous autonomy (Anthias, 
2018; Lyall & Valdivia, 2015). Bebbington (2002, p. 412) explains that, given the 
strength of corporate and state powers, the challenge is not to resist structural change, but 
to control the processes that allow territorialization. 
Currently, indigenous people who can prove ancestral occupation of land and 
indigeneity can claim territory. In the current legal framework, indigenous territory is 
given in perpetuity and cannot be sold in the market (Ecuadorian Constitution, 2008, 
Art.57). Territorial comunas are considered basic units that can directly participate in oil- 
related development to the extent that indigenous plans and projects align with national 
planning. Comunas have the ability to administer and implement projects aimed at 
facilitating the incorporation of the Amazon into the rest of the country (COOTAD, 2010, 
Art. 308; Plan for the Territorial Organization of the Amazon, 2018). This provision is 
new, as in the past comunas were only used to facilitate state legibility and mediate the 
provision of state-led programs and services (Yashar, 2005). 
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Overall, the current state understanding of comunas departs from indigenous 
historical claims for territorial autonomy and greater participation in national planning, 
but in reality, legibility and state central planning reinforce state authority and western 
modernization through decentralization schemes, contradicting indigenous claims to 
exercise non-western forms of governance (Anthias, 2012; Hindery, 2013; Martinez- 
















Scheme. 1: Distribution of mining revenues among territorial comunas. 
 
 
Understanding Oil Volumes and Territorial Comunas 
 
According to Elden (2010), territory can be understood as a political technology 
that uses technical aspects to measure land and its resources and legal aspects to control 
terrain. Elden’s (2013, p. 35) work extends such aspects not only to the surface, but also 
to the subsoil, as accessing, securing, and thinking about underground volumes raises 
concerns and questions related to jurisdiction, authority, and administration. In terms of 
jurisdiction, for example, national historical struggles to access and secure underground 
51  
resources through mining laws often separate legal tenure of the surface from the subsoil 
(Bridge, 2013:56; Marston, 2019). This is the case of Ecuador, where mining resources 
have been nationalized and belong to the state regardless of diverse surface property 
regimes. In terms of authority, administration, and access, control of oil deposits depends 
on legal and institutional mechanisms that seek to secure access to surface points of 
entry, generating dynamic governance forms that often marginalize subordinated 
populations (Clark, 2017; Huber, 2015) 
Moreover, Elden (2013, p.45) and Almklov and Hepso (2011) show that the 
volume of resources such as oil is made legible through socio-technologies interested in 
the materiality of resources, its reach, the incline of geophysical structures, its fluidity, 
and its very material composition. Bridge (2013, p. 57) adds that speculation and 
calculation of resource volumes are key in defining how power is exercised on the 
surface. Thus, the price of mining resources, along with the national and international 
legislation that shapes access to and circulation of oil, depends in part on the ability to 
anticipate access to oil volumes and its flows (Limbert, 2015). Valdivia (2015), for 
example, shows that resource anticipation, along with geological and volumetric 
understanding of deposits, deeply affects regional cooperation strategies between 
Ecuador and neighboring countries. Therefore, the idea of volume, oil materiality and 
underground verticality that becomes material through slopes, cracks, and fractures 
shows that territory is not only the result of state and local struggles competing to control 
terrain and oil points of entry, the struggle is international as well. Processes to 
territorialize resources are the product of different production imperatives that respond to 
the material properties of underground volumes such as oil (Graham, 2004). 
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I argue that volumetric information informs state-led territorial reorganization 
while also affecting indigenous ability to secure land and access to resources. As 
described earlier, a large, recently constructed bureaucratic and institutional infrastructure 
must be navigated to incorporate those territories where the state’s presence has been 
weak. Locals who want to engage in processes of territorialization must have access to 
the state’s technocratic, legal, and volumetric knowledge in order to confront, resist, and 
adapt to state interventions. 
Although scholars have already documented how indigenous people have 
developed deeper understandings of domestic and international legislation to increase 
control over lands (Perreault, 2003; Colloredo-Mansfeld, 2009, among others), what 
occurs at present in the Amazon requires locals to not only master bureaucratic and legal 
knowledge, but also to gain some degree of knowledge about oil production. Although 
Watts (2004) documents similar processes in Nigeria, the difference in Ecuador is that the 
state makes, to some extent, this knowledge available to local populations in pursuit of a 
goal to incorporate indigenous peoples into the nation-state, creating alliances between 
the state and indigenous leaders who act as brokers with the state. Although this could be 
seen as an opportunity for indigenous people to access power through accessing 
knowledge, indigenous aspirations are usually limited by state-corporate economic and 
political power, as argued by Anthias (2018) in her analysis of indigenous efforts to 
control oil companies in Bolivia. 
In the context of comunas, which have agreed to oil extraction by negotiating 
access to land and/or oil compensations in the Amazon of Ecuador, locals must be able to 
understand basic information about oil infrastructure, such as where oil wells and 
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pipelines are located, in order to counter the state’s proposals to draw borders of 
indigenous territories before the land is legalized. To some extent, they need to 
understand calculations of oil activity and these activities’ social and environmental 
effects to assess how many people should be included in oil extractive compensations and 
how much compensation is needed to cover for possible environmental damages in the 
future. 
According to the Mining Law (2009, Art. 26), in addition to the geological studies 
produced by the oil industry, environmental impact assessments are required to guide 
corporate and state decisions regarding the payment of oil compensations, including 
investment in development and modernization. Such technical information should be 
provided to communities in a process called prior consultation that should take place 
before indigenous people decide whether or not to allow mining activities. Still, it is 
common that not all information is given to the people, and when it is provided it is given 
in deceptive ways (Verbeek, 2012; Shade, 2015; Vallejo & Garcia–Torres, 2017). Thus, 
local leaders must use existing networks and outside allies that can help them understand 




Scheme 2: Volumetric knowledge informs territorial decision-making process 
 
 
Post-Neoliberal Comunas and the Pañacocha Territory 
 
The national oil company of Ecuador, Petroamazonas, operates in 19 oil blocks 
throughout the Amazon (Hydrocarbons Secretariat, 2019). Due to the relative absence of 
the state’s presence in the area, the oil company was able to take a major role in the 
planning of territorial organization and in mediating the distribution of oil extraction 
compensations when it began operating in the region (Petroamazonas, 2010a, Ttl.1.2). 
Compensations usually include cash payments, the construction of modernizing 
infrastructure such as small health centers, and the provision of educational and 
productive projects. Compensations are similar to those provided by transnational oil 
companies during the neoliberal period when companies negotiated directly with 
communities by providing similar low-cost compensations and then departed without 
addressing environmental damages (Cepek, 2018; Sawyer, 2004, pp. 68–71). The 
difference now is that Petroamazonas has integrated compensations in an organized and 
methodical way as part of an extractive strategy required by the law. All compensations 
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are supposed to be discussed with the communities before the infrastructure projects start, 
but conversations usually involve only indigenous leaders and not the entire population. 
Currently, Petroamazonas has built 253 compensation-related small infrastructure 
projects in about 371 communities in the Amazon (Petroamazonas, 2014). 
Petroamazonas operates Oil Block 12, whose territory overlaps the provinces of 
Sucumbíos and Orellana. On the south side of the Napo River stand the block houses of 
the Station of Oil Facilities Edén, known as the EPF, which hosts 179 oil wells and an 
industrial station where crude oil is separated from water and gas (Petroamazonas, n/d). 
An underground pipeline brings crude from other platforms located in the northeastern 
side of Edén; crude is stored in the EPF for gas and water separation, so it can be 
transported to the coast for export (Petroamazonas, 2014, pp. 43–49). 
In addition to the Edén comuna, a number of indigenous territories are located in 
Oil Block 12; the most important ones are Santa Elena Association, Santa Elena, 
Pañacocha, and Corazón de Jesús. These communities have been very politically active 
despite hosting a small amount of oil infrastructure as compared to El Edén; an average 
of 39 wells, a pipeline, and formation water pools are located in these communities. 
Moreover, other communities benefit from oil extraction due to their proximity to oil 
infrastructure, even though oil operations don’t take place directly in their territories; 
some of these communities are Playas de Cuyabeno, Chontaurco, Pucapeña, and San 
Roque. All of these communities, with the exception of Pañacocha and Corazón de Jesús, 
were recognized as territorial comunas and, therefore, were granted territory prior to or 
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during oil extraction activities; for this reason, this paper refers to these two comunities 
as indigenous organizations rather than comunas. 
Fig. 1: Oil Block 12, oil infrastructure and communities. Map by R.J Theofield. 
(Hydrocarbons Secretariat, 2019; Geographic Military Institute, 2012; Noroña, 2017) 
 
 
Pañacocha and Corazón de Jesús are organizations both claiming an area of 
17,400 hectares of indigenous territory, and therefore both want to represent the 
legitimate comuna. These are competing grassroots organizations that together represent 
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a total of about 380 people that have lived in this territory since the 1940s, and thus land 
titles should have been granted to either organization prior to oil development. Despite 
the conflict, oil extraction, and therefore compensations and infrastructure development, 
have continued even though land legalization has not been completed, generating further 
conflicts detailed in the next section. I will refer to the land under dispute by these two 
organizations as the ‘Pañacocha territory’ throughout the paper. 
Petroamazonas’s control of the Pañacocha territory is important for oil 
transportation and the implementation of modernizing plans required by law. 
Simultaneously, comuna space became contested among the local people, who struggled 
to control the terms under which the borders of their land are delimited and the ways in 
which oil extraction compensations are made available to the population. 
The conflict between Corazón de Jesús and Pañacocha 
 
Local conflicts over ownership of the territory began in the 1990s when the U.S- 
based Occidental Petroleum Company (OXY) operated the block. Pañacocha and 
Corazón de Jesús were previously one unified territory represented by the Corazón de 
Jesús of Pañacocha Indigenous Centre (hereafter Indigenous Centre), initially organized 
in 1975. In 1993 the Indigenous Centre attempted to legalize the land, hoping that 
legitimation would allow them to be in a better position to negotiate with the oil 
company. Legalization was difficult because neoliberal agrarian laws passed in 1979 and 
1994 discouraged land distribution amongst indigenous communities and instead favored 
large landholdings associated with oil extraction and export production (Schuldt & 
Acosta 2009, pp. 10–15). 
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Around 2006, leaders from the community Playas de Cuyabeno coordinated with 
the Indigenous Centre and a number of communities in the block to form an indigenous 
oil company to operate the wells located in the northern part of the block and take the 
indigenous people’s future into their own hands. Indigenous leaders had received advice 
from Canadian indigenous entrepreneurs, and they attracted an investing oil company 
based in the U.S (Lyall, 2017; Wilson & Bayón, 2017, pp. 105–110) to develop the block 
after OXY’s contract expired in 2006. However, the state believed that an indigenous- 
controlled oil company was too radical and opposed the initiative. In addition, given that 
indigenous leaders didn’t oppose oil extraction, but instead wanted to increase their 
participation in oil planning and its profits as other indigenous coalitions have requested 
in the past (Sawyer, 2004, pp. 137–140), the government promised to deliver large oil 
extraction compensations to these communities including to the Pañacocha territory 
(Wilson & Bayón, 2017, p. 114). 
Because these negotiations had taken place at very high levels involving only the 
communities’ leaders, local populations were very concerned, as they had not been 
consulted during the negotiation processes. According to locals, many were under the 
impression that Indigenous Centre leaders had deceived them in order to get their support 
by failing to explain to them that outside mestizos (the racial majority in Ecuador) and 
foreigners were fully involved in the creation of the company. Thus, people thought that 
outsiders would reap most of the benefits if the company was ever to operate. 
In the meanwhile, Petroamazonas started to further divide the community by 
negotiating directly with groups of families located in areas where key infrastructure was 
located or was going to be built; therefore, it is not surprising that the populations 
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claimed smaller portions of land, forming their own territorial comunas and fully 
controlling access to subsoil resources in those specific sites. For instance, a group of 
families whose land is located near one of the most important oil platforms in the 
northern side of the block separated from its original territorial comuna Playas de 
Cuyabeno and created its own territorial comuna named Santa Elena Association (Wilson 
& Bayón, 2017, p. 111). And in 2001, an extended family in the Pañacocha territory 
whose land was located near one of the smaller oil platforms near the Napo River 
separated from the Indigenous Centre and created the territorial comuna Santa Elena. The 
decision of these communities to divide and fracture indigenous territories favored the oil 
company as negotiating with a few families in each comuna was easier than negotiating 
with larger constituencies that were already suspicious of their leaders. The female leader 
from Santa Elena community explained the following: 
We used to have too many conflicts with male leaders representing the 
community (Indigenous Centre); they would obtain oil compensations paid for the 
oil well located on my extended family’s plot of land, and resources were not 
fairly distributed among all families. . .I would confront these leaders frequently, 
and they would diminish my opinions because I am a woman. These leaders (the 
same that now represent Pañacocha) even threatened my family over the control 
of the well located in here . . . One day, while talking to an oil company engineer 
about these complaints, I got the idea that it would be easier for my extended 
family to manage the compensations directly. In any case the well is in our 
territory, and I was so tired of having to beg for redistribution. . . I decided to go 
to Shushufindi and Quito cities to learn the process of land titling in the Ministry 
of Agriculture. We eventually got titles (she shows me the paperwork and maps). 
Now we deal directly with the oil company, and other leaders can’t intervene. 
 
 
In 2007, a more severe territorial division took place when two groups of leaders 
emerged, those who identified as members of Corazon de Jesús and those who identified 
as members of Pañacocha. Both organizations claimed the land that initially belonged to 
the Indigenous Centre, and leaders from these organizations disagreed about the 
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management of the territory and oil-related compensations promised after Petroamazonas 
took over the block. For example, during fieldwork when meeting with six other families 
from Corazón de Jesús to talk about the conflicts with Pañacocha, family members said: 
“We have always had internal conflicts in the territory, but everything got worse when 
Petroamazonas arrived because there was so much money involved.” Another person 
added that “we disagree about how Pañacocha leaders negotiated the payment of 
compensations. . . whether paid in cash or in modernizing infrastructure; we are sure that 
oil money is appropriated by a few families instead of being redistributed among the 
families that need it the most. Another person in the meeting interjected by saying: “we 
cannot even participate in deciding what type of infrastructure is built and how. Just go 
see how badly built that Millennial City is or see what a waste of money it was to build 
showers and toilets for many family households.” In general, they concluded that families 
identified as Corazon de Jesús disagree with Pañacoha leaders on fundamentals related to 
the way oil and territorial planning takes place, and therefore, a myriad of conflicts 
emerge out of such disagreements. 
Oil Calculation and Comuna Territory as Tools of Legibility for Oil Expansion 
 
According to the Ministry of the Environment (MAE) and the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MAGAP), 54.7% of the territory disputed by the organizations is protected 
forest, thus falling under the control MAE (Forest Affairs Office-MAE, 2017). The 
remaining land, where most families live and subsist, is under the control of MAGAP. It 
is the responsibility of these ministries to identify the legitimate occupants of the territory 
to legalize the land. It is important to note that, according to the community’s historical 
accounts that begin with the arrival of indigenous and mestizo families in the 1940s, 
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Pañacochan families’ small landholdings for living and subsistence are mostly located 
near the Napo River. However, the area—which is considered part of the protected forest 
by MAGAP—had historically been used for hunting, but not for subsistence agriculture 
or for living purposes. Historic occupation of land near the river had been characterized 
by the tenure of specific plots of land by extended families; still, it was common for 
families to move up or down the river, rotating crops and the use of forest resources, 
creating an occupation of land that is permanent, but also dynamic (Santi, 2016). This 
system of land use has been slowly changing since the 1980s, when OXY first arrived, 
because eligibility for oil extraction compensations was based on permanent occupation 
(Cabodevilla, 1996, pp. 317-325), which encouraged families to hold onto specific plots 
of land. 
Currently, compensations are based on calculation of the distance between oil 
infrastructure and family landholdings, as suggested in environmental impact assessment 
documents and official development plans in Pañacocha (Petroamazonas, 2010b, Ttl. 1.5- 
1.10). However, those studies define affected areas in general terms and are not specific 
about which populations should or should not receive compensation. Due to this 
ambiguity, there is space for political maneuvering between the oil company and local 
populations when defining who should receive compensations and what form they will 
take. 
According to the documentation I collected during fieldwork, on numerous 
occasions in 2009 and 2010, Petroamazonas pressured MAE to legalize land located in 
the protected forest. This is because Petroamazonas was poised to build a pipeline across 
the forest to connect northern platforms with the EPF oil complex and needed a comuna 
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with which to begin negotiations about how much cash the comuna would receive for 
allowing the pipeline construction. This is an example of an attempt to make indigenous 
land legible, without a legal comuna, Petroamazonas cannot see anyone to negotiate with, 
whether or not that entity reflects lived realities in the communities in question. It is 
important to note that the company did not pressure the MAGAP to adjudicate land under 
its control; such land corresponds to areas used by the families for subsistence purposes 
near the river. Locals think this is because compensations for oil platforms located near 
households were paid on a family basis based on traditional occupation of land and the 
land’s proximity to oil infrastructure, alleviating the need to deal with the comuna. 
In one of the many letters sent to the MAE, the executive manager of 
Petroamazonas urges the ministry to legalize land immediately “so that Petroamazonas 
can deliver comuna compensations according to the law.” He adds that “compliance 
would prevent delays in the completion of the oil project [oil pipeline construction]” and 
that “failure to legalize land would bring a large economic loss to the country” 
(Petroamazonas, 2009, Letr. 4332). 
During that same period of time, Pañacocha leaders sent several letters to MAE 
officials and to the Office of the President of the Republic requesting that land be granted 
to their organization. They provided a series of arguments to legitimize Pañacocha as the 
recipients of the land. In one of the letters sent to President Correa, they appeal to the 
state’s discourse of the territory, which describes the Amazon as poor and in need of 
development. The letter expresses the leaders’ desire to become full citizens participating 
in the territorial transformation of the Amazon: 
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Our community is in extreme poverty as we don’t have basic services such as 
electricity and running water, nor roads or proper ports. . . our desire is to 
collaborate with the government and become diligent citizens instead of 
indifferent Indians. (Pañacocha, June 18, 2010, Letr.33) 
 
Given these pressures and the lack of understanding of the source of the conflict, MAE 
authorities adjudicated 9,519 hectares of protected forest to a list of 77 families who are 
the descendants of the oldest occupants of the land initially organized as the Indigenous 
Centre (Ministry of the Environment, 2010, Doc. 206), not considering that the 
population was politically divided between leaders representing Corazón de Jesus and 
Pañacocha interests (see figure No.2). Simultaneously, in the same document of 
adjudication, the land was given to the Pañacocha organization despite the fact that the 77 
families did not fully correspond to the list of families represented by the Pañacocha 
organization at that time. According to local accounts from both parties, the mistake 
occurred because in the process of waiting for the titling of the land, Petroamazonas had 
already begun unofficial negotiations with Pañacocha leaders, indirectly legitimizing 
Pañacocha’s authority in the territory and undermining the group of families represented 
by Corazon de Jesus’ leaders. According to local residents, early in the negotiations, 
Pañacocha leaders received motorized canoes and cash payments from the oil company to 
incentivize them to cooperate and keep the population in favor of oil activities. 
In addition, current geographical knowledge of the territory is shaped by recent 
transformations made possible by oil extraction. Locals divide the territory into three 
areas: Tereré, Pañacocha Centre, and Lower Pañacocha. Most Pañacocha leaders have 
traditionally held landholdings in Lower Pañacocha; those families were also granted 
homes in the nearby Millennial City (an urban infrastructure paid for with oil profits), 
along with the provision of utility infrastructure at their landholdings such as electricity, 
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toilets and water wells for a number of families. Ironically, most of the oil development 
infrastructure is located in Tereré, where many Corazón de Jesús leaders have had 
landholdings and where benefits from oil have not materialized as they have in Lower 
Pañacocha; for example, no piped water or electricity is available in Tereré. Thus, 
although most of the oil infrastructure is located in Tereré, families have not received oil 
extractive compensations as fully as families living in Lower Pañacocha. 
In addition, by excluding those community members opposed to Pañacocha 
leaders, Pañacocha increased control over communal space unofficially legitimized by 
the oil company. According to the law, if Pañacocha becomes the official comuna and 
receives the land, oil extraction compensations for activities in Tereré should be 
negotiated and paid to the territorial comuna through its leaders, rather than to individual 
families. Community members usually side with Pañacocha even though they accuse 
them of keeping oil benefits to themselves, maintaining that this is the only way to be 





Fig. 2. Legalized and non-legalized areas of the Pañacocha territory and geographical 
distribution of oil infrastructure, oil-compensations, and population. Map by R.J 
Theofield. (Geographic Military Institute, 2012; Noroña, 2017; Forest-Affairs-Office, 
2017; Ojeda, 2012) 
 
 
Authorities have tried to mediate the conflict between Pañacocha and Corazón de 
Jesus. In the process, Corazon de Jesus requested that the state either divide the land 
between the two organizations or title the land to individual families rather than to one 
community in order to solve the conflict. However, Pañacocha leaders have rejected this 
solution, as the land occupied and claimed by Corazón de Jesús has an oil platform and 
the pipeline in the Tereré area, so the only way to continue to receive benefits from that 
territory is by keeping the land communal. This conflict has also prevented the MAGAP 
from granting the remaining 7,874 hectares used for subsistence agriculture to either 
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organization. Overall, the national oil company becomes the reference for territorial 
reorganization, as final decisions related to whom to negotiate with rely on 
Petroamazonas assessment rather than on the assessment of MAE and MAGAP, 
demonstrating that oil interests are at the core of state legibility. 
Accessing and Securing Bureaucratic, Technical and Volumetric Knowledge 
 
Petroamazonas has an office of community relations with a multidisciplinary staff 
that maintains relations with communities, conducts negotiations with leaders, and plans 
social and compensation programs (Petroamazonas, 2014, p. 103). In the process, 
community relations personnel teach local leaders the basics of state bureaucracy as 
associated with oil infrastructure, oil development and compensations required by law; 
community relations personnel also rely on these leaders to mediate state-led 
development with the rest of the population. This process disempowers traditional 
systems of authority and instead empowers a new class of leaders (Erazo 2013, pp. 119- 
121, Wilson, 2010). In Pañacocha, leaders secure access to technical and volumetric 
knowledge by accessing it directly from Petroamazonas or other actors such as larger 
indigenous organizations, international actors such as the Canadian entrepreneurs initially 
helping local leaders with starting an indigenous oil company, and from outside mestizos, 
such as lawyers involved in negotiations. 
For example, during a night of festivities when former Pañacochan leaders had 
been drinking, one of them explained the following to me: 
Initially, before Petroamazonas started to work here, we wanted to create our own 
oil company, one that would belong to the community. A lawyer who was 
interested in partnering with us knew how to achieve this legally, and we agreed 
with the lawyer’s plan. We (the leaders) were willing to use our land as collateral 
for the initial investment. . . When that was not possible, some of us became close 
friends with Petroamazonas engineers; we helped them to secure consensus 
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among the families so they could take over the wells and build the pipeline. . . we 
know where the most important oil landmarks were located, that is why I told my 
brother to occupy land in Tereré . . . Petroamazonas has been very nice to us, and 
we have helped organize the people and keep things in peace. 
 
 
During this conversation, it was clear that the status of this particular leader had 
been heightened by his participation as a broker with the oil company and that 
Petroamazonas engineers had provided him and other leaders –those willing to 
cooperate– with important information about oil infrastructure. Another leader who 
participated in the conversation regretted not having the participation of the lawyer who 
had initially attempted to help them to create the indigenous oil company. Apparently, 
indigenous leaders were sharing volumetric information with the lawyer in order to 
obtain advice on how to improve negotiations with the oil company in order to benefit the 
leaders’ families. According to Corazón de Jesús families, they became aware of these 
underground negotiations, in which the lawyer was being paid by oil compensations 
received by community leaders on behalf of the community; thus, Corazon de Jesús 
leaders reported the lawyer to the authorities. 
Moreover, during this conversation, other indigenous leaders bragged about their 
knowledge of the future location of two additional wells that Petroamazonas might drill. 
One of them said: “we invited families that are our friends to come live in strategic 
locations.” These families that have been invited to live in Pañacocha are originally from 
nearby communities, and according to Pañacochan leaders, they had been welcomed to 
use land located in strategic locations in exchange for their loyalty and support to local 
leaders. When I asked about why those locations were strategic, they said, “those 
households received cash compensations because of their proximity to oil infrastructure, 
68  
and because we (the leaders) have helped them, they will continue to support us,” 
implying that compensations paid to those families have been shared to some extent with 
local leaders. 
In addition, Pañacocha leaders prevent other community members from accessing 
information by excluding them from leadership positions and by refusing to share 
knowledge. A good example is the urban development known as the Millennial City, 
built in 2014 in the middle of the jungle, which is comprised of approximately 75 tin-roof 
cement homes, a school, a health center, a police station, and administrative offices. This 
urban area was given to the population living in the disputed territory as part of the 
reinvestment of 12% of oil revenues (Petroamazonas, 2013). 
According to accounts from Corazón de Jesús and Pañacocha community 
members, most of the population requested that homes be built at each family’s 
landholding, and many requested the use of traditional materials such as wood and palm 
for the roofs. However, Pañacocha leaders and state officials decided without consulting 
with the population that, transportation of materials to each landholding would be too 
complicated and expensive as families live scattered along the river. Moreover, families 
located in Tereré that identify with Corazón de Jesus wanted the homes to be built in their 
communal space, while some families living in Lower Pañacocha identifying with 
Pañacocha leaders wanted the construction to take place closer to them. 
According to a former local parish authority, it was clear that local leaders were 
hiding information related to the construction of the city from the rest of families; this 
parish authority told me that hiding information reinforces not only leaders’ political 
power but also economic power. For example, the authority explains “the leaders, and the 
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developers of the millennial city used cheap materials in the construction saving money 
that was later redistributed among themselves.” 
At the end, around 50 homes, the school, and health center were built in the 
Pañacocha Center, the remaining 15 homes were built in Tereré, which is also the area 
where the oil platform and pipeline are located (see fig 3). However, the homes in Tereré 
lack electricity, water, and sewer system making the homes unusable; in contrast, clean 
water and electricity are provided in Pañacocha center, and the sewer system is working, 
although with some problems. Locals complain that negotiations did not have the full 
consent of the population; moreover, they were not fully informed of the rationale 
informing these decisions. 
Beneficiaries of the homes don’t live in the urbanized development as there is no 
space for subsistence agriculture, and the Pañacocha parish, which has authority over the 
urbanization, prohibits residents from growing food or raising animals for consumption. 
According to state documents, state plans include turning Millennial Cities into urban 
centralities where most social services can be available to the rest of the population 
scattered up and down the river (Petroamazonas, 2010a; 2013). Most beneficiaries 
continue to live on their landholdings and visit the cement homes on the weekends. 
Moreover, although the Millennial City was a compensation given to the 
community (whether represented by Pañacocha or by Corazón de Jesús), very recently 
the Municipality of Shushufindi took control of the city in order to maintain structures 
that are quickly decaying. For example, the sewer system needs to be rebuilt as pipes are 
too narrow and have collapsed; now grey water ends up in the Napo River. Still, no 
institution has taken care of the homes built in the Tereré area, despite the fact that they 
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are in worse condition. Members from Corazón de Jesús explained that building a few 
homes in Tereré was a strategy to appease family claims for participation and better 
redistribution of oil compensation; however, they think neither Petroamazonas nor local 
Pañacocha leaders were actually interested in improving redistribution. In addition, given 
that the legal status of the comuna is in question, beneficiaries who never received titles 
to their homes (because the homes were supposed to belong to the territorial comuna) 
fear losing what they view as a small inheritance in exchange for oil operations. This 
anxiety applies to all 75 homes. 
Petroamazonas’s decision to undermine the conflict between the competing 
organizations and to negotiate only with Pañacocha legitimizes it as the de-facto owner of 
the land, encouraging many indigenous families to remain part of Pañacocha even though 
they don’t agree with the leaders representing them. As one female head of a household 
expressed: 
There is nothing else for us to do than allow them [the leaders] to continue to put 
money in their pockets. We don’t understand how to speak to the oil company…. 
I don’t even know what those machines behind my house are [she refers to a 
fenced oil platform]. At least with the leaders we end up getting something. 
(Personal interview, August 2, 2017) 
 
 
According to a Corazón de Jesús leader, Pañacocha leaders prevent them from getting 
involved in any type of negotiation because they fear losing their access to the oil 
company and their monopoly on technocratic, bureaucratic, and volumetric information: 
Pañacocha leaders prevent us from getting involved in politics by destroying 
documentation and hiding important information from the community members. 
They’re afraid we could take over their expertise, expose the truth and do things 
differently…. Moreover, when Pañacocha community members have requested 
that oil company officials attend general assemblies to clarify irregularities, oil 
company officials have said they didn’t have the time to explain to over 100 
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people what these negotiations are about; that’s why leaders were already briefed 
on these details. (Personal interview, September 12, 2017). 
 
 
Corazón de Jesús and Pañacocha community members have turned to Petroamazonas and 
other state institutions such as MAE and MAGAP, holding them accountable for what 
they view as development that has benefited only an emerging class of leaders. Often, the 
response of these institutions has been to cite the autonomy that indigenous communities 
have in their territories to administer projects and the economic resources that come from 
oil revenues and oil-related benefits. Sawyer (2004, pp. 137-146), who documented 
similar behavior by oil corporations during the neoliberal period, compares this strategy 
to Ferguson’s anti-politics machine (Ferguson, 1994). She points out that the state and 
companies deny their participation in the creation of the conflicts by claiming that they 
are internal problems that comunas should solve. 
Moreover, the advantage that Pañacocha leaders have over the rest of the 
population rests on its access to oil volumetric knowledge. For example, in a letter sent to 
Petroamazonas, Pañacocha leaders claim that paying oil platform and pipeline 
compensations to individual families living in Tereré would be unfair for the community, 
and they make a case for making payments available to their organization: 
As you know, an oil spill located at the beginning of the flux line [the beginning 
of the pipeline] would likely damage the Pañayacu lake and the Napo River…. 
And as you know, besides the families that have received a millennial house, most 
of the families in Pañacocha rely on river water for survival. Therefore, pipeline 
compensations should be paid to all the Pañacocha comuna instead of individual 
families. (Pañacocha, Feb 12, 2013, letr. No.52). 
 
In this particular case, the oil company decided to pay compensations only to 
those families whose land was intersected by the oil pipeline, as well as to those families 
located near the oil platform, many of them from Corazón de Jesús. According to an 
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interview with a Petroamazonas official working in the block, the only platform built in 
what Pañacocha leaders deem as their territory is in Tereré, and that platform produces 
very little oil compared to other platforms in the block. According to him, initial oil 
calculations of the Tereré oil platform misrepresented oil output, leading Petroamazonas 
to wrongly negotiate large compensations with Pañacocha. If knowledge of actual oil 
production was available when negotiations took place back in 2010, the Pañacocha 
territory would not have received the Millennial City. However, he added that if the oil 
pipeline breaks, then the risks are high, as the combined flux flow of almost 30 
productive wells could get out of control contaminating the area. Because of this danger, 
it makes sense for Pañacocha leaders to have requested compensations for the pipeline to 
be paid to the comuna, rather than to individuals. 
On the other hand, Corazón de Jesús’ leaders and the population they represent 
have reached out to lawyers, cartographers, and indigenous people from other 
communities that understand oil politics to help them make a case against Pañacocha’s 
leaders’ monopoly on oil knowledge. These leaders counter Pañacocha’s political 
advantage by mapping their landholdings and documenting the ways in which they 
believe to have been unfairly treated when receiving oil extraction compensations, 
especially given their geographical proximity to oil infrastructure. These claims have 
effectively prevented MAE and MAGAP from deciding which organization should 
receive the land. 
These examples show how oil knowledge complements technocratic and 
bureaucratic knowledge, proving that the apparatus created by the state to reorganize 
territory in the Amazon requires indigenous people to access such knowledge to 
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guarantee their fair participation in comuna-based territorial development. Still, as this 
article shows, even when the conditions for accessing and securing such knowledge 
depend on government institutions and indigenous leadership, there is always space for 
maneuvering. Indigenous populations are resourceful when building networks and 
finding allies to cooperate with them in accessing and producing information. 
Although the case study provided reveals how struggles to access volumetric 
knowledge can produce territorial fractures, uneven development, and local rivalries, not 
all communities behave the same way. Neighboring communities such as El Edén, whose 
territory holds the largest oil complex currently operated by Petroamazonas in the 
Amazon, have a reputation of better indigenous management of oil-related development. 
Given their proximity to the Pañacocha territory, additional interviews were conducted in 
El Edén; according to local families, their leaders have been more successful in making 
benefits available to most of the population. In addition, according to local perceptions, 
information related to oil development is usually shared with the community in ways that, 
although not perfect, are more transparent than those used in Pañacocha. More 
importantly, families interviewed recognized that understanding oil processes and legal 
frameworks associated with oil extraction had been key for their leaders in negotiating 
with Petroamazonas for favorable terms. As such, they believe that their ability to 
maintain control over their territory along with their political autonomy as a comuna is 
directly linked to their leaders’ understandings of oil and their ability to negotiate and 
lobby in favor of the whole community. 
Conclusion 
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Unlike the neoliberal period, economic restructuring during the post-neoliberal 
era has been characterized by a high level of state intervention and territorial organization 
to facilitate oil extraction, mining, and large-scale infrastructure. This restructuring 
requires the state to transform territory where it has historically been absent or weak into 
a place that can be easily abstracted and understood by state officials. 
I have argued that a special kind of legibility that includes indigenous land 
legalization has become important for the state to access and secure subsoil resources. 
Although land grabbing along with the criminalization of protest have been described in 
the literature as state strategies to secure access to mining and oil resources, land titling of 
indigenous territories is also becoming a common practice used by the state to access 
surface rights and secure sub-surface oil. Thus, the increase in land legalized to 
indigenous communities in the Amazon in the last ten years merits further analysis. 
In this sense, the state provides incentives for peripheral territories and 
populations to welcome extraction by participating in territorial reorganization and 
planning as far as local participation aligns with state plans for modernization. 
Communities likely to cooperate could claim indigenous territory along with access to oil 
extraction compensations. In addition, the state reinforces a discourse in which 
indigenous ways of life are seen as backwards and poor and in which social development 
and modernization paid with oil profits are portrayed as necessary for local and national 
progress, justifying extraction and neo-colonization in indigenous rural and peripheral 
territories. 
More importantly, I have argued that state legibility requires not only technical, 
legal and bureaucratic knowledge, but also volumetric oil information that entails basic 
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understandings of the ways in which the oil industry works, knowledge of the location of 
infrastructure, understanding of the estimated volume and importance of oil reserves, as 
well as calculations of possible environmental effects. Thus, volumetric knowledge 
becomes key to state territorializing processes and to local struggles to secure land and 
livelihoods as the state expands the oil extractive frontier. 
This case study of Pañacocha in Oil Block 12 illustrates how the distribution of 
oil infrastructure defines the ways that indigenous territories are legalized and therefore 
the way in which they become legible to oil industry and state officials. This case study 
also describes the processes through which oil extraction compensations, along with 
state-led development and modernization, serve as powerful tools used to persuade 
indigenous leaders to welcome oil development. Through these processes, the state 
fosters a new class of indigenous leaders that mediates state development and 
modernization. This case study also portrays the ways in which technical, legal and oil 
knowledge are at the core of indigenous contestation. Thus, access to specialized 
knowledge shapes territorial struggles between communities and the state as well as 
internal land conflicts characterized by the competition of indigenous families to secure 
information that enables access to oil-related compensations. 
Finally, despite the incongruencies that post-neoliberal legibility poses for 
territorial comunas, indigenous people find them useful to further their own agendas. In 
this context of state and local access to territory, increased participation in plaining, and 
access to specialized knowledge, local indigenous leaders and competing community 
members unleash processes of resistance and contestation that evidence the shortcomings 
of large-scale central planning. Finally, as documented so often in the past, indigenous 
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people appropriate what seems to be hegemonic knowledge, discourses, and agendas to 
reformulate their own thoughts and needs and to reorganize their struggles in 
unpredictable ways. Although this case study shows how state-led intervention deepens 
internal conflict and uneven distribution of oil-related compensations, it is clear that local 
indigenous people are not naïve, nor powerless, and that they continue to push against 
internal class formations and the very legal frameworks and institutions they initially 




RECLAIMING MARGINALITY: FOREST LIVELIHOOD RESPONSE TO OIL 





Rural and indigenous people’s responses to the rapid expansion of mining and oil 
extraction in frontiers like the Amazon rainforest has become an area of much 
contestation and scholarly attention in the last 20 years (Bebbington, 2012; Bury & 
Bebbington, 2013). Political ecology research has studied the expansion of mining as 
associated to decreased access to resources key to survival, showing that the indigenous 
response is usually resistance and confrontation with states and mining companies 
(Hindery, 2013; Bury & Norris, 2013). However, there are also cases of cooperation with 
mining activities in which rural and indigenous peoples are encouraged or coerced into 
accepting mining investments and waged labor while losing access to traditional ways of 
life (Lyall &Valdivia, 2015; Hall et al., 2015). Furthermore, scholars have also analyzed 
the ways in which locals consider participation in oil extraction as a strategy to increase 
control over territories and oil environmental impacts (Anthias, 2018; Lyall & Valdivia, 
2015). 
I add to the existing literature by arguing that local response does not always 
result in acts of resistance, coercion or cooperation. Instead, populations offer ambiguous 
responses that suit local material needs for survival and a local desire to be included in 
power dynamics. I examine the case of the Pañacocha community, located in the Amazon 
region of Ecuador to illustrate that ambiguous responses can be better understood as the 
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outcome of tactical subjectivity (Sandoval, 2000). I argue that tactical subjectivity, in the 
case of Pañacocha, consists of locals’ conscious participation in some aspects of state-led 
modernization paid by oil profits and rejection of others. Thus, although Pañacochan 
families prefer their traditional ways of life and reject logics of accumulation and market 
productivity, they also embrace certain aspects of state-led modernization and the 
payment of oil compensations as long as it is used to carry out local ideas of what 
constitutes their quality of life. I also illustrate how, as the population engages in tactical 
subjectivity, families create spaces to escape oil politics, if only for a while, and treat 
western assets as symbols of power historically denied to them. 
To arrive at these conclusions, I use an analysis of livelihood strategies 
(Bebbington, 1999), precarity, and border thinking theory (Tsing, 1994; Mignolo, 2012) 
to explain how locals negotiate between material needs, local understandings of what 
constitutes a meaningful quality of life, and their desire for a share in power historically 
denied to marginal populations. These frameworks allow understanding decision-making 
processes at the household level, using the subjective position of local families 
concerning the state and oil development. 
Understanding livelihood strategies in the light of tactical subjectivity is important 
to inform mainstream policy prescriptions, but it is even more important when 
considering how much indigenous families need access to information. This need is 
urgent when approximately 371 communities in the provinces of Sucumbíos, Orellana, 
and Pastaza are undergoing modernization and are the recipients—willing or not—of 
development programs paid for by oil profits (Petroamazonas, 2014). Under these 
conditions, Pañacocha and surrounding communities feel disempowered, forced to lose 
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control over resources that are necessary for basic survival (Wilson & Bayón, 2017; 
Santi, 2016). However, as this study shows, despite the power differentials between 
communities and the nexus of state-oil power, indigenous agency impacts state 
intervention and redefines the local quality of life in particular ways. 
The Pañacocha Community 
 
The Pañacocha community is composed of around 95 households whose territory 
overlaps with Oil Block 12 in the province of Sucumbíos in the Amazon region of 
Ecuador. State officials identify indigenous and non-indigenous families - also known as 
‘colonos’ - as the oldest landholders in modern times. Indigenous families from 
Payamino (near Coca city, see fig.1) arrived in the area in the 1940s with Capuchin 
missionaries, who founded a center in Pañacocha to evangelize, educate and organize 
indigenous people along the Napo River (Goldaraz, 2016). Colonos are the descendants 
of landholders who had held land near Pañacocha before the 1941 war with Perú. 
Landholders usually used indigenous indentured labor for agriculture and to tend 
farms (Santi, 2016) used for subsistence and in the trade of products along the Napo 
River with Perú. After the 1941 war with Peru, several landholding families were forced 
to move out of the areas of conflict; they relocated in or near Pañacocha. Over time, most 
landholdings lost indigenous labor as the Capuchin mission started to organize and help 
indigenous families to free themselves from landlords (Goldaraz, 2016). Without 
indentured labor, colono families adopted rural economies and lifestyles. Over time, 
colono and indigenous families have intermarried, maintaining blood ties and similar 
subsistence practices. For instance, most families have relied on subsistence agriculture, 
forest foraging, hunting, and fishing, and they have had contact with markets over the 
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decades through merchants who would exchange goods in cities. As merchants traveled 
the Napo River, they would provide local families scattered throughout the area with 
goods such as machetes, matches, nails, fishing nets, and candles, amongst other goods; 
and in exchange, they would collect maize, plantains, and wild game to sell in the cities. 
Politically, Pañacocha families have remained semi-isolated as historically there 
have been no roads, communications infrastructure, or state institutions that could 
effectively connect communities along the Napo River with political centers. For 
instance, the registration of births, weddings, and deaths was only possible in Coca City. 
Health services were only available in Coca and Rocafuerte, a post founded by the 
Capuchin Mission where they had a school and a health center available to the local 
population. Getting to Coca and Rocafuerte required two days of travel by river. 
Communities did not have access to Ecuadorian identifications until the 1970s; therefore, 
they were nonexistent for the state, as there was no registry of those populations. 
During the 1970s, oil extractive activities began in the provinces of Sucumbíos 
and Orellana. Oil prospecting and extraction arrived in Pañacocha in 1985 with arrival of 
the Occidental Petroleum Corporation. This company ran operations up until 2006, when 
Ecuador terminated Occidental’s contract and allowed the National Oil Company, 




Fig.1. Pañacocha community and distance to other communities and cities. Map by R.J 
Theofield (Hydrocarbons Secretariat, 2018; Geographic Military Institute, 2012) 
 
 
In addition, Ecuador has recently passed legislation aimed at bringing peripheral 
territories rich in natural resources under its control (Vela-Almeida, 2018). Among these 
laws are the National Development Plan (2017–2021), the Mining Law (2009), and the 
Plan for the Territorial Organization of Amazon (2018); these laws seek to reorganize 
territory in ways that facilitate oil extraction and reinvest oil profits in development and 
the modernization of communities. The state uses the National Oil Company, 
Petroamazonas, to implement and enforce these laws; Petroamazonas, in coordination 
with other state institutions, is responsible for the construction of modern infrastructure 
and development of projects in over 371 communities located in 19 oil blocks throughout 
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the Amazon (Petroamazonas, 2014, p. 103). For example, by 2014, Petroamazonas had 
implemented 253 infrastructure projects in these communities; these projects extend 
state-led education, health, basic services, productive infrastructure, and projects in areas 
where the state was previously absent. Petroamazonas is promoting the cultivation of 437 
hectares of coffee and cacao aimed at supplying the markets (Petroamazonas, 2014, p. 
107); and in Pañacocha, Petroamazonas has built an urbanized area with 75 cement 
homes known as the Millennial City. It has also provided cash compensations, 
agricultural programs, and wage labor opportunities aimed at encouraging families to 
engage with the markets and move towards urbanization. These programs promote 
conditions for the loss of land and livelihoods, decreasing families’ abilities to relate to 
forest resources, thereby generating dependence on state-led programs (Borras Jr., 
Franco, Gómez, Kay, Spoor, 2012; Harvey, 2009). 
Methodology 
 
This study looks at livelihood response to the expansion of oil extraction and state 
intervention in Pañacocha. It does so by analyzing the efforts of local families to secure: 
1) access and control to clean water and food, 2) use of cash compensations, 3) use of 
wage labor and productive projects. Additionally, this study contrasts livelihood 
responses from the study period (2017) with livelihood conditions 12 years ago. To 
understand livelihood conditions in the past, I conducted a focus group with 12 
indigenous and colono people of the area, six from Pañacocha community and six from 
the El Edén, Sani and Santa Elena communities; all are neighbor communities with 
Pañacocha facing similar conditions (see fig.1). 
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With the help of one research assistant, I engaged in participant observation and 
semi-structured interviews with 20 percent of the households in Pañacocha (20 out of 95 
households), spending an average of 10 days with each household. We documented 
observations and made systematic entries concerning family daily activities (see points 1 
to 3 above). To clarify this information and add depth, we also held interviews and 
unstructured conversations with family members. Finally, the researcher conducted semi- 
structured interviews with key informants such as the school principal at the Millennial 
City, community elders, and Petroamazonas personnel. The analysis of this information 
entailed organization and coding of observations and semi-structured interviews 
according to the above categories; response frequencies were established among 
households and then compared to livelihood conditions in the past. 
Landgrabs 
 
Landgrabs here refers to the processes by which local populations lose control 
over land and/or their means of subsistence as a consequence of state and corporate 
interests in natural resources, including agricultural land, water, and oil, amongst others 
(Peluso & Lund, 2011). Such processes don’t always require expulsion of local 
populations; instead, land grabbing includes processes aimed at controlling the resource 
grabbing mechanism (Ribot & Peluso 2003; Borras et al., 2012). Specifically, although 
families stay on the land, their labor is absorbed by industries, their lands are leased to 
private investors, or families agree to cooperate with industries in exchange for economic 
inclusion (Borras et al., 2012; de L.T-Oliveira, 2013). Conditions for this type of 
dispossession are produced by the systematic identification of peripheral or marginal land 
held under ambiguous tenure regimes (Li, 2014; Makki, 2018). Thus, marginality is 
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often produced by ambiguity that results from the lack of state presence in those areas, or 
by the lack of state claims on the land. 
These conditions flourish when there is a lack of private property, for example, 
when the territory has been populated by communities under communal forms of land 
tenure. In these situations, national legislation may recognize certain indigenous or 
customary rights, but those rights are often treated as less legitimate than the individual 
or corporate rights recognized by the state (Correia, 2018). It is precisely the ambiguity 
between customary and private rights that allows states to legally maneuver in favor of 
transnational capital and private property to the dispossession and detriment of 
communities with customary rights. 
Scholars have long theorized and documented such legal ambiguity and how it 
allows for the dispossession of land and livelihoods (Anthias & Radcliffe, 2015; Correia, 
2018; Sawyer, 2004; Anthias, 2018). In the case of Ecuador, the state has taken 
advantage of this ambiguity in favor of mining and oil extraction interests, especially in 
areas where the state presence has been previously weak, as in the case of Pañacocha, or 
in areas where local populations have no legal titles over land (Sawyer, 2004). Moreover, 
the state justifies resource extraction and dispossession of livelihoods by using discourses 
and legal frameworks that portray traditional ways of life as backward and poor, so that 
they must invest oil profits in development and modernization to raise standards of living 
(Vallejo, 2014; Martinez-Sastre, 2015, pp. 237–238). 
Land grabs and dispossession are frequently mediated by local leaders, who feel 
pressured and persuaded by the state and oil companies to collaborate with oil 
development and state intervention. Leaders might sign agreements with states or 
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transnational capital without fully understanding their consequences (Lu, Valdivia & 
Silva 2017, pp. 200–201). Moreover, as scholars have shown, even when leaders 
understand the consequences of oil extraction (Lyall & Valdivia, 2015, p. 30; Anthias, 
2018), they sometimes sign legal documents without the full consent of their populations 
(Li, 2014, p. 598). Indeed, knowledge of the logic of the state apparatus and the oil 
industry grants local leaders a position to negotiate the terms under which modernization 
and oil extraction take place (Erazo, 2013; Wilson, 2010). These negotiations are often 
not shared with the rest of the population, thus, a response to oil expansion usually has 
two sides: on the one hand, a response that represents leaders’ efforts to act on behalf of 
their populations, and on the other hand, the daily struggles the population itself deals 
with as they adapt to the changing circumstances (Indigenous Women’s Mandate, 2018). 
As I found in Pañacocha, leaders welcomed oil extraction in exchange for 
communal land titles as well as access to oil compensations sanctioned in the 2009 
Mining Law. Also, even when titles to land have not yet been secured, access to oil 
compensations and modernization have materialized through the construction of 
modernizing infrastructure and the payment of cash compensations. However, as in other 
examples of imposed modernization in resource frontiers (Scott, 1998), families complain 
about not agreeing to the terms under which modernization and development take place. 
Livelihood Strategies 
Given the structural forces aimed at controlling land rich in resources, livelihoods 
that depend on land and control over the means of subsistence become precarious. 
According to Tsing, precarity in this context can be defined as “livelihoods without 
security”, where changing with the circumstances is equated with survivability (Tsing, 
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2015, pp. 3, 27). Precarity is both a stress on families and also serves as a strategy and an 
opportunity to take advantage of existing and imposed assets, networks, political power 
and structural forces (Scoones, 2009; Bebbington, 2004; Alobo-Loison, 2015). According 
to Bebbington (1999), livelihood strategies are shaped mainly by the following: a) 
people’s perceptions of what counts as well-being, b) access to natural resources and 
assets such as modernizing infrastructure, c) awareness of the structural conditions that 
produce dispossession, d) awareness of networks of outside allies and institutions and e) 
ability to create meaning out of situations of dispossession, as well as from opportunities 
to access assets. 
According to Bebbington (1999) and Escobar (2008), populations are forced to 
change with the circumstances, and in the process, they learn from the structural forces 
shaping their reality. For instance, modernizing infrastructure can become “vehicles for 
instrumental action” that transform traditional knowledge by adding new meanings that 
lead to new forms of agency, empowering decision-making processes where people have 
more leverage to decide how to change (Bebbington, 1999, p. 2022). Escobar (2008, 
Ch.4) has also written extensively about how community access to assets and knowledge 
through networks of allies allows them to adapt to oppressive environments, challenging 
the conditions under which dispossession takes place. However, despite these 
opportunities, power dynamics continue to affect marginalized populations, as economic 
interests usually favor national and corporate agendas that undermine communities’ 
needs while reinforcing racism and mainstream economic systems (Hale, 2005; Escobar, 
2008; Vallejo, 2014). 
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Political ecologists, for instance, have documented how families living in 
peripheral areas of the Amazon of Ecuador respond to market integration; their results 
show lack of control over resources that are key to survival lead to poor nutrition, 
affecting average growth of children (Lu, 2007; Lu et al., 2010; Houck et al., 2013). 
Other studies have discussed how development and modernization programs offered as 
oil compensations in the Amazon seek to replace communities’ ties with the forest, 
creating a dependence on state-led services and forcing market logics upon indigenous 
populations (Cielo, Coba & Vallejo, 2016; Cielo & Carrión, 2018). Indeed, 
Petroamazonas hopes to transform local families into entrepreneurs by offering 
agricultural assistance to help them produce for the markets. However, based on 
historical evidence of similar state programs operating in indigenous highland 
communities between the 1940s and 1970s (Yashar 2005), we know that such efforts do 
not always achieve all of the state’s goals because technical assistance and training are 
necessary along with access to markets and capital investments, not to mention families’ 
willingness to participate. Still, these elements are not present in current state efforts in 
the Amazon (Lu, Valdivia & Silva 2017). 
Participation in Oil Extraction as an Access Strategy 
 
Local willingness to directly participate in oil development often functions as a 
mechanism to increase control over natural resources and assets; in other words, 
participation in oil extraction functions as a mechanism to control how land and 
livelihoods are grabbed (Borras Jr. et al., 2012). For example, indigenous leaders have 
tried to start their own oil companies, participate in them as shareholders, and be involved 
in state oil planning to increase control over the terms under which environmental 
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impacts and oil extraction compensations are paid to local families (Anthias, 2018; Lyall 
& Valdivia, 2015; Sawyer, 1994). Others studying grassroots responses to corporate 
power have discussed how rural families seek active incorporation into corporate value 
chains as a way to secure inclusion in wage labor and access to markets (Hall et al., 2015; 
Martin et al., 2016; Gilberthorpe & Hilson, 2016). 
Moreover, Lyall and Valdivia (2015) argue that communities’ decisions to 
participate in oil extraction are often explained not only by the need to increase control 
over livelihoods, but also by their pursuit of inclusion in systems of power from which 
they have been excluded along ethnic lines. According to many researchers, initiatives 
such as the construction of ports, the building of urbanizations like the Millennial City, 
and state-led services in the Amazon are a façade that function as an aesthetic simulation 
of modernity to enchant and pacify locals in exchange for oil extraction support (Wilson 
& Bayón 2017; Cepek 2018; Vallejo 2014). Although these projects might not 
successfully incorporate families into the markets immediately, they affect living 
conditions and introduce modernization as an ideal among local families. Thus, local 
subjectivities often seek to emulate western ways of living to ease the power differentials 
that have divided them from the rest of the nation-state, but such emulation do not change 
power relations. 
Consider for instance Sani and Añangu communities (see fig.1), both located near 
the Napo River. Sani agreed to oil operations in exchange for the construction of tourist 
infrastructure that would benefit the community, while Añangu benefited from the 
assistance of an NGO working with sustainable tourism. Although some control is 
gained, there are still huge power differentials, Sani for example considers that they could 
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have negotiated a better deal with the oil company when negotiations took place. 
Moreover, after agreements with the oil company and NGO respectively were over, 
communities found themselves unable to run the business side of touristic initiatives 
successfully; instead, they rely on outside expert labor, placing them at a disadvantage 
once more (Personal interviews with Sani and Añangu indigenous leaders, August 2 and 
September 14, 2017). Communities grow frustrated, feeling alienated and forced into 
ways of living or circumstances they did not choose, whether they agree or disagree with 
oil extraction (Thill, 2018; Lu, Valdivia & Silva, 2017, pp. 133–175). 
This study complements prior scholarship by arguing that, despite these 
adversities, livelihood strategies in Pañacocha include nuanced forms of agency based on 
tactical subjectivity (Sandoval, 2000), an exercise that locals might not even be aware of. 
Tactical subjectivity allows local families to partially embrace and reject certain aspects 
of cash compensations, modernizing infrastructure, and extraction based on different 
circumstances. Livelihood strategies are also the result of families’ efforts to materially 
cope with dispossession as they struggle to level economic power differentials with the 
state and oil companies. As the results section demonstrates later in this article, families 




While dispossession takes place through the identification of peripheral land as 
marginal in relation to the state and corporate power, colono and indigenous populations 
living in Pañacocha are not entirely marginal to the state, nor are they part of the state 
apparatus. As Tsing puts it (1993, pp. xi, 9), “populations living in marginal areas share 
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understandings of expanding capitalism, and they speak from spaces and subjectivities 
that cannot be situated inside nor outside state and corporate power." 
It is precisely this in-between marginality that reveals the instability of categories 
such as resistance versus willingness to cooperate with modernization and development 
(Tsing, 1993). Other authors have called this in-between state border thinking or double 
consciousness (Mignolo, 2012), third space (Bhabha, 1994, ch.1), and trickster 
consciousness (Vizenor, 1990), among others. Rather than defining an alternative space 
in which livelihood strategies might operate in Pañacocha, I pay attention to the processes 
through which locals produce marginal ways of responding. Specifically, I find that it is 
between the awareness of structural power and local understandings of what counts as 
quality of life that marginal or border thinking becomes tangible in Pañacocha. Indeed, 
border or marginal thinking is the result of the very processes through which territory and 
people in Pañacocha become marginal to the state and oil interests and where indigenous 
and colono rights become subordinate to corporate interests, as explained by Li (2014). I 
argue that this state of marginalization also allows for the possibility of acting on survival 
strategies that dance between a partial embrace and a rejection of power dynamics; this 
study refers to such strategies and processes as “tactical subjectivity,” as suggested by 
Sandoval (2000, pp. 54–59). 
Sandoval argues that tactical subjectivity can be understood as the awareness of 
the marginal location of a subject concerning oppressive forms of power that allows 
subjects’ ability to move between positionalities according to their needs. In this process 
the subject makes use of whatever is available to speak to power, for instance, it requires 
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looking at oneself at the crossroads of many possibilities where loyalties shift depending 
on survival, moral, or political imperatives (Sandoval, 2000, p. 30). 
Sandoval thinks of tactical subjectivity in the context of feminist efforts for social 
liberation, thus it is “performative” and aimed at securing political influence (2000, p. 
62). I argue that families in Pañacocha engage in tactical subjectivity not only to increase 
control over their livelihoods, but also as a political tool to distance themselves from oil 
politics and modernization. Thus, a model to explain livelihood strategies in peripheral 
areas could add tactical subjectivity to Bebbington’s livelihoods model (1999). Important 
livelihood strategies that require consideration when analyzing peripheral areas of 
extraction would include people’s ability to participate in tactical subjectivity in addition 
to the following aspects identified by Bebbington: a) local ability to access resources and 
assets, b) local perceptions of well-being, c) the ability to learn and generate meaning out 
of structural forces affecting living conditions, and d) access to networks and allies 
Findings 
Access to and Control of Water 
 
Overall, this study has found that the presence of oil operations and modernizing 
infrastructure has decreased local access to and control over water. Oil operations, 
modernization, and development have necessitated increased navigation of rapid 
motorized canoes in order transport development experts and oil personnel. In addition, 
there are large barges regularly transporting construction materials and oil machinery 
deep into the Amazon. Increased navigation causes contamination and harms wildlife, 
affecting Pañacocha and other communities. 
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Traditionally, the river was used for consumption, fishing, bathing, washing 
clothes, and local transportation; such use has been negatively affected by contamination. 
To compensate for this, Petroamazonas has built water wells for several households 
dispersed throughout the forest, and it has provided filtered and purified water to 50 of 
the homes built in the urbanization. Still, access to wells is uneven and limited to a few 
families; well water quality is not always fit for consumption as it is mixed with large 
amounts of clay. Indeed, only two out of 20 families participating in this study were able 
to use their wells regularly. In the last 12 years, families have started to collect rainwater 
using tin roofs during the rainy season (February to July) in order to access clean water; 
17 of the families reported collecting water from nearby rivers, lakes, and even the Napo 
River when no other options were available during the dry months (December to 
January). Most families still bathe in the Napo River, except for three families who have 
running water, and river water is generally used to wash clothes and clean dishes, 





Fig. 2. Rain water collection system using tin roofs 
 
Petroamazonas has also built toilets and showers in most households, but hardly 
any of the families use them as there is no running water, and even when they could be 
used by being filled with buckets of water, families prefer to use them as storage space 
for household tools, food products, or eggs. Indeed, locals recognize the irony of having 
toilets, as they were built to prevent locals from going to the river as they had 
traditionally done in the past, and they realize that the oil company contaminates the river 
more than all the communities together. 
Only a few families that have a steady cash income and can afford to buy food 
from markets are able to live in the urbanization and access clean water; indeed, only one 
out of 20 families from the sample lives in the urbanization. Most families remain on 
their landholdings, as they depend on subsistence agriculture and the forest to subsist. 
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Moving into the urban area is not an option, as the urban layout does not allow for 
subsistence agriculture or domestic animals. 
Cielo and Carrión (2018) have identified similar conditions in the community 
Playas de Cuyabeno, where another urbanization was built. Indeed, the Pañacocha parish 
has ruled that no farm animals are allowed, as the parish hopes to transform the 
urbanization into a town in the near future. Most families visit their urban homes on the 
weekends, fearing that abandonment of homes would lead to losing what they were told 
represents the most lucrative compensation paid to families in exchange for oil extraction 
(El Telégrafo, 2013). 
Fig. 3. Millennial City, Pañacocha. 
 
 
Access to and Control of Food 
 
Concerning access to food, the diet of families in Panacocha remains similar to 
the traditional diet of cassava, plantains, chicha (a fermented drink made from cassava or 
plantains), fish, forest grubs, turtle eggs, and forest game. However, access to forest game 
has continue to diminish over the past 12 years; according to locals, oil operations and the 
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construction of modernizing infrastructure have scared animals away. The amount of fish 
and turtle eggs has also diminished drastically, probably due to contamination, noise, and 
increased presence of oil activity. Fishing in the Napo River is becoming less of an 
option, and turtles are disappearing from the shores. Families fish in nearby smaller rivers 
and lakes where some animals are still present. Twelve years ago, families would have 
had meat, eggs, fish, or grubs four to five times a week. Today, access to this type of food 
has been reduced to twice or three times a month, and families must walk long distances 
to find the wild game they previously were used to having nearby. 
To compensate for the lack of wild game, families have increased their numbers 
of domestic animals, especially chickens, and a few families have fish pools and pigs. 
Petroamazonas promotes farm chickens and fish pools; the company distributes them 
amongst families as part of its productive programs aimed at encouraging market 
production. Most families use the chickens for their own consumption instead of for 
market purposes. Forest game is preferred among all households, but it is consumed only 
when available; these households also sell extra agricultural output in the markets at least 
once a month to obtain cash for products such as rice, cooking oil and gas for cooking. 
When extra cash is available, these families also buy tomatoes, onions, oil, tuna, 
flashlights, batteries, alcohol, school supplies, and clothing. It is important to note that 
Petroamazonas has distributed commercial chicks among families on several occasions, 
hoping to encourage families to produce for the markets. Still, families often sell the 
excess of chicks as many are not interested in market production. 
Three households lacking access to protein reported that fish are less available, 
and that they do not have enough income or time to maintain farm animals. These 
96  
families consume plantains, cassava and large amounts of chicha for several days until 
fish or some forest game becomes available. It was also noted that when these families 
had access to some cash, they used it to buy alcohol, as many members consume it in the 
morning to get the strength to work; indeed 16 out of 20 households always had alcohol 
or chicha ready on a daily basis. Drinking has become a big problem in the community, 
as now several stores in the urbanization sell alcohol and beer; 12 years ago, accessing 
alcohol was difficult because it was only available in nearby cities. 
Women in these three households explained that having farm animals such as pigs 
are symbols of colonizer behavior; locals remember the days when indigenous people 
used to live under the control of large landholders and when indentured indigenous labor 
was used to tend farm animals and commercial crops. In addition, they remember that 
they had always preferred living in freedom and feeding themselves from abundant forest 
resources; memories of forest abundance go back to the 1970s and 1980s. Other females 
explained that having chickens requires producing corn to feed them, and they lack the 
land required to produce corn. Similarly, fish pools require balanced food only available 
in the markets, and they are unable to afford it. 
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Fig. 4. Caiman soup and chicha, considered a luxury given the decrease of wild game. 
 
 
In addition, 54 percent of the Pañacocha territory is demarcated as a protected 
forest where families cannot live or conduct subsistence agriculture, but they can hunt 
there for self-consumption (Ministry of the Environment, 2010). According to families, 
access to the forest is becoming more restricted because hunting is now more regulated, 
and families are not allowed to have guns. Therefore, families keep dogs that are able to 
hunt for animals that are in close proximity to their homes. 
Use of Cash Compensations 
 
In terms of access to market goods, in the last ten years, Petroamazonas has paid 
cash compensations for seismic prospecting in the territory, and it has also compensated 
families living near oil platforms and pipelines. Families have received between 3,000 
and 9,000 US dollars since 2009. From the sample of families, 15 had received cash 
compensation, and they used the money to purchase large freezers, fridges, boom boxes, 
motorized canoes, and alcohol, among other items. Locals explained such purchases were 
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made in hopes of having electricity soon, as Petroamazonas had agreed to share some of 
the electricity produced by the industrial generators located in the Oil Complex El Edén, 
located across the river from Pañacocha (Petroamazonas, 2010, p. 5); however, electricity 
has only arrived in 50 homes in the urbanization. 
When asked what they would store in the freezers if they had electricity, most 
men responded beer, while women said that a freezer wouldn’t be useful to them. Even in 
households that don’t have electricity, freezers and boom boxes are usually located in a 
central area of the household where everyone can see them; they seem to be a status item 
more than a real need. Similar behavior was documented in the communities Playas de 
Cuyabeno and Gareno, where families spend money on beer and boom boxes (Lyall & 
Valdivia 2015; Lu, Valdivia & Silva 2017). 
Fig. 5. Fridge and boom box (to the right) located in the open living room of a 
household 
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Even though male heads of households made most of the decisions related to how 
to spend the cash compensations—often spending money on alcohol and music devices— 
women of 12 households reported that they would have paid for school uniforms, school 
supplies, and means to send children to schools outside the community, if they were 
making the decisions. Women in five households said that they would have kept the 
money for medical emergencies. All women said that buying food would have been 
important as well; however, it seemed to be less of a priority than education. 
Additionally, all families had used cash to replace some of the roofs with those 
made of tin, and they have adapted them to collect water. In addition, almost all families 
with access to oil compensation bought necessities such as gas stoves, gas cylinders, and 
small electric generators. Although having gas stoves seem to be useful to women, most 
families keep using traditional stoves that operate with charcoal in addition to their gas 
stoves. According to women, cooking in gas stoves is easier, but they continue to use 
wood and charcoal stoves as they report that food doesn’t taste the same when cooked in 
the gas stove. Also cooking in the charcoal stove is faster when cooking for large 
amounts of people; therefore, all women think keeping the traditional stoves along with 
the gas stoves is necessary. The few families that have working generators use them at 
night to help children to complete homework when diesel is available. 
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Fig. 6. Replacement of traditional roofs with tin ones at family homes 
 
 
Fig. 7. Traditional stove 
 
Finally, some families that received oil compensations also bought motorized 
canoes, but owners explained that the motors were either discarded or given away when it 
became too expensive to maintain them. Women in 16 households reported that owning 
the boats was expensive because of the cost of gas, and therefore said there was no point 
in keeping the motors. According to the principal of the school in Pañacocha, men that 
bought motorized canoes were more interested in showing off than utilizing the boats as 
transportation. 
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In general, families are suspicious of their leaders, and they are also tired of oil 
politics. For instance, families ignore general assemblies requested by leaders to discuss 
oil-related job opportunities, oil compensations, development programs, and 
infrastructure. According to families, there is no point in attending as their concerns are 
not taken into consideration when it comes to oil politics. Oil compensations have 
brought conflicts and discord; thus, families prefer to stay at home where peace remains. 
For instance, 14 of the families reported that they find peace and a good quality of life in 
their family households, and that such peace is disturbed by local leaders and oil politics. 
The last three assemblies held during 2017 had an attendance of less than a 
quarter of the population, and subsequently leaders had to recruit male community 
members door-to-door to work on the maintenance of the oil-pipeline infrastructure, labor 
that was going to be paid by Petroamazonas. To attract families to the assemblies, leaders 
offer families beer and chicha, thus, the few men that attend get drunk. Men interviewed 
say that alcohol grants them the courage and knowledge to complain about local leaders’ 
negotiations with Petroamazonas. Indeed, when extended families get together during the 
weekends, they eat and drink, and alcohol seems to allow bonding and the desire to 
discuss local politics. Conversations reflect the frustration of families in relation to 
leaders and the ways that oil compensations, development, and modernization have 
impacted their life. 
Use of Wage Labor and Productive Projects 
 
The presence of oil activities and modernization has opened job opportunities. 
 
Most of the jobs associated with the oil industry are only seasonal, not lasting more than 
six months. In the last 12 years, local unskilled labor was needed to build infrastructure, 
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such as an oil platform foundation, and to clean the path under which a significant 
pipeline cut across Pañacocha territory. After these construction tasks had been 
completed, there were few permanent jobs. 
A survey of labor opportunities available during fieldwork in 2017 in Pañacocha 
revealed that two to three men were hired yearly to drive canoes for Petroamazonas, at 
least four people were hired by the local school, and one person was hired at the health 
center. In addition, tasks associated with the maintenance of oil infrastructure require 
hiring around 15 men every other year for a period of four to six weeks. 
Interviews with men who have worked for the oil company reveal that wage labor 
is not something they would seek permanently. Men explain that they don't like having a 
schedule, nor do they like the discipline that keeping a job requires. They accept working 
for Petroamazonas occasionally, but they prefer the freedom of their households. When 
asked whether they need cash, they said that wage labor was a necessity, as indeed cash 
complements the household economy, as described earlier. Still, they were not interested 
in having more than what was needed to pay for the basic necessities, school supplies, 
and clothing. Indeed, Petroamazonas personnel explained to me that there is not much 
choice when hiring boat drivers among community men, as only a few are willing to 
commit to a schedule and to be responsible for the care of the boats. 
Similarly, despite Petroamazonas’ efforts to encourage families to produce coffee 
and cacao for the markets by providing technical assistance and agricultural supplies, 
only two families have been successful in producing products of market quality. Indeed, 
according to a Petroamazonas technician, families ignore agricultural advice, wasting 
agricultural supplies distributed by Petroamazonas. The technician thinks families are not 
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interested in these projects; according to him, only communities with a long history of 
engagement with the markets such as Sani and the Edén community have shown some 
interest, and even in those communities the number of families participating in market 
production is small compared to the total population. 
Moreover, according to a former Petroamazonas technician that had worked in 
communitarian relations in Pañacocha, families’ reluctance to engage with markets and to 
take advantage of productive projects has slowed down Petroamazonas and other state 
institutions efforts to introduce development programs in the area. 




In addition, the incorporation of Pañacocha in oil-associated development has 
created opportunities for locals to open restaurants and stores. Pañacocha has become a 
place where oil personnel and public canoe transportation stop for lunch and to rest as 
canoes travel up and down the Napo River. Usually, canoe rides from Coca to Rocafuerte 
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take up to seven hours, and if the trip is to Peru, the travel time can be up to 12 hours, 
making a stop in Panacocha ideal for travelers. In the last 12 years, two restaurants and 
three stores have been successfully established by families in Pañacocha. These families 
have left their households behind and commit all their time to working in their restaurants 
and stores. 
Families living in their landholdings are critical of those with permanent jobs. 
They think these families have adopted an oppressive colonizer mentality that desires 
accumulation. One head of household, for example, explained that: “only colonizers and 
outsiders are interested in having more than what is needed for survival.” Later, his wife 
interjected by saying that, “it does not make sense to have more land than what families 
need, depending on how many children each has” (Interview November 3, 2017). 
Moreover, although teenagers seem very interested in market goods such as boom 
boxes and cellphones, when asked about their future subsistence, most of them expressed 
interest in securing land through marriage either in Pañacocha or nearby communities. 
Many said they would like to finish their high school education to be able to find 
intermittent wage labor in nearby cities to complement their household economies. In 
December 2017, out of 388 people living in Pañacocha, 13 people had permanent jobs, 




Research results show that oil expansion significantly affects local access to and 
control over basic resources such as water and food, as well as local understandings of 
quality of life. As Tsing suggests, local families are forced to change according to 
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circumstances, and adaptation is equated with ability to survive (2015). Thus, families in 
Pañacocha continue to lose access to clean water and forest game; however, they have 
some agency in deciding how and when to change livelihood strategies. In this sense, 
precarity is not only the stress of survival, but also an opportunity to take advantage of 
imposed assets such as modernizing infrastructure, as discussed by Bebbington (1999) 
and Escobar (2008). This is seen in the way locals use resources such as rainwater 
collection, reject the use of toilets, or make the decision to maintain farm chickens 
provided by the oil company as an at-hand source of protein. Moreover, families might 
seek state services that they consider to be necessary, such as requesting the municipality 
to extend the water grid, while rejecting pressure to leave their traditional lifestyles and 
move into the urbanization. 
Families make these decisions fully aware of the conditions that allow for 
dispossession; thus, local families identify: loss of livelihoods, increased conflict among 
families, mistrust of local leaders and oil politics, and uneven power relations with the 
state as negative aspects of oil and state interventions. Such awareness informs the 
negative ways that most families see accumulation of cash and land, as when families 
render accumulation and market production as colonizer traits, incompatible with local 
values. Other examples include local criticism against leaders’ mediation of oil politics 
and the low value they place on cash compensations as related to livelihood strategies. 
Local awareness in Pañacocha allows me to consider changes in livelihoods in the 
context of local agency and expanding understandings of the role of the state and the 
structural forces that shape living conditions. Just as Tsing (1993) suggests, marginal 
populations situate their livelihoods, and therefore their subjectivities, from a perspective 
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in which they don’t see themselves as part of hegemonic national projects, but neither do 
they consider themselves to be outsiders. It is this in-between that produces marginal 
conditions, where local responses reveal the instability of categories that dance between 
resistance and cooperation with oil and state intervention. 
This study illustrates that Pañacocha’s livelihood strategies appear as ambivalent; 
such ambivalence is the product of marginal thinking or double consciousness (Mignolo, 
2012). Such thinking or subjectivity does not fully embrace or entirely reject oil 
expansion, modernization, and development. Instead, I argue that processes of tactical 
subjectivity (Sandoval, 2000) allow families to pick and choose what aspects of 
development and modernization best suits local needs, while simultaneously permitting 
them to redefine what constitutes a good quality of life. For instance, local resistance to 
joining market production and reluctance to use cash compensations in western ways 
contrasts with local preference for traditional ways of survival, such as traditional staples 
and forest game; this contrast shows that locals consider non-market relations and forest 
subsistence to be critical aspects of their life. 
Resistance to projects aimed at accumulation does not mean that families don’t 
value money at all; indeed, families report needing to access cash to complement their 
economies. Still, I found that, far from seeing wage labor and entrepreneurial 
opportunities as important to subsistence, families prefer subsistence livelihoods and 
view cash only as a complement. Other scholars have mentioned that such preferences 
could differ between generations; thus, younger generations in the future might value and 
use wage labor and accumulation different than their parents (Lyall, 2017; Lu, Valdivia 
& Silva 2017, pp. 200–201). Still, from the interviews collected with youth in Pañacocha, 
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teenagers seem eager to secure household land and to continue to mix traditional 
livelihoods with eventual wage labor. 
Also, families understand that cash, along with modern goods and infrastructure, 
symbolize economic and political power historically denied to them. Therefore, families 
desire to acquire the status and respect that money and accumulation seem to guarantee. 
Thus, families that have had access to large amounts of cash have bought freezers, 
motorized boats, and large amounts of alcohol, among other items, to display a higher 
social status. Lyall and Valdivia (2015) document similar behavior in Playas de 
Cuyabeno, and they explain that such purchases can be understood as a means to climb 
the social latter within the community. However, in Pañacocha, the disconnect between 
the usefulness of such items and what families deem as needed for survival serve only as 
a reminder that oil development has become an opportunity to access symbolic power; 
this is because families are aware that these items don’t contribute to their needs. Similar 
treatment has been given to the urban area; although families prefer not to live there, they 
continue to maintain their homes in the urbanization. While these homes seem useless to 
families now, they are a symbol of western status gained in exchange for oil cooperation. 
In general, families’ resistance to productive projects, the low value they assign to cash, 
their resistance to waged discipline, and their resistance to move into the urbanization 
become impediments for Petroamazonas’ attempts to achieve its development outcomes 
in Pañacocha and nearby communities, as one of its former communitarian relations 
personnel explained to me. 
In addition, families distance themselves from oil politics and local leaders by 
ignoring general meetings and the leaders’ mediation with the state and the oil company. 
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This shows families’ efforts to escape oil politics and find peace and a good quality of 
life in their households. Moreover, increased consumption of alcohol seems to respond to 
the need to cope with feelings of frustration related to the arrival of oil extraction and the 
loss of control over livelihoods. Alcohol is also used to get the courage to speak up 
against leaders and oil politics with which families don't agree. Alcohol consumption 
reveals feelings of exclusion and a sense of little control over the structural forces that 
shape livelihoods, demonstrating that families underestimate their agency and power to 
resist and shape oil and state interventions. 
Finally, it is essential to mention that most families expressed interest in accessing 
research results from this study. They anticipate that this information will help them 
access knowledge to hold leaders accountable for their decisions, and to help them make 
decisions concerning to how to cope with the material realities of dispossession. Other 
authors such as Bornschlegl (2018) have documented similar requests from communities 
facing the loss of livelihoods due to mining activities in the Amazon; thus, this study adds 
to the efforts of other scholars and emphasizes the need to make information available to 
rural and indigenous populations. 
Conclusions 
 
Political ecologists have described indigenous and rural responses to the 
expansion of oil extraction and state intervention in terms of resistance, leading to 
conflict between communities and oil interests. In addition, literature shows that some 
communities are coerced to agree to oil extraction, while others are willing to participate 
in oil extractive planning to increase control over the ways in which oil and state 
expansion grab and/ or affect their livelihoods. 
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The findings of this study complement the existing literature by including an 
analysis of livelihood strategies and everyday forms of material response in the 
community of Pañacocha in the Amazon of Ecuador. Results show an ambivalent 
response to oil expansion; such response is not purely consistent with resistance, 
coercion, or cooperation. Instead Pañacocha families embrace some aspects of oil 
expansion and state intervention while rejecting others as they fit or impair survival needs 
and changing circumstances. 
Understanding everyday livelihood strategies is important in Pañacocha, as 
leaders’ decisions to cooperate with oil extraction don’t reflect families’ needs and views 
in relation to oil and state intervention. Specifically, Pañacocha leaders have agreed to oil 
extraction in exchange for communal land titles and access to modernizing infrastructure 
and development programs; however, families disagree with leaders’ decisions because 
oil related benefits don’t conform with local views of a good quality of life. Similar 
situations might be taking place in other communities, as Petroamazonas has similar 
projects in around 371 communities in the Amazon. 
This study argues that families enact livelihood strategies by engaging in tactical 
subjectivity; thus, families use oil compensations, infrastructure, and productive 
programs in tactical and selective ways that fit material needs and subjectivities that don’t 
fully embrace or reject state and oil intervention. Instead, families chose conditions that 
fit present needs and that are coherent with local understandings of what entails a good 
quality of life. 
Research results show that despite the fact that families face decreased access and 
control over resources necessary for their survival, they find some space to adapt and 
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respond to the loss of natural resources, increased wage labor opportunities and the 
introduction of modernizing infrastructure and productive projects. This study has found 
that local understandings of what counts as a positive quality of life inform livelihood 
strategies, and such understandings don’t conform with state plans as follows: Families 
are increasingly concerned about how to secure access to clean water and traditional 
sources of protein, these resources have been impacted by oil extractive activities and 
territorial state regulations that prevent the use of resources in the protected forest. 
Families' strategies include rainwater collection and grassroots organizing without local 
leaders’ involvement to request that the state expand the water grid to the community. In 
addition, families use productive farm projects introduced by Petroamazonas to generate 
protein security through the maintenance of chickens and fish farms rather than using 
farms to produce for the markets as Petroamazonas expects. 
In terms of use of oil cash compensations, results show that families don’t use 
them to improve living standards in western ways, as the state would have hoped. 
Compensations have paid for some needs such as tin roofs for water collection, gas 
stoves, and electric generators. However, most families have bought status items such as 
motorized canoes, freezers, and alcohol; this signals efforts to level power differentials 
between populations historically excluded from national development and the rest of the 
country. Such items allow access to the symbolic power that western lifestyles seem to 
ensure, although those lifestyles are not needed or even desired by local families. 
In terms of families’ response to wage labor opportunities generated by the oil 
industry and the introduction of productive programs, we can see that the state 
encourages the accumulation of cash and resources, but many families see accumulation 
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processes in a negative light, as they associate accumulation with the oppressive 
behaviors of western colonization, thus bringing back memories of oppression in which 
indigenous populations were used as indentured labor as recently as the 1970s. Also, state 
programs aimed at producing for the markets or joining wage labor opportunities create 
conflicts between those preferring traditional livelihoods and those interested in joining 
the markets, exacerbating class and racial divides within the community. Most families in 
Pañacocha consider cash as a need which complements their livelihoods; however, they 
prefer traditional subsistence ways of living that are equated with direct relation to forest 
resources. In addition, the population mistrusts their leaders, leading families to distance 
themselves from oil politics to escape oil development, compensations, and loss of 
livelihoods. 
On the other hand, state efforts to incorporate territories and populations such as 
Pañacocha continue to deepen, as even up to 2019, the state had tried to lease new blocks 
in the Amazon’s primary and secondary forest. However, the families’ response shows 
that local populations have a great deal of agency in shaping how such integration takes 
place and at what pace. Therefore, in the case of Pañacocha, although the state imposes 
specific ways of living, local families choose to delay engagement with the markets and 
hold onto traditional ways of living as much as they can. As a result, the long-term 
change that the state might have desired in Pañacocha is being delayed by livelihood 
strategies, showing that families’ decision-making processes about livelihoods 
significantly impact state efforts. This reality could change if the state seriously invests in 
access to markets by making ports viable or by building roads to connect populations to 
major cities, this is a serious concern as such plans attract colonizers and outside 
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investors increasing pressures over natural resources and land, not to mention the damage 
it would pose to the social fabric of communities. 
Finally, understanding livelihood strategies in light of tactical subjectivity is 
important to critically inform policy attuned to indigenous realities and needs, not to 
mention the need of rural and indigenous families for access to this type of information. 
As discussed in this paper, families usually feel alienated and powerless without fully 
realizing the importance and power that decisions at the household level have on state 
and oil interventions. Finally, research studying land grab processes need to be made 
available to communities in an accessible format to make research useful to those 





MINING AS EPISTEMIC VIOLENCE: ERASURE OF INDIGENOUS 




This study adds to feminist critical geography by bringing post-colonial race and 
gender intersectionality (Quijano, 2000b; Lugones, 2007; Mollet & Faria, 2013; 
Radcliffe, 2015) into conversations about settler colonial notions of elimination (Wolfe, 
1999, 2006: Johnson & Murton, 2007; Zaragocín, 2019) to better understand recent state 
efforts to expand the mining frontier into the Amazon. Such efforts reinforce structural 
processes of violence that seek to eliminate indigenous traditional knowledge. 
By using three case studies of Kichwa indigenous communities in the Amazon, I 
illustrate how the symbolic power of state-led modernization paid for with mining profits 
not only reinforces colonial violence based on race, gender and patriarchy among 
indigenous territories as others have shown (Vallejo 2014; Lu, Valdivia & Silva 2017). I 
argue that internalized colonial violence along with state intervention systematically 
undermine, silence and erase indigenous ontologies and epistemologies that explain the 
complexity of mining conflicts and denounce systemic violence. Such erasure allows the 
state to justify the expansion of the mining frontier and portray indigenous accounts of 
violence as a-historical and naïve, eliminating indigenous epistemic authority and 
therefore displacing claims for accountability. 
In addition to using post-colonial and settler colonial theory to frame a discussion 
of epistemic elimination, I find it necessary to engage with a decolonial praxis that goes 
beyond post-colonial criticism (Smith 1999; Naylor et al. 2017). I do this by drawing 
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attention to the very epistemologies that the state seeks to eliminate. Thus, I rely on a 
female analysis of indigenous narratives to unveil the complexity of female 
understandings of intersectionality and violence, exposing the logic that drives 
elimination. 
The article is organized as follows; first I introduce the case studies and provide 
an overview of recent state legal and institutional frameworks aimed at facilitating the 
expansion of the mining frontier into the Amazon. Second, I provide an overview of post- 
colonial intersectionality using the modernity/coloniality framework (MC); this section is 
followed by an exploration of indigenous understandings of colonial intersectionality as 
related to mining activities in their territories, paying attention to women’s marginality. 
Forth, I bring MC in conversation with emergent literature on settler colonialism in Latin 
America. In this context, I further a discussion of mestizaje understood as a process of 
racial and cultural mixing between indigenous people and traits, and the rest of 
Ecuadorian society to point at the way violence is structural but also self-inflicted. 
Finally, I illustrate indigenous ways of making sense of violence, this is what I refer to as 
epistemology to explain how indigenous denunciation of violence is ignored and 
eliminated by the state. 
Situating Tzawata, Pañacocha and Santa Elena communities 
 
This article is the result of research conducted with the Kichwa communities of 
Tzawata, Pañacocha, and Santa Elena between 2014, 2015 and 2017. All these 
communities have been affected by mining and oil extractive activities in the past 15 
years. Tzawata is a community of 40 families located in the province of Tena on the road 
that connects the cities of Tena and Puyo; their territory is contained within Oil Block 28, 
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where the state has interests in gold mining, oil extraction and hydroelectric production. 
In 2004, a gold mining company arrived to extract gold from the riverbanks, forcing the 
population to survive on a very limited piece of land. In 2010, Tzawata started to 
politically organize and oppose gold mining extraction, successfully forcing the company 
to cease operations. Since that time, the community has resisted state and corporate 
efforts to forcefully remove them and to allow the company to continue its extractive 
work. 
Pañacocha has approximately 95 families, and Santa Elena has ten; both are 
Kichwa and are located in a remote area of the Amazon, where the state’s presence has 
been minimal. In the 1980s the Occidental Petroleum Corporation arrived in the region to 
conduct oil exploration and eventually started to operate in what is now known as Oil 
Block 12, where both communities are located. In 2008, the National Oil Company 
(Petroamazonas) took over OXY's oil operations as part of national efforts to increase 
state control over extractive activities and to extend the presence of the state in the 
Amazon. 
State efforts to exert control include making changes in legal frameworks to allow 
the state and mining companies the ability to persuade communities to agree to mining 
and modernization in rural areas. For instance, since the 2009 Mining Law was passed, 
Petroamazonas can use oil revenues and other state funding to invest in development 
programs as a negotiation tool. In Pañocha, Petroamazonas agreed to build an urban area 
of 75 homes along with a state-funded school, a small health center and a small police 
station to serve Pañacocha, Santa Elena and other nearby communities. The state not only 
uses negotiation but also force to facilitate extraction. For instance, in Oil Block 28 where 
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Tzawata is located, gold mining is not the only resource that troubles local communities; 
the state is also interested in the construction of a hydroelectric power plant along with 
oil extraction. Different from communities in Oil Block 12 which have agreed to 
extraction, Tzawata and other communities in Oil Block 28 are resisting such 
interventions. Thus, the state has tried to remove the population out of the land by force. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Location of communities, map by R.J Theofield (Hydrocarbons Secretariat, 2018; 
Geographic Military Institute, 2012) 
 
 
Understanding epistemic violence and its logic among subordinated groups such 
as indigenous people is significant to those confronting these realities. This is because 
there are approximately 371 communities located in the oil blocks controlled by 
Petroamazonas, such as Santa Elena and Pañacocha, these communities undergo 
117  
processes that seek to assimilate their traditional ways of life into western national 
standards (Petroamazonas, 2014). Similarly, approximately 17 rural indigenous 
communities in the province of Tena, where Tzawata is located, risk being forcefully 
removed from their territories due to their opposition to mining activities and hydropower 
plants (Interview with regional indigenous representative, May 16, 2018; Morán 2019). 
Methodology 
 
I used a collaborative research methodology as proposed by Steven (2007), 
Gaudry (2011), and Stephen and Hale (2013, 1-29); such methods call for ways in which 
subordinated concerns and knowledges should be taken seriously in the formulation of 
the research processes. Thus, research planning, data gathering, and analysis is produced 
with research participants. Thus, research questions emerged in 2015 out of female 
indigenous concerns as related to how women could be better prepared to resist and 
survive the detrimental effects of state intervention and mining expansion along with my 
own interest in understanding systemic colonial violence in extractive territories. I used a 
mix of traditional research methods and participatory methodologies that also included 
collaborative analysis. 
Traditional methods consisted of participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews in Pañacocha and Santa Elena. In Pañacocha, I lived with 15 out of 95 
households for 10 days each in Pañacocha and with two out of ten households in Santa 
Elena. Additional interviews included oil company personnel, local police, health center 
personnel, and school teachers from the urban area recently built by the National Oil 
Company. In Tzawata, I collected 5 oral histories from community members and two 
group discussions (similar to focus groups) with 10 percent of the population (18 people). 
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Collaborative methods include the participation of a female indigenous leader 
from Tzawata, who traveled with me to Pañacocha and Santa Elena to exchange 
information about the difficulties of living on mining territories for two months. 
Women’s exchanges focused on their perceptions of violence associated with mining 
activities and how to best respond. Exchanges relied on traditional ways of knowledge 
that include telling dreams and narratives which use symbolism that blurs the nature- 
culture divide. For instance, processes that enable violence take the shape of animals or 
other forest spirits. Kichwa narrations are usually the product of dreams or collective 
understandings that explain conflict and violence (Uzendoski, 2015; Descola, 2004; 
Garzón, 2013). 
The overall analysis required identifying data that describes situations of 
oppression and violence as associated with mining expansion and the state’s presence. To 
understand the nature of such relations, informants defined their subjectivities in relation 
to a) state officials and oil personnel, b) mestizos (the hegemonic racial group in 
Ecuador), c) indigenous men, d) local indigenous leaders and e) natural beings such as 
animals, river bodies and the forest. Although some of the information comes from my 
observations and interviews, the most revealing information was provided through female 
narratives. The narratives analysis took place between the Tzawata female collaborator, 
female informants, and myself as project researcher. The analysis required further 
questions to explain how these narratives were relevant to power relations involving these 
categories. In some cases, drawings were required to dig deeper into emotions, feelings, 
and the logics that inform these narratives. 
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Female participation in the research is central to the inquiry and findings of this 
paper. Findings are aimed at adding to decolonial efforts as suggested by Naylor et al. 
(2011). Therefore, I consider indigenous narratives and analysis as theory in its own 
right. The methods and theoretical findings add to the voice of other scholars who have 
criticized academic production as usually detached from communities' needs and 
interests, turning academic production into another extractive enterprise (Smith, 1999; 
Gaudry, 2011; Hale, 2006). Similarly, indigenous and Latin American scholars have 
denounced the fact that scholarly production on social justice has spent too much time 
criticizing neo-colonial and post-colonial ways of oppression instead of furthering anti- 
colonial agendas (Smith, 1999; Puebla-Cisneros 2015; Naylor et al. 2017). 
Contextualizing Contemporary State Violence 
 
Like in the rest of Latin America, policies that have promoted economic 
development and modernization in Ecuador have been informed by colonial 
understandings of difference, in which ideas of rurality, backwardness, and poverty have 
been linked to marginalized populations such as people of color, indigenous people and 
women (Rodriguez, 2012; Radcliffe, 1995). Specifically, Ecuador has historically used 
inclusive social policies or ‘racial democracy’ to encourage indigenous and other 
minority populations to assimilate into the dominant group in order to be considered 
political and economic actors (Radcliffe 1996, p. 30-41; Sundberg 2004; Yashar, 1999, 
2005, 2015; Wade, 2010, p. 55-56). This is because indigenous ways of life diverge from 
western ones; thus, indigenous people have been considered an obstacle to economic 
growth and a problem that needed to be solved (Gutierrez, 1996; Escobar, 2008; De-la- 
Cadena, 2000, Ch.3). An example of this type of policy in Ecuador is the recognition of 
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ethnic differences in legislation drafted under neoliberal regimes that simultaneously 
reinforce racism, dispossession, and assimilation. 
For instance, the Ecuadorian constitutions of 1998 and 2008 have recognized 
differentiated indigenous rights along with nature’s rights; this recognition responds to 
indigenous historical demands for autonomy and claims to protect their territories from 
capitalist interests (Gudynas & Acosta, 2011). However, enforcement of constitutional 
mandates, policies, and regulations are politically subordinated to economic growth and 
modernizing development plans that divert from indigenous views (Gudynas, 2015; 
Walsh, 2014). Thus, as several authors have argued, inclusive policies and changes in 
constitutions are political moves to address social discontent, but land redistribution, 
protection of natural resources and access to political and economic autonomy are still 
lacking, reinforcing racial and gendered discrimination (Lalander, 2014; Kroger & 
Lalander, 2016; Radcliffe, 2012; Povinelly, 2002; Yashar, 2005, Radcliffe & Westwood 
2005, p. 44). 
 
The negative effects of racial democracy have become acute in the last 12 years as 
Ecuador has decided to expand its mining frontier into the Amazon using a discourse that 
privileges national economic growth over indigenous struggles to protect their 
environments and autonomy in their territories (Murcia et al. 2015). Authors have 
identified such a nationalistic discourse and modernizing agenda as “resource 
nationalism” (Koch & Perreault, 2019). Specifically, the state argues that the region is 
poorest, poverty is assessed in terms of access to formal education, state-health services, 
‘adequate' housing, and wage labor, amongst others (Vallejo, 2014). 
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On the other hand, rural and indigenous populations have historically maintained 
economies with different degrees of reliance on subsistence agriculture and intermittent 
wage labor relations with nearby cities such as the Tzawata community. Communities 
located in peripheral areas of the Amazon such as Santa Elena and Pañacocha have 
maintained economies that rely on subsistence agriculture, forest gathering and hunting 
with limited access to markets; for all of these communities, understandings of what 
counts as a meaningful quality of life and what development should be differs from state 
views (Indigenous Women’s Mandate, 2018; Vallejo & García, 2017; Altman, 2013). 
Racial democracy and resource nationalism become even more clear in laws such 
as the Plan for the Territorial Organization of the Amazon (2018) that seeks to 
incorporate and assimilate indigenous populations that have remained disconnected from 
the markets into national culture, national production, and wage labor systems. Also, the 
Land Organization Code known as COOTAD (2010, Arts. 93, 100) allowed indigenous 
territories to operate as decentralized federal units for the first-time. Thus, indigenous 
territories could directly benefit from state and oil rents as municipalities do, but access 
to public funds is available only if locals comply with development plans that seek 
cultural and economic incorporation. 
A prime example of assimilation efforts is the Mining Law (2009, Arts. 40, 67, 
93), which mandates that 12 percent of all mining profits, along with three percent of all 
royalties, must be used in western rural development and modernization, especially in 
territories where extraction takes place. This type of law provides the state a tool to 
negotiate benefits with indigenous communities that might oppose mining and 
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simultaneously enables assimilation (Valdivia, et al. 2017; Cepek, 2018; Burgaleta et al., 
2018). 
Systemic violence and the coloniality of power 
 
The theoretical framework of modernity/coloniality (MC), also known as the 
power of coloniality, was first developed by the Latin-American scholar Quijano (2000, 
2007, 2015) and later expanded by other Latin American scholars such as Walter 
Mignolo (2002), Arturo Escobar (2004, 2007) and Maria Lugones (2007, 2010). These 
scholars provide a Latin-American perspective of colonial power rooted in Latin America 
history, intersectionality and decolonial efforts to situate subjectivities within power 
structures. These contributions, along with post-colonial studies produced by radical 
women of color in the United States and Canada such as Anthias and Yuval-Davis 
(1992), Collins (2000) and Moraga and Anzaldúa (2015) among others, provide a body of 
theory generally referred to as post-colonial intersectionality. 
In Latin America, the MC framework has been highly influential among scholars, 
and it explains how modern social relations in Latin America are profoundly shaped by 
the colonial racial hierarchical order that defines the organization of other categories, 
including class. According to these four scholars, white Europeans secured the monopoly 
of economic and political power by naturalizing racial inferiority. This perceived racial 
inferiority rendered non-western cultures, productive systems and epistemologies as less 
legitimate, inferior and immoral in the new colonial order (Spivak, 1993; Johnson & 
Murton, 2007). Accompanying this is the fictional view in which non-western knowledge 
and its very existence was seen as pre-historical, and the location of non-western 
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populations was seen as peripheral in relation to centers of accumulation (Mignolo, 2012; 
Smith, 1999; and Garzón, 2013). 
In addition, the colonial capitalist system requires racial differences to appropriate 
labor force, just as it requires uneven geographical development to appropriate land and 
natural resources (Quijano, 2000b; Escobar, 2007; Mignolo, 2009, ch.1; Smith, 1999). 
Moore (2015, ch.9), Radcliffe (2015), Pulido (2017) and Escobar (2008, ch.3–4) among 
others have used similar arguments to show that modern capitalism, along with state 
action and international development policies, organize nature in particular ways in 
which heterogeneous social difference (racial, gender and class difference among others) 
is necessary to facilitate appropriation of resources, subordinate labor and to justify 
environmental racism. The power of coloniality, in sum, portrays how modernity came to 
be at the same time that coloniality permeated social relations in Latin America; 
therefore, coloniality and modernity inform each other. 
Lugones (2007) reframes MC by arguing that masculinity and patriarchy are built 
in opposition to femininity and non-western logics of organization and knowledge, 
constituting a dichotomy parallel to the racial divide (white/colored), similar analysis has 
been furthered by North American scholars such as Kobayashi and Peake (1994). Thus, 
struggles to access and control resources along with access to sexual control have, since 
colonial times, been defined by heterosexual, white maleness. These assumptions are 
further inscribed in an assumed nature-culture divide; according to Latour (1993), this 
divide has justified the human knowledge enterprise in its efforts to objectify nature as an 
object of study, a natural resource and as an object of desire. As a result, non-western 
groups are racialized, sexualized and gendered in a hierarchy that positions them as closer 
124  
to nature, thereby justifying objectification. Scholars such as (Wade, 2010), Sundberg 
(2003), De la Cadena (1992, 2005) and Burgaleta et al. (2018), among others, have 
illustrated that indigenous groups that have remained geographically more isolated, 
particularly, women are rendered as closer to nature and farther away from culture, while 
mestizos and those accessing western cultural traits, such as those living in cities, are 
identified as closer to culture than nature. 
The internalization of these logics explains why men racialized as inferior are also 
feminized or seen as closer to nature as in the case of indigenous men; however, these 
men think of themselves as superior to women of color because of their gender, 
disrupting self-reflection and opportunities for solidarity (Spivak, 1993; Lugones, 2007). 
At the same time, women considered to belong to hegemonic groups such as the mestizo 
are seen as closer to culture or closer to those attributes given to men, positioning them 
farther away from women of color and their concerns (Radcliffe, 2015, p.7). In this way, 
feminized indigenous women undergo ways of marginalization in which gender, race, 
geographical location and reproductive activities intersect, rendering female knowledge 
and agency as closer to nature and subordinated to patriarchal ways of organizing the 
world (Radcliffe, 2015; Zaragocín, 2019). 
Insurgent Analysis: Indigenous Understandings of Colonial Power 
 
Conversations among women reveal deep understandings of colonial 
intersectionality in which they acknowledge the hierarchical ways in which systemic 
violence is displayed. Still, they feel their knowledge is ignored and invisibilized at 
home, in their communities, and when relating to the state and private interests. During a 
meaningful exchange between the female collaborator from Tzawata and a group of 
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women in Pañacocha, the collaborator explained violence in Tzawata by narrating a 
repeated dream that has haunted her for a while: 
In my dreams, I am wrapped on sheets, and someone is trying to immobilize me 
and suffocate me. When I try to see who is doing this, I see two individuals part 
human, part monkey. They try to kill me, but I struggle for my life. . . In the fight, 
I can pull one arm out of the sheets, and after a further struggle, I introduce my 
arm through his mouth far enough to grab his heart and pull it out of his body. I 




















Figure.2: Representation of man/monkey narrative. Painting by Guillermo Jimenez 
Further analysis of the dream with this collaborator reveals that the men/monkeys 
 
could be interpreted as mining interests seeking to evict the community off the land. 
Indeed, Tzawata lost its territory between 1950 to 1972 during a process of agrarian 
reform in which the state declared those territories as empty without taking into 
consideration the existence of indigenous populations living on them (Deeds, 1958; 
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Yashar 2005, p.109–118). From that point in time, landlords not only used land and 
natural resources but also appropriated indigenous labor in feudal ways until 1982, when 
landlords were no longer allowed to use this practice (Deeds, 2010). In 2004, a gold 
mining company forced the population to live in about 250 square meters, suffocating 
families’ ability to survive on subsistence agriculture while their fishing activities also 
significantly diminished due to contamination. In 2010, the community decided to resist 
mining activities and start a legal fight to recuperate their ancestral territory and 
traditional ways of survival. 
Thus, the fury and force this Tzawata woman feels as she tries to survive in the 
dream are comparable to the force experienced by her and women and children who 
confronted police forces sent by the state to protect the mining company private rights 
and remove the population by force on June of 2010. The day of the incident, most 
indigenous men were away working for the day; women and children had to use their 
bodies at the entrance of the community to prevent the police from invading the land. 
Over time the men arrived and helped the resistance, and, by the end of the day, the 
police left the site as they were unable to attack women and children publicly. 
Although the collaborator considers herself a leader in her community, and 
despite the fact that women’s input in fighting for their territory has been extremely 
important to the community’s resistance, she and other women are still subjected to 
violence at home at the hands of their husbands. Moreover, male leaders are suspicious of 
women's participation in organized resistance. She thinks the anger she feels in the dream 
is also comparable to the anger she feels when her husband beats her children and her. 
Similarly, men sometimes mistreat children who are not able to fully help in reproductive 
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activities at home and simultaneously keep up with school. In those moments, this female 
leader wishes she had the force she has in her dreams to grab her husband’s heart and 
teach him he can’t harm her and her children. 
Embodied Kichwa women’s experiences are usually dreamt, narrated and shared 
among one another in a praxis that communicates emotions and feelings of 
marginalization within larger structures of power. Thus, female dreams articulate 
concerns in which masculinity and patriarchy are defined along with gender and race 
logics. Such logic is not only structural but internalized in communal relations. Indeed, as 
this female leader explains, the men/monkeys could be indigenous while simultaneously 
white, depending on the circumstances. 
Because Tzawata, like other communities in the province of Napo, has rejected 
corporate solutions that seek to pacify indigenous people by offering them long term 
opportunities to buy small plots of land or short-term solutions that allow them to use 
small plots of land in exchange for cooperation with mining activities, Tzawata identifies 
its survival as profoundly tied to territory rather than to individual plots of land. Thus, 
state and corporate efforts tend to criminalize indigenous resistance and seek forceful 
removal of populations (Becker, 2013; Warnaars, 2013; Plan V, 2019). 
In the case of communities such as Santa Elena and Pañacocha, recognition of 
communal land is conditioned on its willingness to cooperate with oil extraction. Both 
communities currently have agreed to receive oil-related compensations, development 
and modernization programs in exchange for their support. In these cases, mediation 
between communities, the state and oil companies is conducted by male indigenous 
leaders. Indigenous men that access leadership positions in this part of the Amazon, 
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usually have had access to some formal education in relation to the rest of the community 
(Burgaleta et al., 2018). Thus, they understand legal frameworks, basic oil production, 
and the inner workings of bureaucracy. If decision-making processes lead by leaders do 
not properly consider community participation, it generates processes of marginalization 
within the community (Wilson, 2010; Indigenous Women’s mandate, 2018). 
Conversations about the dream provided above dynamized conversations between 
women in Pañacocha, and they have served as tools that reinforce shared understandings 
of violence as well as traditional networks of resistance. In Pañacocha, families have 
been long concerned about leaders being coopted by state officials and oil personnel; 
people suspect that leaders appropriate oil-related compensations that belong to the 
community for their benefit. Moreover, they disagree with how leaders negotiate the 
terms in which modernization and development programs are made available to the 
community. When men publicly ask for accountability, leaders dismiss their arguments 
by insisting they are too ignorant to understand the logic that informs their decisions. 
Men are told that they carry an indigenous mentality that prevents them from progressing 
and moving forward. Women who conversed with the Tzawata female leader started to 
refer to local indigenous leaders as men/monkeys. According to them, leaders belong to 
the land; however, they have been invaded by a mestizo ideology brought by state 
officials. 
Men and women fear men/monkeys retaliation and further marginalization; thus, 
men try to keep themselves away from oil politics. This includes prohibiting their wives 
from organizing or even discussing oil politics outside of their homes. Embodied 
experiences of these men and women identify the subordination of indigenous men to the 
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force of the state and oil capitalist logics in ways in which men are feminized in relation 
to leaders’ authority and oil and state modernizing logics. While women are usually 
located at the very bottom of the hierarchy where they are subordinated to their husband’s 
authority, subordinated men feel they are superior to the women in their households. 
These logics exemplify how the interlocking of race, gender, and patriarchy 
weakens possibilities for solidarity between subordinated subjectivities such as those of 
men/monkeys and their constituent community members. On the other hand, the Tzawata 
story of resistance where women and children were on the frontlines empowered 
Pañacocha women and also generated important conversations of patriarchy present in 
state, corporate oil and indigenous men’s behavior. 
Settler Colonialism in Conversation with Modernity/Coloniality 
 
Settler colonialism as a conceptual framework has been used mostly in the United 
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to explain structural and systemic ways in 
which settler states have sought to displace, eliminate and assimilate indigenous 
populations in order to appropriate land and/or and indigenous and African labor (Wolfe 
1999, 1–3, 2006; Radcliffe 1995). Similar to the MC framework, elimination, 
displacement, and assimilation are justified by racial superiority and capital interests to 
appropriate natural resources and labor to expand capitalism (Gott, 2007; Speed, 2017). 
Post-colonial and feminist geographers have started to pay attention to settler 
colonialism as a tool to further analyze colonialism in Latin America. Post-colonial 
historian Gott (2007), for instance, evidences how Latin American states adopted 
elimination and assimilation policies characteristic of settler-colonial societies upon 
independence. Earlier contributions such as those of Radcliffe (1995) and Gutierrez 
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(1995) show that assimilation and eliminations in the context of settler colonialism in 
Latin America has to be understood in the context of dynamic social relations marked by 
racial mixing and the cultural amalgamation between settlers, native populations, and 
immigrant labor. 
Other geographers such as Speed (2017) and Castellanos (2017) have argued that 
settler colonialism helps to account for systemic elimination in processes of state 
formation in Latin America, an aspect that the MC framework fails to account for. 
According to these two authors, states encouraged mestizaje and racial democracy to 
create a sense of nationalism and to further processes of modernization suppressing 
indigeneity. Thus, building on this lack of recognition and on notions of elimination, 
feminist geographer Zaragocin (2019) has used settler colonialism to study gender-based 
elimination. Her findings show that elimination processes are not only present in state 
policies but also in daily social relations practiced by larger society including indigenous 
people, evidencing how gendered and racial logics of elimination are present across 
social differences and affect the most marginalized in profound ways. 
In my reading, accounting for elimination requires a more in-depth reflection 
about mestizaje not only as mixing between different ethnic groups, but as cultural 
assimilation across groups identified as different in terms of gender, class, race, etc. This 
is because power relations, such as those discussed by the MC framework, shape 
subjectivities across difference, blurring the subordinated/indigenous versus the 
hegemonic/mestizo (Mignolo 2009; Escobar 2008, ch.4). Thus, it is difficult to point at 
what individuals and processes can be identified as settler/colonizer and which ones as 
indigenous/colonized. Thus, to account for elimination, it is necessary to locate what 
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temporal and geographical aspects of difference are being eliminated when talking about 
indigenous people and the expansion of the mining frontier. 
The Elimination of Indigeneity 
 
According to Wolfe (2006), the logics that inform settler logics of elimination 
respond to a scheme that seeks appropriation of land to create conditions for private 
property, productivity based on extraction and accumulation, individuality and 
appropriation of human labor. Thus, native people whose cosmovision relies on social 
relations in which nature is ontologically equal to human existence presents an obstacle 
to the objectivation of natural resources and labor. These competing understanding of 
realities have produced a perceived geographic and temporal difference between specific 
indigenous knowledge and livelihoods as compared to western ones (Johnson & Murton, 
2007; Uzendoski, 2010). Of course, we cannot draw a clear division between indigenous 
perception of reality and the rest of the population because the heterogeneity of society 
marks all individuals as different in relation to current reiterations of power, namely 
neoliberalism (Radcliffe, 2015, 2017). 
In Latin America, elimination and acculturation logics respond to similar western 
logics. Ecuador had tried to get rid of indigenous productive and reproductive relations 
based on subsistence agriculture and reciprocity by promoting mestizaje as a path to 
citizenship, inclusiveness and national unification (Radcliffe & Westwood 2005, p. 30– 
34). Ideas of what mestizos and what proper citizenship should be were rooted in ideas 
of white masculinity, literacy, private property and individual autonomy (Sundberg 2003, 
p. 572–575; De la Cadena 2000, 2005, p. 269). Mestizo characteristics overshadowed 
indigenous culture and knowledge and promoted western ones. Indeed, De la Cadena 
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(2000, 2005) argues that contemporary racial identification in Latin America takes on not 
only biological traits but most importantly western ways of knowing, western dress codes 
and even on the geographical location such as rural or urban. Mestizaje is not only 
informed by racial mixing but also by subjective identification and embracement of the 
hegemonic culture; this can be seen as both structural violence and as a survival strategy 
that seeks to overcome racial inferiority (De la Cadena 2000, p. 142, 304, 320). 
In the context of the evidence provided at the beginning of this article, we can see 
that the state uses inclusive policies such as the compulsory investment of mining profits 
in modernization and development in indigenous territories. This type of policy can be 
understood as an effort to further pursue racial democracy and resource nationalism, 
which only deepens state violence. As discussed in the following section, such policies 
seek to eliminate certain indigenous traits like traditional indigenous ways of life that rely 
on non-western ontologies and epistemologies. 
Some indigenous people might welcome these policies as they might find in them 
a survival strategy, and/or they might feel forced to welcome these policies knowing that 
resistance is often met with state and corporate violence (Cepek 2018, Anthias, 2018). In 
the process of resisting, adapting or embracing state options, indigenous people are 
forced to use masters’ tools such as use of the Spanish language and knowledge of legal 
frameworks and bureaucratic processes to mediate communication with the state and 
corporate actors (Huarcaya, 2010; Graham, 2002; Hale, 2006). Although these strategies 
allow indigenous leaders some political and material advantages, their use reinforces 
capitalist relations, empowering hegemonic state practices along with a certain group of 
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indigenous leaders who might or might not establish relations of accountability with their 
constituents (Vallejo & García-Torres, 2017; Wilson, 2010). 
Thus, I argue that an analysis that bridges post-colonial intersectionality, such as 
MC along with deeper-reflection of the logics of elimination embodied by processes of 
mestizaje, clarifies that violence is self-inflicted. Mestizaje and violence is structured by 
the state and capitalist processes, and at the same time, violence is systematically 
internalized by society and forced onto indigenous people currently facing dispossession 
of land livelihoods as the mining frontier expands into the Amazon. Thus, indigenous 
subjectivities already reflect colonial power dynamics that exacerbate the expansion of 
the mining frontier, showing that systemic elimination is not only structural but self- 
inflicted. 
What is Being Eliminated? 
 
Authors like Echeverri (2004), Escobar (2008, ch.3) and the Critical Geography 
Collective of Ecuador (2018), among others, argue that many rural and indigenous 
populations understand their territories as intrinsically linked to their bodies, traditional 
economies, and local ways of knowledge. Thus, these authors refer to indigenous bodies 
and their territories as “body-territories.” Rural and indigenous women are especially 
prone to favoring body-territory epistemologies and ontologies in their explanations of 
their connection to their environments and natural resources (Muratorio, 1998; 
Uzendoski, 2005, Ch.3,5). This is due to women’s roles in productive, reproductive and 
caretaking tasks in which their realms of action are vitally linked to their environments 
(Silva, 2019; Plumwood, 1993, Rocheleau et al., 1996, 3–26) 
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Moreover, De la Cadena (2015) shows how body-territory relationships have 
survived state structural violence throughout time, and she illustrates the ways in which 
feminized indigenous men and women continue to resist state efforts to eliminate their 
bonds with “earth beings”, or ‘Tirakuna’ in Kichwa (De la Cadena, 2015, 2019, Ch.5). 
When analyzing state efforts to access and secure natural resources versus indigenous 
survival efforts, Stetson (2012), De la Cadena (2015), Uzendoski (2010) and Kohn 
(2007) assert that state/indigenous discrepancies on how to relate to the environment are 
the result of ontological differences. According to these authors, the differences are 
rooted in indigenous understandings of human-nature relations, where survival is 
ontologically linked to the survival of ‘body-territory.' On the other hand, state and 
western ontology is rooted in a nature-culture divide where nature is femininized and 
objectified as a resource, making it difficult to have a conversation about indigenous and 
state realities because body-territory is assumed as a-historical, backward and lacking 
legitimacy to speak (Spivak, 1993, 82–83); thus, indigenous arguments lack a voice and 
don’t constitute a legitimate interlocutor. 
Understandings of body-territory as an ontology among Kichwa people have 
several expressions; one of them is oral narration. According to Uzendoski (2015) and 
Descola (2004), oral narrations in the Amazon can be understood as “meshworks” that 
incorporate indigenous embodied experiences and the experiences of more-than-human 
subjectivities, such as animals, forests, bodies of water, and mountains. Oral narrations 
seek to explain the emotion and the logics that guide social relations, especially the logics 
that make sense of social justice in indigenous terms rather than explaining cause and 
effect (Cusicanqui, 2008). Oral narrations are usually produced collectively, and 
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knowledge emerges from daily experience and praxis such as daily work in agriculture, 
use of traditional medicine, and interrelation with nature (Garzon, 2013; Cusicanqui, 
2008). 
I argue that women’s narratives in Tzawata, Pañacocha, and Santa Elena 
constitute ontologies aimed at communicating the logics behind mining conflicts and 
violence. They are also used as a tool to prevent violence by warning other women about 
the risks that mining conflicts pose and also to create networks of knowledge and 
resistance that circulates among indigenous communities. It is important to mention that 
the Tzawata female leader’s participation in this research allowed her to share her own 
stories of resistance with women in Pañacocha and Santa Elena, while also gaining 
important information about the negative effects of oil expansion in Oil Block 12 that she 
named “katary-waira” or deathly wind. Recent legal frameworks and state expansion and 
its logic target these narratives to further systemic violence by invisibilizing and erasing 
women’s and other indigenous people’s epistemologies. 
In the following paragraphs, I provide one of four narratives collected in the field 
that are well known in several communities in Oil Block 12; some of these communities 
are El Edén, San Roque, Sani, Chontaurco among others. This narrative is provided by 
an elderly female leader from Santa Elena community and uncovers the complexity of 
women's epistemologies as caretakers, knowledge producers and as active denunciators 
of violence. This is because the narrative constitutes narrated knowledge that evidences 
violence and provides advice to other communities undergoing similar situations: 
My six-year-old granddaughter was probably playing near the river when she was 
taken away. It has been a year, and we have not heard from her. Quickly we 
called the shamans for an urgent meeting, but they live far away, and it took them 
a while to arrive. [After drinking a potent hallucinogen] they saw my child. She is 
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still alive, but they could not bring her back. The powerful river boa had taken her 
through the Napo river waters without killing her. The shamans told us the boa 
took my girl through the underground world deep in the river and left her near the 
Peruvian side. The Shamans saw that she is forced to work on a farm down the 



























Figure 3. Representation of boa/oil narrative. Painting by Guillermo Jimenez 
According to this elder, she has lost two adult family members and two 
 
grandchildren to oil-related violence. Her household and those of her extended family sit 
near one of the hundreds of oil platforms located on Oil Block 12. She explains that some 
years ago, she decided to separate her extended family and the territory they occupy from 
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the Pañacocha community, forming a new community called Santa Elena. She did this to 
avoid getting involved in oil politics dominated by the men who had been coopted by the 
National Oil Company. According to her, most of the oil benefits from the oil platform 
located in her backyard were not fairly distributed among families and were frequently 
appropriated by leaders; thus, she decided her extended family was numerous enough to 
start a new community and mediate oil benefits by themselves. 
Further analysis of this narrative reveals that oil politics are integral to indigenous 
 
– nature relations in Santa Elena. This elder explains the river connects the Kichwa with 
the underworld, which is a side of reality where large cities, electricity, roads, and human 
noises overwhelm the noises of the forest. Thus, the underworld represents the body of 
western civilization, represented by the Ecuadorian state, wage and forced labor, 
productivity, and profit accumulation. As this Kichwa leader explained "to arrive at the 
city, you either travel by boat and road, or you can travel through the underworld. . . 
which is under the river on the other side.” 
She refers to the boa as one of the most powerful forest beings. Its spirit inhabits 
only powerful realms such as the great Napo River or the oil streams that navigate the 
subsoil: “the boa can live in water and on the ground. It can kill the jaguar and the 
Kichwa; the boa is as powerful as oil is. Oil can also kill the jaguar and the Kichwa, like 
blood, oil it circulates the subsoil, and when it reaches the surface, it overwhelms the 
Kichwa with mestizo ideology . . . the boa takes children away, sometimes it kills them, 
and sometimes it just takes them away.” Thus, the boa represents the power that oil has to 
alienate indigenous people when used as a natural resource for capital accumulation. 
According to the elder, shamans who serve the interests of families that benefit from oil 
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extraction are behind this violence; she thinks that these families have decided to fully 
adopt a mestizo ideology and are only interested in the money that oil has brought to 
communities. 
As the female collaborator from Tzawata listened to this elder, she asked why 
women had not denounced these deaths or why they had not organized so they could 
fight back against local leaders, the oil company and the state as women have done in 
Tzawata. The elder, along with other women who conversed with us, argued that they 
engage in daily denunciation of violence, as the repetition of these narratives constitutes a 
reflection of daily experience and shared denunciation. Still, this elder and my Kichwa 
collaborator knew that these stories were no more than constitutive parts of the body of 
knowledge that Kichwa women use and that such knowledge had no authority to be heard 
among actors such as the state and the oil company. 
Indeed, out of 12 narratives collected during research, at least five of them are 
well-known among most communities living along the Napo River in Oil Block 12. My 
collaborator and I followed these stories by conversing with women who were familiar 
with the main characters in the narratives. Widespread knowledge of these narratives is 
the outcome of women’s networks in which they visit each other and discuss violence 
taking place in their communities and households. For example, a woman from 
Pañacocha explained that she visits her extended family at least once a week: 
“I bring chicha to share with my sisters and we talk, sing and work together. . . the 
singing and talking helps to get rid of the sadness, but it also helps us to 
remember. . . Sometimes we talk about our husbands, sometimes we talk about 
our children, sometimes we talk about our chacras (domestic crops), we also talk 
about leaders and we criticize leaders’ wrongdoings. . .” 
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At that moment, an elder woman added “we all know because we all share with 
each other, there cannot be secrets when we are not the only ones paying attention,” 
implying that other beings in the forest witness oil extraction and violence. Thus, this 
knowledge goes beyond female narration and is also shared with natural beings such as 
the boa. 
During my conversations with families and women, I collected similar stories that 
portray violence. Stories tell narratives that include destruction of property, deaths, rapes 
and inexplicable illnesses associated to the payment of oil-related compensations, oil 
contamination and competition between families seeking to secure contracts and jobs 
with the oil company. I went further and tried to obtain data about these crimes from state 
officials. When asking the police about the disappearance of the six-year-old, they told 
me: "you cannot believe these stories; what happens here is that these people are savages 
and they take matters into their own hands, and we could do nothing even if we had 
evidence." A doctor at the health center told me they do not have the resources to perform 
autopsies, nor do they have the resources to diagnose certain unknown illnesses in the 
area. A former employee of the oil company who had worked teaching families on how 
to produce crops for the markets said these events are common along the Napo River and 
that “they are manifestations of the wild character of the forest; this will all end when the 
state fully enforces law and order.” Another oil employee working on health programs 
told me that "violence and deaths are matters internal to the indigenous community, and 
that the oil company cannot intervene in indigenous affairs." These responses illustrate 
how state officials and public servants reinforce colonial violence; their accounts portray 
indigenous knowledge as feminine, a-historical and even mythical in comparison to 
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western knowledge. Such prejudice diminishes the authority these accounts carry and 
undermines, ignores and eventually eliminates indigenous epistemologies. 
As we can see, the recent expansion of state institutions, state services, oil 
infrastructure, and oil compensations generate competition among families that reinforces 
the nature-culture divide as well as gendered and racialized power relations. Indigenous 
ontologies and epistemologies that define the relationship between the community and 
their environment present an obstacle to the expansion of the state and oil extraction; 
thus, colonial hierarchical orders are further inscribed, targeting body-territories and the 
epistemologies they engender. Thus, the systemic erasure of indigenous ontologies and 
epistemologies is critical in justifying systemic violence and enforcing assimilation 
processes among indigenous populations. 
Conclusions 
 
This article adds to critical feminist geography by using the Latin American 
framework of MC in conversation with settler colonialism along with indigenous 
understandings of colonial intersectionality and epistemic violence to better understand 
the logic of elimination and assimilation used in recent legal and institutional frameworks 
furthered by state-led mining interest in the Amazon of Ecuador. 
Within post-colonial studies, MC is a Latin American framework that has been 
highly influential in understanding modern colonial relations; thus, it has shaped the 
writings of authors interested in understanding power dynamics between the state and 
subordinated groups such as indigenous people. This article has laid out recent changes in 
legal and institutional frameworks as the Ecuadorian state has decided to push the mining 
frontier further into the Amazon region, affecting indigenous people in particular. Recent 
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policies favor racial democracy and policies that seek national social inclusion, such as 
the mandatory use of mining profits in modernization and development programs 
targeting indigenous territories. Such policies find ambivalent responses amongst 
indigenous people who oppose, resist, negotiate, and might even embrace them if other 
survival strategies are unavailable. On the other hand, communities that oppose and resist 
mining have been criminalized and risk being forced out of their territories. 
In general, as other authors have shown, these policies reinforce hierarchical 
power relations organized around racial and gender logics that define the geographical 
and temporal position of heterogenous subjects across scales, where indigenous people 
and particularly women and children are the most marginalized. These power dynamics 
could also be understood by using Latour’s culture-nature divide in which subjects 
racialized as white are seen as closer to culture, while on the other hand indigenous and 
particularly women are seen as closer to nature. Between these two extremes, power 
dynamics produce social heterogeneity in which indigenous subjectivities are differently 
positioned in relation to the state. 
In an effort to make research accountable to indigenous needs, this study uses a 
collaborative examination of colonial power relations described above in three 
indigenous communities: Tzawata, Pañacocha, and Santa Elena. Thus, in addition to 
traditional research methods, I used collaborative research and analysis, in which female 
indigenous epistemologies have been shared among women who participated in research, 
allowing them a deeper understanding of the nature of mining violence and furthering 
conversations on how best indigenous women can respond to such violence in their own 
terms. 
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This paper brings modernity/coloniality in conversation with settler colonial 
logics of elimination to engage in a deeper reflection about what aspects of indigeneity 
are currently being targeted by state efforts to make space for mining activities. Women's 
narratives are central to understanding post-colonial intersectionality, violence and 
elimination in the context of the expansion of the mining frontier in the Amazon. Based 
on the few women’s narratives that this article has allowed these women and me to share, 
I suggest that accounting for elimination requires further discussion of racial democracy, 
resource nationalism and mestizaje, where the state encourages development and 
modernization paid with mining profits while also encouraging racial amalgamation, 
suggesting mestizo ways of life among indigenous people. Thus, processes of mestizaje 
do not only count as as racial mixing but as a process of colonial violence that seeks to 
eliminate indigenous traits, where violence is structural and self-inflicted as colonial 
power relations are present across heterogeneous social groups, including indigenous 
people. 
Thus, patriarchy, corporate interests, racism and gender violence, along with 
structural ways of violence, affect primarily indigenous traditional ways of relating to 
their environment and natural resources. Indigenous relations to their environment have 
been theorized by Latin-American scholars as ‘body-territory' to indicate the degree to 
which indigenous ways of understanding reality include intrinsic relations between 
indigenous bodies, their territories and other beings such as forests and the animals that 
inhabit their environments. Structural violence and internalized colonial power dynamics 
target body-territory relations to make space for mining and modernization. This is 
because Kichwa and female relations with nature get in the way of capitalism and state 
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logics that see extraction, accumulation, private property, and market dynamics as 
necessary for national development. 
I argue that women’s narratives reflect body-territory ontologies and 
epistemologies in ways that clearly specify the logics behind mining conflicts and 
violence; these narratives constitute knowledge of realities that denounce and expose 
state, corporate and patriarchal violence. In addition, these narratives are meant as 
warning signs about the negative effects of mining in a praxis in which these stories 
travel from mouth-to-mouth between communities replicating emotions of loss and fear. 
Indeed, the most important outcome of this research, according to women who 
collaborated with research, has been the praxis of exchanging stories, the exercise of 
denouncing violence and the expansion of resistance networks that use women’s 
narratives as a warning of the negative effects of mining. 
In addition, findings show that despite the richness of women's epistemologies, 
state institutions, mining companies, and larger society disqualify indigenous information 
by marking it as temporally a-historical and geographically as peripheral and savage. 
Thus, indigenous and particularly women's epistemologies and ontologies are 
disqualified even before they have the opportunity to be discussed with the state and 
broader society. This reality is particularly worrisome as epistemic erasure silences 






In this dissertation, I bring resource geography and post-colonial critique into 
conversation with political ecology to better understand how the expansion of oil 
extraction and state expansion into the Amazon of Ecuador affect: a) indigenous political 
participation and agency in the configuration of indigenous territories, b) indigenous 
livelihoods and c) indigenous understandings of violence and conflict produced by the 
increased presence of the state and extractive activities. These research objectives have 
responded to indigenous needs to access specialized information and resources in order to 
increase their autonomy and self-determination in their territories. At the same time, 
research findings contribute theoretically to a better understanding of the relationship 
between hydrocarbons, racism and struggles over territory and autonomy within the field 
of political ecology. In this section I provide a brief overview of research methods, a 
summary of the main empirical and theoretical finding in each chapter, a summary of the 
contributions of the dissertation and a discussion about future areas of inquiry. 
Research methods 
 
Theoretical findings are built upon empirical collection of data using traditional, 
collaborative and participatory research methods. Research questions were drawn from 
preliminary fieldwork conducted in 2013 and 2015 with indigenous leaders and 
communities from the Amazon of Ecuador. To complete fieldwork, I spent seven and a 
half months between 2017 and 2018, two research assistants helped with the collection of 
data for two months on the field, and a female indigenous collaborator accompanied me 
in the field for another two months. The research methods I used were participant 
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observation, interviews, semi-structured interviews, focus groups and a collaborative 
research method I called female epistemological exchange; this method was aimed at 
facilitating conversations related to mining and oil-related violence among indigenous 
women. Analysis of data required frequency analysis and content analysis, and for 
collaborative analysis, I invited indigenous women to further discuss their subjectivity in 
relation to their experiences with mining- and oil-related violence. The discussions were 
guided by a method that questions subjectivity in relation to power, which was suggested 
in The Methodology of the Oppressed by Chela Sandoval. 
Theoretical and empirical findings 
 
Theoretical and empirical findings are divided into three chapters of this 
dissertation. In chapter three, Post-neoliberal Legibility and Indigenous Oil Conflicts in 
the Amazon of Ecuador, I illustrate that state-led efforts to increase control over 
territories and people in the Amazon has led to changes in mining legislation and 
institutional frameworks. These changes seek to make territory, oil resources and people 
legible to the state and the national oil company in order to facilitate surface access to oil 
deposits as well as to create conditions that facilitate the construction of oil infrastructure. 
One of the most important changes in mining legislation is the redistribution of oil profits 
as compensation among indigenous and rural communities in addition to the legal 
recognition of ancestral indigenous land in exchange for indigenous cooperation with 
mining activities and indigenous participation in decision-making process as related to 
how compensations will be redistributed and used. 
By using the case study of the indigenous community of Pañacocha and after 
reviewing Ecuadorian legislation and the rulings that guide territorial administration in 
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the Amazon, I argue that processes that define the redistribution of mining and oil profits, 
as well as process through which the state decides which land should be legalized, 
respond to state’s ‘volumetric knowledge.’ Volumetric knowledge is knowledge related 
to the location of oil deposits, the quality and volume of oil deposits, as well as 
knowledge about what infrastructure is key to facilitate circulation of oil through 
pipelines, among others. Therefore, indigenous struggles to secure land and access to oil 
related compensations also rely on accessing, understanding and controlling volumetric 
knowledge produced by the state and the oil industry. 
Understanding volumetric knowledge, legislation and institutional frameworks 
allow indigenous people to successfully navigate the bureaucratic apparatus that permits 
them to lobby in favor of indigenous interests. At the same time, such specialized 
knowledge becomes a contested space of struggle that can easily be coopted by state and 
corporate interests seeking to further the oil frontier. Thus, the uneven ways in which 
indigenous communities access volumetric knowledge also generates divisions and 
conflicts, specifically unequal participation in decision-making process and the unequal 
redistribution of oil related compensations. 
In chapter four of the dissertation Reclaiming marginality: Forests Livelihood 
response to oil extraction and state-led development in the Amazon of Ecuador, I use a 
livelihoods strategies analysis to better understand local response to the loss of lands and 
livelihoods in Pañacocha, a process that has been well documented in communities 
throughout the Amazon where the state has furthered the oil frontier. Specifically, I 
document current livelihood strategies among Pañacocha’s families and compare them 
with living conditions present 12 years ago. I do this to assess how state-led 
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modernization, development as well as payment of cash-based oil compensations affect 
the families in Pañacocha. 
Other studies have argued that local response to the expansion of mining in 
peripheries of extraction can be understood by the willingness to cooperate in aims to 
improve the ability of the community to control how their livelihoods will change. 
However, resistance and imposition of mining and oil activities are also well 
documented. In cases such as Pañacocha, where leaders have agreed to cooperate with oil 
extraction, I suggest that families’ response cannot be generalized as one that embraces 
extraction, modernization and development; instead, I provide evidence to argue that the 
population partially embraces some aspects of state and oil intervention while rejecting 
others. 
Indeed, peripheric populations such as Pañacocha are aware of their historic 
marginality in relation to the state, in which subjectivities don’t identify themselves as 
part of state projects that seek modernization and but not as complete outsiders either. 
Therefore, I argue that Pañacocha engages in tactical subjectivity, a concept developed by 
Chela Sandoval in her book the Methodology of the Oppressed, to explain how 
marginalized subjects make decisions depending on multiple positionalities as far as it 
helps survival strategies. Thus, Pañacocha families resist, embrace, cooperate, and reject 
simultaneously different aspects of modernization, development and oil politics. 
Finally, I suggest that tactical subjectivity should complement current understandings of 
livelihood strategies, especially in peripheries of extraction where families have to make 
practical decisions in short periods of time in order to maintain living standards according 
to their own views of what counts as quality of life. 
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In chapter five of this dissertation, Mining as Epistemic Violence: Erasure of 
Indigenous Epistemologies in the Amazon Region of Ecuador, I bring attention to 
indigenous voices and narratives as they make sense of mining violence in peripheries of 
extraction. To achieve this, I draw from post-colonial critique, settler colonial notions of 
elimination and fieldwork in three Kichwa communities - Tzawata, Pañacocha and Santa 
Elenea - to better understand the mechanisms that silence indigenous explanation and 
denunciation of violence in peripheries of extraction. 
Resource nationalism is a concept that explains how Ecuador promotes 
participation in economic development through the social redistribution of nationalized 
mining profits. This agenda is usually supported by the mestizo society which is the 
hegemonic racial group that benefits from safety nets, modernization and development 
paid for with mining profits. Policies that democratize access to oil profits also target 
indigenous people living in extractive sites, but these policies seek to modernize 
indigenous and rural ways of life, creating conflicts among populations who disagree 
about the extent to which modern lifestyles are coherent with traditional ones. 
Using post-colonial critique and indigenous voices, I make space for indigenous 
female voices that make sense of resource nationalism and the ways extraction affects 
them. Specifically, indigenous women expose how racism and patriarchy is structurally 
imposed but also reproduced among populations which are not isolated but immersed in 
colonial power dynamics. I use settler colonial notions of elimination and cultural 
mestizaje to show how power dynamics enforced by resource nationalism threaten 
indigenous relations with their territories and natural resources, a relation that has being 
theorized as body-territory. 
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Body-territory not only makes sense of the relation between human and non- 
human beings such as rivers, animals and the forest for the purpose of survival, but it also 
explains how indigenous people understand non-human beings as agents in the making of 
indigenous reality. Therefore, when indigenous people explain mining and oil-related 
violence using their own ontologies, they narrate and denounce violence in ways in which 
the nature – culture division is blurred. 
I argue that resource nationalism, in the context of mining extraction, seeks to 
eliminate body-territory ontologies to undermine local explanations and denunciation of 
violence. This is achieved as state officials and broader society deem indigenous 
narrations of conflict and violence as peripheric to western knowledge, a-historical and 
savage. Thus, indigenous explanations of violence are disqualified even before they have 
the opportunity to be heard and discussed. This reality is particularly worrisome as 
epistemic erasure silences dispossession of land, loss of livelihoods, deaths and illnesses 
caused by the state and oil extraction compensations while enforcing and naturalizing 
resource nationalism. 
Contributions and significance of the dissertation 
 
My dissertation has contributed to the field of political ecology, resource 
geography and post-colonial studies in the following ways: a) it adds ‘volumetric 
knowledge’ to the analysis of indigenous – state struggles to access and secure territory 
and natural resources within political ecology; b) it suggests that ‘tactical subjectivity’ 
should be included in the analyzes of livelihoods strategies, especially in peripheric 
territories under pressure to adapt to state intervention and extractive activities and, c) it 
adds ‘epistemic elimination’ to current understandings of resource nationalism to better 
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By volumetric knowledge, I have referred to technical knowledge pertaining 
location, volume and materiality of mining resources such as oil as well as 
understandings of the infrastructure necessary to assure circulation of such resources. I 
coin ‘volumetric knowledge’ after Stuart Elden’s conceptualizations of vertical territory 
and Gavin Bridge’s elaborations of volume a metric that informs governance. In this 
sense, I argue that volumetric knowledge is becoming a contested space of struggle 
among indigenous populations that have decided to participate in mining extractive 
activities as a way to increase autonomy in their territories. 
Understanding volumetric knowledge in the context of indigenous – state 
struggles to access and secure land and resources responds to recent calls made by 
political ecologists Anthony Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury in Subterranean Struggles to 
better understand how underground resources shape political economy in Latin America 
without resorting to resource determinism. Moreover, in the book Subterranean States, 
resource geographers and political ecologists Hanna Appel, Arthur Mason, Michael 
Watts and Matt Huber have identified that what is missing is scholarly attention to the 
biopolitical consequences that underground resources have in shaping lifestyles, 
structures of governance, jurisdiction and surveillance. Thus, volumetric knowledge 
could include all aspects of mining resources including toxicity, geological information 
as related to the location of resources and even security concerns. This information 
extends as far as it is important for marginal stakeholders who need this information to 
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better sit at the table of negotiation whether with states, corporate power, regulatory 
agencies and non-governmental organizations among others 
Tactical Subjectivity and Livelihoods 
 
By tactical subjectivity, I have referred to the ability that populations, considered 
as marginal to the state, have to act on survival strategies that dance between partial 
embracement and rejection of imposed modernizing and development models paid for 
with mining profits. I borrow tactical subjectivity from Chela Sandoval’s Methodology of 
the Oppressed to show that the marginal location of subjects concerning oppressive forms 
of power allow subjects ability to move between positionalities according to material 
need while also reconfiguring local understandings of what counts as the quality of life. 
I suggest that tactical subjectivity should inform current understandings of 
livelihood strategies in peripheries of extraction to better understand how marginalized 
populations respond and adapt to the negative effects of extractive activities and state 
intervention. This is an important contribution to better understanding local response to 
the mining expansion, especially because according to a number of authors such Emma 
Gilberthorpe and Gavin Hilson’s work on Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous 
Livelihoods, studies on adaptation usually focus on climate change stressors, large scale 
agriculture and renewable resources, giving little attention to the mining sector. 
Moreover, scholars report that studies focused on local response using a livelihood’s 
perspective are minimal. 
Thus, by bringing postcolonial understandings of tactical subjectivity to 
understand local rural and indigenous response using a livelihood’s framework adds to 
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political ecology’s ability to better understand in what ways and how fast peripheral 
populations are responding to the intensification of mining activities in Latin America. 
Epistemic Elimination and Resource Nationalism 
Although hispano-phone post-colonial studies and critical geographers studying 
race have time explored power relations embedded in race and at the intersections of 
race, gender and class differences for a long, there has been little conversation between 
these disciplines and anglo-phone political ecology interested in the distribution of 
environmental conflicts. In recent years, scholars such as Sharlene Mollet and Caroline 
Faria have critiqued political ecology with articles such as Messing with Gender in 
Political Ecology, in which they suggest that the field has avoided treating race and 
racism in a critical way when exploring the links between gender and other types of 
differences and their relation to environmental conflicts. Similarly, in recent 
contributions, critical geographer Laura Pulido, in a series of articles exploring 
Geographies of Race and Ethnicity, concludes that lack of engagement with race within 
geography as a discipline might be the result of the lack of diversity in the field, a factor 
that makes scholars uncomfortable to engage with power relations from a self-reflective 
perspective in which race and racism are explored. 
In this dissertation, I use my positionality as a woman of color to engage with the 
racism embedded in indigenous struggles for self-determination in a context of mining 
extraction. To achieve this, I have used settler colonial theory that explains racial 
elimination and anthropological work that identifies ontological differences between 
western and non-western knowers. Based on this previous work, I argue that epistemic 
elimination explains ongoing process of marginalization, racialization and elimination 
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taking place in the application of resource nationalist policies and discourses in Ecuador 
and the region. By using epistemic elimination, I show how resource nationalism 
undermines and eliminates indigenous and rural knowledge while empowering western 
ones in peripheries of extraction; thus, I unveil the racist character of extractive policies. I 
suggest that epistemic elimination is a useful concept to better understand the ways in 
which violence is applied to indigenous producers of non-western ontologies that 
denounce the conflict and violence generated by the expansion of mining frontiers. 
In addition, I also contribute to decolonial scholarship within geography, given 
that I use collaborative and participatory methods aimed at making research useful to 
indigenous concerns while legitimizing indigenous voices within academia. Thus, I 
respond to the call of political ecologists interested in better understanding conflicts 
associated with underground resources who have made calls to make political ecology 
useful to social policy and marginalized populations, transcending academic production 
that seeks social justice. This call has been clear in publications such as Peter Walker’s 
Political Ecology: Where is the policy, and Jeffrey Bury and Anthony Bebbington’s 
introduction to the book Subterranean Struggles, among many others. It also responds to 
recent calls from critical geographers such as Lindsay Naylor, Michelle Daile, Sofia 
Zaragocín and Marietta Ramírez to decolonize political ecology by engaging in anti- 
colonial efforts and by including marginalized populations in the production of 
knowledge. Thus, in addition to using participatory and collaborative methods, in this 
dissertation I use indigenous female narratives and female analysis as theory in its own 
right as I explore epistemic elimination and power dynamics in the context of mining 
extraction. 
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The Policy Question 
 
Activist-scholars such as Carlos Mazabanda, Penelope Anthias, Mark Becker and 
Arturo Escobar have studied the friction that arises as states try to incorporate indigenous 
populations into economic markets and western culture. They have pointed to the fact 
that state and corporate interests have historically prevented indigenous people from 
pursuing full self-determination despite the fact that international conventions such as the 
International Labor Organization 169, state constitutions and domestic legal frameworks 
protect indigenous rights to territory and self-determination based on ethnic differences in 
countries like Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia. Thus, research results in this dissertation 
illustrate, once again, the limitations of social inclusive policies, this time a type of 
inclusion based on mining nationalism. 
Solutions proposed by Confederation of Indigenous People of Ecuador 
(CONAIE) since the 1990s have called for the right to live according to what indigenous 
people consider their quality of life, along with the right to govern indigenous territories 
on their own terms. Indeed, changes in the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution were aimed at 
fulfilling these aspirations. Specifically, states’ acknowledgement of indigenous people 
and culture as rightful citizenship subjects and traits, and the recognition of nature’s 
rights were aimed at providing the legal infrastructure to empower indigenous self- 
determination and protect natural resources located in national parks, protected areas and 
indigenous territories from extractive activities. Still, as I illustrate in this dissertation, 
state-led modernization and racial democracy have historically been at odds with 
indigenous aspirations, either because the state sees such aspirations as separatist efforts, 
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or because the state frames indigenous logics and aspirations as non-western and, 
therefore, as an obstacle to the trajectory of national development. 
Still, the indigenous movement in Ecuador has been clear in identifying that what 
is at stake is true redistribution of power and equal participation of indigenous people in 
national life as clearly explained by the latest indigenous Women’s Mandate presented to 
the government of Ecuador in March of 2018. In their mandate, indigenous Amazon 
women reject extractive activities and command the state to enforce existing laws. In the 
context of this dissertation, enforcing existing laws requires sharing economic and 
political power with indigenous people; thus they should be consulted about extractive 
activities in their territories prior to extraction. If they freely agree with extraction, they 
should be given the means to participate in the planning of extractives activities as 
regulated under the Mining Law and the Territory Organization Law, amongst other laws. 
Equal participation in the process would require making highly specialized knowledge 
such as volumetric information available to indigenous people who would require this 
knowledge to better negotiate the terms under which extraction takes place. 
In this sense, states such as Ecuador refuse to implement international 
conventions and constitutional mandates to protect economic and political interests, 
reflecting contradictions along with class and racial fractures within the Ecuadorian 
society. It is precisely in the drafting and implementation of secondary laws that most of 
the contradictions are found because laws seek indigenous inclusion only as a tool to 
secure consent to further the extractive frontier, while economic and political 




Future areas of inquiry identified either in empirical findings not included in this 
dissertation or during analysis include: 
First, a more rigorous analysis of volumetric knowledge as a site of contestation 
among indigenous and rural populations which have agreed to mining extraction in 
exchange for redistribution of mining profits is required. In chapter three of this 
dissertation, I present information that shows that a recent increase in rural land titles 
coincides with the expansion of mining activities. Therefore, it is be important to assess 
the nature of environmental and land conflicts among communities that received land in 
exchange for their cooperation with mining activities. 
Specifically, I was able to identify that 123 communal land titles have been 
granted to indigenous communities in the last ten years; 82 of them are located in the 
Amazon Region. Future studies could survey the nature of environmental and land 
conflicts either in all these territories or a sample of them. Land and environmental 
conflicts are usually tracked by documentation as communities negotiate with the state, 
such documentation reveals what type of information indigenous people require to make 
their arguments legible to the state as in the case of volumetric knowledge. This 
information is important to indigenous politics as well as to inform political ecology’s 
interest in the materiality of mining resources and its relationship with politics on the 
ground. 
Second, more information is needed to better understand how livelihoods change 
in response to the expansion of the state in peripheries of extraction. This dissertation, for 
instance, does not cover local response to the presence of state-led education or to state- 
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led health services. Still, these services have been widely expanded throughout the 
Amazon among communities that are currently cooperating with oil extraction. Education 
is particularly important to explore as it could shape present and future’s generations 
views of how they want to respond and adapt to mining extraction and state efforts to 
modernize traditional ways of life. 
In addition, a more systemic evaluation of how livelihoods strategies are changing 
among community’s participation in mining extraction is required throughout the 
Amazon. Quantitative analysis could better explain the degree to and the speed at which 
rural livelihoods are changing. This information might be particularly important for 
policy makers but also for indigenous organizations worried about survival. 
Third, much more work in needed to understand violence in peripheries of 
extraction, especially because violence is ignored and unacknowledged by the state as 
this dissertation shows. Thus, quantitative along with qualitative studies are needed to 
account for violence. I would suggest surveying and mapping deaths, disappearances and 
rapes in communities where mining extraction takes place using official and unofficial 
accounts. For transparency and accountability, I would also suggest involving indigenous 
people to collect information. This information could portray a better picture of the most 
damaging aspects of mining in peripheral areas of extraction and could be used for 
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